fix: resolve all 213 code-scanning alerts + N-03 CT path for message signing
- bip39.cpp: fix 45 alerts (const-correctness, braces-around-stmts, init-vars, cert-err33-c) - zk.cpp: fix 25 alerts (const-correctness, braces-around-stmts) - ufsecp_impl.cpp: fix 72 alerts (braces, const, modernize-auto, init-vars, implicit-widening) - message_signing.cpp: N-03 security fix (use ct::ecdsa_sign_recoverable on CT path) - ct_sign.cpp + ct/sign.hpp: add ct::ecdsa_sign_recoverable implementation - compat/libsecp256k1_shim: add secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable + secp256k1_ecdsa_recover - SECURITY.md: Q-07 Known Non-CT Exceptions table with fix status - Other alert files: address.cpp, coin_address.cpp, eth_signing.cpp, wallet.cpp, test_bip39.cpp, test_ethereum.cpp, test_wallet.cpp, test_zk.cpp, test_ffi_round_trip.cpp
This commit is contained in:
Vano Chkheidze
GitHub
parent
a4d5742df9
commit
c38b659b06
10
SECURITY.md
10
SECURITY.md
@ -160,6 +160,16 @@ The CT layer uses no secret-dependent branches or memory access patterns. It car
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**Important**: The default (non-CT) operations prioritize performance and are NOT constant-time. Use the `ct::` variants when processing secret keys or nonces.
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### Known Non-CT Exceptions (Q-Series)
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The following functions are documented exceptions where a `fast::` code path was historically used in a secret-key context. Each has been assigned a tracking ID; the fix status is noted.
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| ID | Function | Issue | Status |
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|----|----------|-------|--------|
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| Q-07 | `::ecdsa_sign_recoverable()` in `recovery.cpp` | Called by `bitcoin_sign_message()` and the libsecp256k1 shim -- uses `fast::scalar_mul(k)` and `fast::scalar_inverse(k)` on the secret nonce, leaking timing information about k. Affects Sparrow Wallet, ECIES, Ethereum `personal_sign`, and any caller using the recovery-ID signing path. | **Fixed** -- `bitcoin_sign_message()` and `secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable()` now call `ct::ecdsa_sign_recoverable()` (added in `ct_sign.cpp`), which uses `ct::generator_mul()` for R=k\*G and `ct::scalar_inverse()` for k^{-1}. The variable-time `::ecdsa_sign_recoverable()` remains available for public-data contexts (address search, batch verification) but must not be called with a secret key. |
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**Rule**: any function that accepts or derives a private key or secret nonce -- including message-signing wrappers -- must route through `ct::`. Filing a new exception requires an explicit SECURITY.md entry before the code ships.
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### ECDSA & Schnorr
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- ECDSA: Deterministic nonces via RFC 6979 (no random nonce generation needed)
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@ -1051,9 +1051,8 @@ static void test_bip39_round_trip() {
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CHECK_OK(ufsecp_bip39_validate(ctx, mnemonic), "bip39_validate");
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// Invalid mnemonic
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CHECK(ufsecp_bip39_validate(ctx, "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon") != UFSECP_OK
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|| ufsecp_bip39_validate(ctx, "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon") == UFSECP_OK,
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"bip39_validate accepts or rejects known mnemonic");
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CHECK(ufsecp_bip39_validate(ctx, "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon") == UFSECP_OK,
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"bip39_validate accepts valid 12-word mnemonic");
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// To seed
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uint8_t seed[64];
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@ -1314,7 +1313,7 @@ static void test_btc_message_sign() {
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CHECK_OK(ufsecp_pubkey_create(ctx, priv, pub33), "btc_msg: pubkey");
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const uint8_t msg[] = "Hello, Bitcoin!";
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size_t msg_len = 15;
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const size_t msg_len = 15;
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// Message hash
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uint8_t hash[32];
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@ -1535,7 +1534,7 @@ static void test_adaptor_signatures() {
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uint8_t neg_point[33];
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CHECK_OK(ufsecp_pubkey_negate(ctx, extracted_point, neg_point),
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"negate extracted point");
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bool match = (std::memcmp(extracted_point, adaptor_point, 33) == 0) ||
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const bool match = (std::memcmp(extracted_point, adaptor_point, 33) == 0) ||
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(std::memcmp(neg_point, adaptor_point, 33) == 0);
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CHECK(match, "extracted secret matches adaptor (direct or negated)");
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@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ add_library(secp256k1_shim STATIC
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src/shim_extrakeys.cpp
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src/shim_seckey.cpp
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src/shim_tagged_hash.cpp
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src/shim_recovery.cpp
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)
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# Public includes -- exposes libsecp256k1-compatible headers
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87
compat/libsecp256k1_shim/include/secp256k1_recovery.h
Normal file
87
compat/libsecp256k1_shim/include/secp256k1_recovery.h
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
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#ifndef SECP256K1_RECOVERY_H
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#define SECP256K1_RECOVERY_H
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// ============================================================================
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// secp256k1_recovery.h -- libsecp256k1-compatible ECDSA recovery module
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// ============================================================================
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// Provides secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature, secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable,
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// and secp256k1_ecdsa_recover as a drop-in replacement for the corresponding
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// libsecp256k1 recovery module (include/secp256k1_recovery.h).
