ccf8f4a97d
Gap #4 RESOLVED: audit/test_exploit_ethereum_differential.cpp — 10 tests / 15 sub-checks against go-ethereum, web3.py, ethers.js reference vectors (address derivation KAT, ecrecover, EIP-191, EIP-155, eth_personal_sign, keccak256 KAT, tamper detection). Gap #7 RESOLVED: audit/test_fuzz_musig2_frost.cpp — 15 tests / 16 sub-checks (MuSig2 key_agg / nonce_agg / partial_verify / partial_sig_agg, FROST keygen_finalize / sign / verify_partial / aggregate, schnorr + ecdsa adaptor, boundary n_signers=0 → error). ClusterFuzzLite expanded to 5 targets: + cpu/fuzz/fuzz_ecdsa.cpp (ECDSA sign→verify invariants, parse_compact_strict) + cpu/fuzz/fuzz_schnorr.cpp (BIP-340 sign→verify, adversarial from_bytes verify) Gap #5/#6 PARTIALLY RESOLVED: OpenCL now wires zk_knowledge_verify_batch, zk_dleq_verify_batch, bip324_aead_encrypt_batch, bip324_aead_decrypt_batch. bulletproof_verify_batch: PARITY-EXCEPTION (no WNAF multi-scalar on OpenCL). Metal: stubs documented with PARITY-EXCEPTION / TODO(parity) markers.
75 lines
2.9 KiB
C++
75 lines
2.9 KiB
C++
// ============================================================================
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// Fuzz target: ECDSA sign / verify cycle
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//
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// Input layout (64 bytes):
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// bytes 0-31 : private key (raw big-endian; reduced mod n internally)
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// bytes 32-63 : message hash (32 bytes, treated as opaque)
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//
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// Invariants checked:
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// 1. sign → verify produces true
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// 2. sign → verify with wrong hash produces false
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// 3. sign → verify with adversarial (random) signature produces false
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// (or accept only if a brute-force collision happened -- astronomically rare)
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// 4. parse_compact_strict rejects out-of-range (r,s) byte sequences without crash
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// ============================================================================
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#include <cstdint>
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#include <cstring>
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#include <array>
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#include "secp256k1/ecdsa.hpp"
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#include "secp256k1/scalar.hpp"
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#include "secp256k1/point.hpp"
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using secp256k1::fast::Scalar;
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using secp256k1::fast::Point;
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using secp256k1::ECDSASignature;
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extern "C" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
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if (size < 64) return 0;
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std::array<uint8_t, 32> key_buf{};
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std::array<uint8_t, 32> msg_buf{};
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std::memcpy(key_buf.data(), data, 32);
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std::memcpy(msg_buf.data(), data + 32, 32);
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// Build private key scalar (reduced mod n -- from_bytes clamps internally)
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auto priv = Scalar::from_bytes(key_buf);
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// Zero key: sign should return a zero sentinel; no crash.
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if (priv.is_zero()) {
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auto sig = secp256k1::ecdsa_sign(msg_buf, priv);
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// Just ensure no crash. A zero-key signature is the known failure sentinel.
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(void)sig;
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return 0;
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}
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// Derive public key
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auto pub = Point::generator().scalar_mul(priv);
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if (pub.is_infinity()) return 0; // shouldn't happen for non-zero priv, but guard
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// -- Invariant 1: sign → verify produces true ----------------------------
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auto sig = secp256k1::ecdsa_sign(msg_buf, priv);
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bool ok = secp256k1::ecdsa_verify(msg_buf, pub, sig);
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if (!ok) __builtin_trap();
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// -- Invariant 2: flipped first byte of message → verify must reject -----
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std::array<uint8_t, 32> wrong_msg = msg_buf;
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wrong_msg[0] ^= 0xFF;
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bool ok_wrong = secp256k1::ecdsa_verify(wrong_msg, pub, sig);
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if (ok_wrong) __builtin_trap();
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// -- Invariant 3: parse_compact_strict on raw fuzzer bytes (no crash) ----
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// We feed the raw 64-byte input as a "compact" sig to the strict parser.
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// The parser must not crash; it may return false for out-of-range inputs.
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ECDSASignature parsed{};
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(void)ECDSASignature::parse_compact_strict(data, parsed);
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// -- Invariant 4: normalise is idempotent --------------------------------
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auto norm1 = sig.normalize();
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auto norm2 = norm1.normalize();
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// Both should verify against the original message and pubkey
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if (!secp256k1::ecdsa_verify(msg_buf, pub, norm1)) __builtin_trap();
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if (!secp256k1::ecdsa_verify(msg_buf, pub, norm2)) __builtin_trap();
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return 0;
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}
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