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//
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// Used by: ECIES implementations, Ethereum ecrecover, light clients that need
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// to recover the signer's public key from an (r, s, v) tuple without storing it.
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//
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// All signing uses the CT path (ct::ecdsa_sign_recoverable) internally -- the
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// nonce and private key are never processed by variable-time code.
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// ============================================================================
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#include "secp256k1.h"
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#ifdef __cplusplus
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extern "C" {
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#endif
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// -- Opaque recoverable signature type ----------------------------------------
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// Layout: [recid: 1 byte] [r: 32 bytes] [s: 32 bytes] = 65 bytes, zero-padded
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// to match libsecp256k1's 65-byte internal representation.
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typedef struct {
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unsigned char data[65];
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} secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature;
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// -- Parse / Serialize --------------------------------------------------------
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// Parse a compact (64-byte) recoverable signature.
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// recid must be 0, 1, 2, or 3.
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// Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
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int secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(
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const secp256k1_context *ctx,
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secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *sig,
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const unsigned char *input64,
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int recid);
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// Serialize a recoverable signature to compact (64 bytes) + output recid.
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// Returns 1 on success.
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int secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(
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const secp256k1_context *ctx,
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unsigned char *output64,
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int *recid,
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const secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *sig);
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// Convert a recoverable signature to a non-recoverable one (drops recid).
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// Returns 1 on success.
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int secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(
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const secp256k1_context *ctx,
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secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig,
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const secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *sigin);
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// -- Sign (recoverable) -------------------------------------------------------
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// Sign a 32-byte message hash and produce a recoverable signature.
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// Uses ct::ecdsa_sign_recoverable internally -- constant-time on privkey/nonce.
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// noncefp and ndata are accepted for ABI compatibility but ignored (RFC 6979 is
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// always used).
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// Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure (null args, zeroed privkey).
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int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(
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const secp256k1_context *ctx,
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secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *sig,
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const unsigned char *msghash32,
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const unsigned char *seckey,
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secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp,
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const void *ndata);
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// -- Recover public key -------------------------------------------------------
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// Recover the public key from a recoverable signature and the original message
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// hash. Needed by Ethereum ecrecover, ECIES, and light-client implementations.
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// Returns 1 if recovery succeeded, 0 otherwise.
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int secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(
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const secp256k1_context *ctx,
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secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
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const secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *sig,
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const unsigned char *msghash32);
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#ifdef __cplusplus
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}
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#endif
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#endif // SECP256K1_RECOVERY_H
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148
compat/libsecp256k1_shim/src/shim_recovery.cpp
Normal file
148
compat/libsecp256k1_shim/src/shim_recovery.cpp
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
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// ============================================================================
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// shim_recovery.cpp -- ECDSA sign-recoverable + public key recovery
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// ============================================================================
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// Implements the libsecp256k1 recovery module API using the internal
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// ct::ecdsa_sign_recoverable() (constant-time) and ecdsa_recover() (fast,
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// recovery is a public operation).
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// ============================================================================
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#include "secp256k1_recovery.h"
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#include <cstring>
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#include <array>
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#include "secp256k1/scalar.hpp"
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#include "secp256k1/point.hpp"
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#include "secp256k1/field.hpp"
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#include "secp256k1/recovery.hpp"
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#include "secp256k1/ct/sign.hpp"
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using namespace secp256k1::fast;
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// Internal helpers that mirror shim_ecdsa.cpp conventions ----------------
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static void point_to_pubkey_data(const Point& P, unsigned char data[64]) {
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auto unc = P.to_uncompressed(); // [0x04] [x:32] [y:32]
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std::memcpy(data, unc.data() + 1, 32); // x
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std::memcpy(data + 32, unc.data() + 33, 32); // y
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}
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// Recoverable sig opaque layout: data[0] = recid, data[1..32] = r, data[33..64] = s
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static void rsig_to_data(const secp256k1::RecoverableSignature& rsig,
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unsigned char data[65]) {
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data[0] = static_cast<unsigned char>(rsig.recid & 0x03);
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auto rb = rsig.sig.r.to_bytes();
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auto sb = rsig.sig.s.to_bytes();
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std::memcpy(data + 1, rb.data(), 32);
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std::memcpy(data + 33, sb.data(), 32);
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}
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static secp256k1::RecoverableSignature rsig_from_data(const unsigned char data[65]) {
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std::array<uint8_t, 32> rb{}, sb{};
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std::memcpy(rb.data(), data + 1, 32);
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std::memcpy(sb.data(), data + 33, 32);
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return {
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{ Scalar::from_bytes(rb), Scalar::from_bytes(sb) },
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static_cast<int>(data[0] & 0x03)
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};
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}
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extern "C" {
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// -- Parse / Serialize --------------------------------------------------------
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int secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(
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const secp256k1_context *ctx,
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secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *sig,
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const unsigned char *input64,
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int recid)
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{
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(void)ctx;
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if (!sig || !input64) return 0;
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if (recid < 0 || recid > 3) return 0;
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sig->data[0] = static_cast<unsigned char>(recid);
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std::memcpy(sig->data + 1, input64, 64);
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return 1;
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}
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int secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(
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const secp256k1_context *ctx,
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unsigned char *output64,
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int *recid,
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const secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *sig)
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{
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(void)ctx;
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if (!output64 || !recid || !sig) return 0;
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*recid = static_cast<int>(sig->data[0] & 0x03);
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std::memcpy(output64, sig->data + 1, 64);
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return 1;
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}
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int secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(
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const secp256k1_context *ctx,
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secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig,
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const secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *sigin)
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{
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(void)ctx;
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if (!sig || !sigin) return 0;
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// Non-recoverable sig is r||s (64 bytes); strip the recid byte.
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std::memcpy(sig->data, sigin->data + 1, 64);
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return 1;
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}
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// -- Sign (recoverable) -------------------------------------------------------
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int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(
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const secp256k1_context *ctx,
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secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *sig,
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const unsigned char *msghash32,
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const unsigned char *seckey,
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secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp,
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const void *ndata)
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{
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(void)ctx; (void)noncefp; (void)ndata;
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if (!sig || !msghash32 || !seckey) return 0;
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try {
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std::array<uint8_t, 32> msg{}, kb{};
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std::memcpy(msg.data(), msghash32, 32);
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std::memcpy(kb.data(), seckey, 32);
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auto privkey = Scalar::from_bytes(kb);
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if (privkey.is_zero()) return 0;
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// CT path: constant-time on privkey and nonce (N-03 fix).
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auto rsig = secp256k1::ct::ecdsa_sign_recoverable(msg, privkey);
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if (rsig.sig.r.is_zero()) return 0;
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rsig_to_data(rsig, sig->data);
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return 1;
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} catch (...) { return 0; }
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}
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// -- Recover public key -------------------------------------------------------
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int secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(
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const secp256k1_context *ctx,
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secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
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const secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *sig,
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const unsigned char *msghash32)
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{
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(void)ctx;
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if (!pubkey || !sig || !msghash32) return 0;
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try {
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std::array<uint8_t, 32> msg{};
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std::memcpy(msg.data(), msghash32, 32);
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auto rsig = rsig_from_data(sig->data);
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auto [pk, ok] = secp256k1::ecdsa_recover(msg, rsig.sig, rsig.recid);
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if (!ok || pk.is_infinity()) return 0;
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point_to_pubkey_data(pk, pubkey->data);
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return 1;
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} catch (...) { return 0; }
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}
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} // extern "C"
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@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
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#include <array>
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#include <cstdint>
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#include "secp256k1/ecdsa.hpp"
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#include "secp256k1/recovery.hpp"
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#include "secp256k1/schnorr.hpp"
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#include "secp256k1/private_key.hpp"
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#include "secp256k1/ct/point.hpp"
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@ -50,6 +51,28 @@ ECDSASignature ecdsa_sign_hedged_verified(const std::array<std::uint8_t, 32>& ms
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const fast::Scalar& private_key,
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const std::array<std::uint8_t, 32>& aux_rand);
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// -- CT ECDSA Sign with Recovery ID -------------------------------------------
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// Like ecdsa_sign() but also returns the recovery ID (0-3) needed for public key
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// recovery. Uses ct::generator_mul() for R=k*G and ct::scalar_inverse() for
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// k^{-1}: the private key and nonce remain constant-time throughout.
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//
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// Replaces the variable-time ::ecdsa_sign_recoverable() in all signing contexts
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// where a private key is involved (bitcoin_sign_message, Ethereum personal_sign,
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// and any Sparrow Wallet / ECIES integration using this library).
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//
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// Recovery ID extraction reads R.y parity from FieldElement::limbs()[0]&1 and
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// checks R.x overflow with a byte comparison -- neither branches on secret data.
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RecoverableSignature ecdsa_sign_recoverable(
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const std::array<std::uint8_t, 32>& msg_hash,
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const fast::Scalar& private_key);
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// PrivateKey overload.
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inline RecoverableSignature ecdsa_sign_recoverable(
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const std::array<std::uint8_t, 32>& msg_hash,
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const PrivateKey& private_key) {
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return ecdsa_sign_recoverable(msg_hash, private_key.scalar());
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}
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// -- CT ECDSA Sign (PrivateKey overload) --------------------------------------
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// Preferred overload: accepts strong-typed PrivateKey for compile-time safety.
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inline ECDSASignature ecdsa_sign(const std::array<std::uint8_t, 32>& msg_hash,
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@ -513,8 +513,7 @@ static std::uint64_t cashaddr_polymod(const std::vector<std::uint8_t>& v) {
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static std::vector<std::uint8_t> cashaddr_prefix_expand(const std::string& prefix) {
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std::vector<std::uint8_t> ret;
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ret.reserve(prefix.size() + 1);
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for (char c : prefix) ret.push_back(static_cast<std::uint8_t>(c & 0x1f));
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ret.push_back(0);
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for (const char c : prefix) ret.push_back(static_cast<std::uint8_t>(c & 0x1f)); ret.push_back(0);
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return ret;
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}
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@ -524,7 +523,7 @@ std::string cashaddr_encode(const std::array<std::uint8_t, 20>& hash,
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const std::string& prefix,
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std::uint8_t type) {
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// Version byte: type (0=P2PKH, 1=P2SH) in upper 4 bits, size=0 (=20 bytes) in lower 4
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std::uint8_t version_byte = static_cast<std::uint8_t>(type << 3);
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const auto version_byte = static_cast<std::uint8_t>(type << 3);
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// Payload: version_byte + 20-byte hash = 21 bytes
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std::uint8_t payload[21];
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@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ static bool csprng_fill(uint8_t* buf, size_t len) {
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#else
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FILE* f = std::fopen("/dev/urandom", "rb");
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if (!f) return false;
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bool ok = (std::fread(buf, 1, len, f) == len);
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std::fclose(f);
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const bool ok = (std::fread(buf, 1, len, f) == len);
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(void)std::fclose(f);
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return ok;
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#endif
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}
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@ -43,11 +43,14 @@ static int word_index(const char* word) {
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// Binary search in the sorted BIP-39 english wordlist
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int lo = 0, hi = 2047;
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while (lo <= hi) {
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int mid = lo + (hi - lo) / 2;
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int cmp = std::strcmp(word, detail::bip39_english[mid]);
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const int mid = lo + (hi - lo) / 2;
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const int cmp = std::strcmp(word, detail::bip39_english[mid]);
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if (cmp == 0) return mid;
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if (cmp < 0) hi = mid - 1;
|
||||
else lo = mid + 1;
|
||||
if (cmp < 0) {
|
||||
hi = mid - 1;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
lo = mid + 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -90,11 +93,12 @@ void pbkdf2_hmac_sha512(const uint8_t* password, size_t password_len,
|
||||
|
||||
for (uint32_t i = 1; i < iterations; ++i) {
|
||||
u = hmac_sha512(password, password_len, u.data(), u.size());
|
||||
for (size_t j = 0; j < 64; ++j)
|
||||
for (size_t j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
|
||||
result[j] ^= u[j];
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
size_t to_copy = std::min<size_t>(64, output_len - offset);
|
||||
const size_t to_copy = std::min<size_t>(64, output_len - offset);
|
||||
std::memcpy(output + offset, result.data(), to_copy);
|
||||
offset += to_copy;
|
||||
++block_num;
|
||||
@ -107,15 +111,17 @@ void pbkdf2_hmac_sha512(const uint8_t* password, size_t password_len,
|
||||
std::pair<std::string, bool>
|
||||
bip39_generate(size_t entropy_bytes, const uint8_t* entropy_in) {
|
||||
// Valid entropy sizes: 16, 20, 24, 28, 32 bytes
|
||||
if (entropy_bytes < 16 || entropy_bytes > 32 || (entropy_bytes % 4) != 0)
|
||||
if (entropy_bytes < 16 || entropy_bytes > 32 || (entropy_bytes % 4) != 0) {
|
||||
return {"", false};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
uint8_t entropy[32];
|
||||
if (entropy_in) {
|
||||
std::memcpy(entropy, entropy_in, entropy_bytes);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if (!csprng_fill(entropy, entropy_bytes))
|
||||
if (!csprng_fill(entropy, entropy_bytes)) {
|
||||
return {"", false};
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute SHA-256 checksum of entropy
|
||||
@ -123,32 +129,35 @@ bip39_generate(size_t entropy_bytes, const uint8_t* entropy_in) {
|
||||
|
||||
// Build the bit stream: entropy bits + checksum bits
|
||||
// checksum_bits = entropy_bytes * 8 / 32 = entropy_bytes / 4
|
||||
size_t entropy_bits = entropy_bytes * 8;
|
||||
size_t checksum_bits = entropy_bytes / 4;
|
||||
size_t total_bits = entropy_bits + checksum_bits;
|
||||
size_t word_count = total_bits / 11;
|
||||
const size_t entropy_bits = entropy_bytes * 8;
|
||||
const size_t checksum_bits = entropy_bytes / 4;
|
||||
const size_t total_bits = entropy_bits + checksum_bits;
|
||||
const size_t word_count = total_bits / 11;
|
||||
|
||||
// Extract 11-bit indices from the combined entropy+checksum bit stream
|
||||
std::string mnemonic;
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < word_count; ++i) {
|
||||
uint32_t index = 0;
|
||||
for (size_t b = 0; b < 11; ++b) {
|
||||
size_t bit_pos = i * 11 + b;
|
||||
uint8_t byte_val;
|
||||
if (bit_pos < entropy_bits)
|
||||
const size_t bit_pos = i * 11 + b;
|
||||
uint8_t byte_val = 0;
|
||||
if (bit_pos < entropy_bits) {
|
||||
byte_val = entropy[bit_pos / 8];
|
||||
else
|
||||
}
|
||||
else {
|
||||
byte_val = hash[(bit_pos - entropy_bits) / 8];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
size_t bit_in_byte = 7 - (bit_pos % 8);
|
||||
if (bit_pos >= entropy_bits) {
|
||||
size_t cs_bit = bit_pos - entropy_bits;
|
||||
const size_t cs_bit = bit_pos - entropy_bits;
|
||||
byte_val = hash[cs_bit / 8];
|
||||
bit_in_byte = 7 - (cs_bit % 8);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (byte_val & (1u << bit_in_byte))
|
||||
if (byte_val & (1u << bit_in_byte)) {
|
||||
index |= (1u << (10 - b));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (i > 0) mnemonic += ' ';
|
||||
@ -168,8 +177,9 @@ bool bip39_validate(const std::string& mnemonic) {
|
||||
auto words = split_words(mnemonic);
|
||||
|
||||
// Valid word counts: 12, 15, 18, 21, 24
|
||||
if (words.size() < 12 || words.size() > 24 || (words.size() % 3) != 0)
|
||||
if (words.size() < 12 || words.size() > 24 || (words.size() % 3) != 0) {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Look up each word index
|
||||
std::vector<int> indices(words.size());
|
||||
@ -179,26 +189,28 @@ bool bip39_validate(const std::string& mnemonic) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Reconstruct entropy + checksum bits
|
||||
size_t total_bits = words.size() * 11;
|
||||
size_t checksum_bits = words.size() / 3;
|
||||
size_t entropy_bits = total_bits - checksum_bits;
|
||||
size_t entropy_bytes = entropy_bits / 8;
|
||||
const size_t total_bits = words.size() * 11;
|
||||
const size_t checksum_bits = words.size() / 3;
|
||||
const size_t entropy_bits = total_bits - checksum_bits;
|
||||
const size_t entropy_bytes = entropy_bits / 8;
|
||||
|
||||
uint8_t entropy[32] = {};
|
||||
uint8_t checksum_byte = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < words.size(); ++i) {
|
||||
uint32_t idx = static_cast<uint32_t>(indices[i]);
|
||||
const auto idx = static_cast<uint32_t>(indices[i]);
|
||||
for (size_t b = 0; b < 11; ++b) {
|
||||
size_t bit_pos = i * 11 + b;
|
||||
bool bit_set = (idx >> (10 - b)) & 1;
|
||||
const size_t bit_pos = i * 11 + b;
|
||||
const bool bit_set = (idx >> (10 - b)) & 1;
|
||||
if (bit_pos < entropy_bits) {
|
||||
if (bit_set)
|
||||
if (bit_set) {
|
||||
entropy[bit_pos / 8] |= (1u << (7 - (bit_pos % 8)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
size_t cs_bit = bit_pos - entropy_bits;
|
||||
if (bit_set)
|
||||
const size_t cs_bit = bit_pos - entropy_bits;
|
||||
if (bit_set) {
|
||||
checksum_byte |= (1u << (7 - cs_bit));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -220,8 +232,9 @@ bip39_mnemonic_to_seed(const std::string& mnemonic,
|
||||
const std::string& passphrase) {
|
||||
std::array<uint8_t, 64> seed{};
|
||||
|
||||
if (mnemonic.empty())
|
||||
if (mnemonic.empty()) {
|
||||
return {seed, false};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// salt = "mnemonic" + passphrase
|
||||
std::string salt_str = "mnemonic" + passphrase;
|
||||
@ -243,8 +256,9 @@ bip39_mnemonic_to_entropy(const std::string& mnemonic) {
|
||||
Bip39Entropy ent{};
|
||||
|
||||
auto words = split_words(mnemonic);
|
||||
if (words.size() < 12 || words.size() > 24 || (words.size() % 3) != 0)
|
||||
if (words.size() < 12 || words.size() > 24 || (words.size() % 3) != 0) {
|
||||
return {ent, false};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
std::vector<int> indices(words.size());
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < words.size(); ++i) {
|
||||
@ -252,26 +266,28 @@ bip39_mnemonic_to_entropy(const std::string& mnemonic) {
|
||||
if (indices[i] < 0) return {ent, false};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
size_t total_bits = words.size() * 11;
|
||||
size_t checksum_bits = words.size() / 3;
|
||||
size_t entropy_bits = total_bits - checksum_bits;
|
||||
size_t entropy_bytes = entropy_bits / 8;
|
||||
const size_t total_bits = words.size() * 11;
|
||||
const size_t checksum_bits = words.size() / 3;
|
||||
const size_t entropy_bits = total_bits - checksum_bits;
|
||||
const size_t entropy_bytes = entropy_bits / 8;
|
||||
|
||||
uint8_t entropy[32] = {};
|
||||
uint8_t checksum_byte = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < words.size(); ++i) {
|
||||
uint32_t idx = static_cast<uint32_t>(indices[i]);
|
||||
const auto idx = static_cast<uint32_t>(indices[i]);
|
||||
for (size_t b = 0; b < 11; ++b) {
|
||||
size_t bit_pos = i * 11 + b;
|
||||
bool bit_set = (idx >> (10 - b)) & 1;
|
||||
const size_t bit_pos = i * 11 + b;
|
||||
const bool bit_set = (idx >> (10 - b)) & 1;
|
||||
if (bit_pos < entropy_bits) {
|
||||
if (bit_set)
|
||||
if (bit_set) {
|
||||
entropy[bit_pos / 8] |= (1u << (7 - (bit_pos % 8)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
size_t cs_bit = bit_pos - entropy_bits;
|
||||
if (bit_set)
|
||||
const size_t cs_bit = bit_pos - entropy_bits;
|
||||
if (bit_set) {
|
||||
checksum_byte |= (1u << (7 - cs_bit));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ std::string coin_address_cashaddr(const fast::Point& pubkey,
|
||||
auto compressed = pubkey.to_compressed();
|
||||
auto h160 = hash160(compressed.data(), compressed.size());
|
||||
|
||||
std::string prefix = testnet ? "bchtest" : "bitcoincash";
|
||||
const std::string prefix = testnet ? "bchtest" : "bitcoincash";
|
||||
return cashaddr_encode(h160, prefix, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
|
||||
#include "secp256k1/ct/sign.hpp"
|
||||
#include "secp256k1/ct/point.hpp"
|
||||
#include "secp256k1/ct/scalar.hpp"
|
||||
#include "secp256k1/recovery.hpp"
|
||||
#include "secp256k1/sha256.hpp"
|
||||
#include "secp256k1/tagged_hash.hpp"
|
||||
#include "secp256k1/config.hpp"
|
||||
@ -274,4 +275,81 @@ SchnorrSignature schnorr_sign_verified(const SchnorrKeypair& kp,
|
||||
return sig;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ============================================================================
|
||||
// CT ECDSA Sign with Recovery ID
|
||||
// ============================================================================
|
||||
// Uses ct::generator_mul() for R=k*G and ct::scalar_inverse() for k^{-1}.
|
||||
// Replaces the variable-time ::ecdsa_sign_recoverable() for all secret-key
|
||||
// signing paths (bitcoin_sign_message, Ethereum personal_sign, shim, ECIES).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Recovery ID computation:
|
||||
// bit 0 -- R.y parity via FieldElement::limbs()[0]&1 (no secret branch)
|
||||
// bit 1 -- R.x >= n overflow via constant-time byte comparison
|
||||
|
||||
RecoverableSignature ecdsa_sign_recoverable(
|
||||
const std::array<uint8_t, 32>& msg_hash,
|
||||
const Scalar& private_key) {
|
||||
|
||||
static const std::array<uint8_t, 32> ORDER_BYTES = {
|
||||
0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
|
||||
0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFE,
|
||||
0xBA,0xAE,0xDC,0xE6, 0xAF,0x48,0xA0,0x3B,
|
||||
0xBF,0xD2,0x5E,0x8C, 0xD0,0x36,0x41,0x41
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if (private_key.is_zero()) return {{Scalar::zero(), Scalar::zero()}, 0};
|
||||
|
||||
auto z = Scalar::from_bytes(msg_hash);
|
||||
|
||||
// Deterministic nonce (RFC 6979)
|
||||
auto k = rfc6979_nonce(private_key, msg_hash);
|
||||
if (k.is_zero()) return {{Scalar::zero(), Scalar::zero()}, 0};
|
||||
|
||||
// R = k * G -- CT path (data-independent execution trace)
|
||||
auto R = ct::generator_mul(k);
|
||||
if (R.is_infinity()) return {{Scalar::zero(), Scalar::zero()}, 0};
|
||||
|
||||
// r = R.x mod n
|
||||
auto r_fe = R.x();
|
||||
auto r_bytes = r_fe.to_bytes();
|
||||
auto r = Scalar::from_bytes(r_bytes);
|
||||
if (r.is_zero()) return {{Scalar::zero(), Scalar::zero()}, 0};
|
||||
|
||||
// Recovery ID bit 0: parity of R.y
|
||||
// Extract from normalized limbs[0] -- avoids full serialization and does
|
||||
// not branch on the secret nonce.
|
||||
int recid = 0;
|
||||
if ((R.y().limbs()[0] & 1u) != 0) recid |= 1;
|
||||
|
||||
// Recovery ID bit 1: whether R.x >= n (R.x overflowed the curve order).
|
||||
// Probability ~2^{-128}; byte-by-byte comparison of public r_bytes vs ORDER.
|
||||
bool overflow = false;
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
|
||||
if (r_bytes[i] < ORDER_BYTES[i]) break;
|
||||
if (r_bytes[i] > ORDER_BYTES[i]) { overflow = true; break; }
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (overflow) recid |= 2;
|
||||
|
||||
// s = k^{-1} * (z + r * d) mod n
|
||||
// CT inverse: SafeGCD Bernstein-Yang divsteps-59, constant-time.
|
||||
auto k_inv = ct::scalar_inverse(k);
|
||||
auto s = k_inv * (z + r * private_key);
|
||||
if (s.is_zero()) return {{Scalar::zero(), Scalar::zero()}, 0};
|
||||
|
||||
// CT low-S normalization (branchless).
|
||||
ECDSASignature pre_sig{r, s};
|
||||
bool const was_high = !pre_sig.is_low_s();
|
||||
ECDSASignature sig = ct::ct_normalize_low_s(pre_sig);
|
||||
// Negating s flips the R.y parity bit in the recovery ID.
|
||||
if (was_high) recid ^= 1;
|
||||
|
||||
// Erase all stack buffers that held secret-derived material.
|
||||
secure_erase(&k, sizeof(k));
|
||||
secure_erase(&k_inv, sizeof(k_inv));
|
||||
secure_erase(&z, sizeof(z));
|
||||
secure_erase(&s, sizeof(s));
|
||||
|
||||
return {sig, recid};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
} // namespace secp256k1::ct
|
||||
|
||||
@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
|
||||
namespace secp256k1::coins {
|
||||
|
||||
using fast::Scalar;
|
||||
using fast::Point;
|
||||
|
||||
// -- Decimal length encoding (no heap) ----------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
@ -93,8 +92,8 @@ ecrecover(const std::array<std::uint8_t, 32>& msg_hash,
|
||||
const std::array<std::uint8_t, 32>& s,
|
||||
std::uint64_t v) {
|
||||
// Parse r, s
|
||||
Scalar r_scalar = Scalar::from_bytes(r);
|
||||
Scalar s_scalar = Scalar::from_bytes(s);
|
||||
const Scalar r_scalar = Scalar::from_bytes(r);
|
||||
const Scalar s_scalar = Scalar::from_bytes(s);
|
||||
|
||||
if (r_scalar.is_zero() || s_scalar.is_zero()) {
|
||||
return {{}, false};
|
||||
|
||||
@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
|
||||
#include "secp256k1/coins/message_signing.hpp"
|
||||
#include "secp256k1/ecdsa.hpp"
|
||||
#include "secp256k1/recovery.hpp"
|
||||
#include "secp256k1/ct/sign.hpp"
|
||||
#include "secp256k1/hash_accel.hpp"
|
||||
#include <cstring>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -27,13 +28,15 @@ static std::size_t write_varint(std::uint8_t* out, std::uint64_t val) {
|
||||
return 3;
|
||||
} else if (val <= 0xFFFFFFFF) {
|
||||
out[0] = 0xFE;
|
||||
for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i)
|
||||
for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
|
||||
out[1 + i] = static_cast<std::uint8_t>((val >> (8 * i)) & 0xFF);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 5;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
out[0] = 0xFF;
|
||||
for (int i = 0; i < 8; ++i)
|
||||
for (int i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
|
||||
out[1 + i] = static_cast<std::uint8_t>((val >> (8 * i)) & 0xFF);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 9;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -62,7 +65,7 @@ std::array<std::uint8_t, 32> bitcoin_message_hash(const std::uint8_t* msg,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Total payload size
|
||||
std::size_t total = BITCOIN_MSG_PREFIX_LEN + varint_len + msg_len;
|
||||
const std::size_t total = BITCOIN_MSG_PREFIX_LEN + varint_len + msg_len;
|
||||
|
||||
// Stack buffer for small messages, heap for large
|
||||
constexpr std::size_t STACK_MAX = 512;
|
||||
@ -90,7 +93,9 @@ RecoverableSignature bitcoin_sign_message(const std::uint8_t* msg,
|
||||
std::size_t msg_len,
|
||||
const fast::Scalar& private_key) {
|
||||
auto hash = bitcoin_message_hash(msg, msg_len);
|
||||
return ecdsa_sign_recoverable(hash, private_key);
|
||||
// Use CT path: private key and RFC-6979 nonce must not leak via timing.
|
||||
// (Q-07: fast::ecdsa_sign_recoverable is variable-time on the nonce.)
|
||||
return ct::ecdsa_sign_recoverable(hash, private_key);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// -- Bitcoin Verify Message ---------------------------------------------------
|
||||
@ -149,8 +154,8 @@ static bool base64_decode(const std::string& b64, std::uint8_t* out, std::size_t
|
||||
|
||||
std::size_t out_idx = 0;
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < b64.size(); i += 4) {
|
||||
int a = base64_char_value(b64[i]);
|
||||
int b = base64_char_value(b64[i + 1]);
|
||||
const int a = base64_char_value(b64[i]);
|
||||
const int b = base64_char_value(b64[i + 1]);
|
||||
int c = (b64[i + 2] == '=') ? 0 : base64_char_value(b64[i + 2]);
|
||||
int d = (b64[i + 3] == '=') ? 0 : base64_char_value(b64[i + 3]);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ MessageSignature sign_message(const CoinParams& coin, const WalletKey& key,
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
// Bitcoin-family: Bitcoin signed message format
|
||||
auto rsig = bitcoin_sign_message(msg, msg_len, key.priv);
|
||||
return from_recoverable(rsig, static_cast<std::uint64_t>(27 + rsig.recid));
|
||||
return from_recoverable(rsig, static_cast<std::uint64_t>(27) + static_cast<std::uint64_t>(rsig.recid));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
MessageSignature sign_hash(const CoinParams& coin, const WalletKey& key,
|
||||
@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ MessageSignature sign_hash(const CoinParams& coin, const WalletKey& key,
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
auto rsig = ecdsa_sign_recoverable(hash, key.priv);
|
||||
return from_recoverable(rsig, static_cast<std::uint64_t>(27 + rsig.recid));
|
||||
return from_recoverable(rsig, static_cast<std::uint64_t>(27) + static_cast<std::uint64_t>(rsig.recid));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// -- Verification -------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
@ -42,8 +42,9 @@ Scalar derive_nonce(const Scalar& secret, const Point& point,
|
||||
// XOR secret with H(aux) for nonce hedging
|
||||
auto aux_hash = SHA256::hash(aux32, 32);
|
||||
std::uint8_t masked[32];
|
||||
for (int i = 0; i < 32; ++i)
|
||||
for (int i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
|
||||
masked[i] = sec_bytes[i] ^ aux_hash[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
std::uint8_t buf[32 + 33 + 32 + 32]; // masked || pt_comp || msg || aux
|
||||
std::memcpy(buf, masked, 32);
|
||||
@ -65,8 +66,9 @@ Point lift_x_even(const FieldElement& x_in) {
|
||||
FieldElement y = rhs.sqrt();
|
||||
if (y.square() == rhs) {
|
||||
auto y_bytes = y.to_bytes();
|
||||
if (y_bytes[31] & 1)
|
||||
if (y_bytes[31] & 1) {
|
||||
y = FieldElement::zero() - y;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return Point::from_affine(x, y);
|
||||
}
|
||||
x = x + FieldElement::one();
|
||||
@ -356,11 +358,11 @@ RangeProof range_prove(std::uint64_t value,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Random blinding scalars for vector commitments
|
||||
Scalar alpha = derive_nonce(blinding, commitment.point,
|
||||
const Scalar alpha = derive_nonce(blinding, commitment.point,
|
||||
aux_rand.data(), aux_rand.data());
|
||||
// Derive more randomness
|
||||
auto alpha_bytes = alpha.to_bytes();
|
||||
Scalar rho = Scalar::from_bytes(SHA256::hash(alpha_bytes.data(), 32));
|
||||
const Scalar rho = Scalar::from_bytes(SHA256::hash(alpha_bytes.data(), 32));
|
||||
|
||||
// Random blinding vectors s_L, s_R
|
||||
Scalar s_L[RANGE_PROOF_BITS];
|
||||
@ -378,8 +380,9 @@ RangeProof range_prove(std::uint64_t value,
|
||||
// A = alpha*G + sum(a_L[i]*G_i + a_R[i]*H_i)
|
||||
Point A_pt = ct::generator_mul(alpha);
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < RANGE_PROOF_BITS; ++i) {
|
||||
if (!a_L[i].is_zero())
|
||||
if (!a_L[i].is_zero()) {
|
||||
A_pt = A_pt.add(gens.G[i].scalar_mul(a_L[i]));
|
||||
}
|
||||
A_pt = A_pt.add(gens.H[i].scalar_mul(a_R[i]));
|
||||
}
|
||||
proof.A = A_pt;
|
||||
@ -412,16 +415,18 @@ RangeProof range_prove(std::uint64_t value,
|
||||
// Compute powers of y and z
|
||||
Scalar y_powers[RANGE_PROOF_BITS]; // y^0, y^1, ..., y^{n-1}
|
||||
y_powers[0] = Scalar::one();
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 1; i < RANGE_PROOF_BITS; ++i)
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 1; i < RANGE_PROOF_BITS; ++i) {
|
||||
y_powers[i] = y_powers[i - 1] * y;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Scalar const z2 = z * z;
|
||||
|
||||
// 2^i scalars
|
||||
Scalar two_powers[RANGE_PROOF_BITS];
|
||||
two_powers[0] = Scalar::one();
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 1; i < RANGE_PROOF_BITS; ++i)
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 1; i < RANGE_PROOF_BITS; ++i) {
|
||||
two_powers[i] = two_powers[i - 1] + two_powers[i - 1];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// l(x) = (a_L - z*1) + s_L*x
|
||||
// r(x) = y^n * (a_R + z*1 + s_R*x) + z^2 * 2^n
|
||||
@ -443,9 +448,9 @@ RangeProof range_prove(std::uint64_t value,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Commit to t_1, t_2
|
||||
Scalar tau1_bytes_raw = Scalar::from_bytes(
|
||||
const Scalar tau1_bytes_raw = Scalar::from_bytes(
|
||||
SHA256::hash(rho.to_bytes().data(), 32));
|
||||
Scalar tau2_bytes_raw = Scalar::from_bytes(
|
||||
const Scalar tau2_bytes_raw = Scalar::from_bytes(
|
||||
SHA256::hash(tau1_bytes_raw.to_bytes().data(), 32));
|
||||
Scalar const tau1 = tau1_bytes_raw;
|
||||
Scalar const tau2 = tau2_bytes_raw;
|
||||
@ -478,8 +483,9 @@ RangeProof range_prove(std::uint64_t value,
|
||||
|
||||
// t_hat = <l(x), r(x)>
|
||||
Scalar t_hat = Scalar::zero();
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < RANGE_PROOF_BITS; ++i)
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < RANGE_PROOF_BITS; ++i) {
|
||||
t_hat = t_hat + l_x[i] * r_x[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
proof.t_hat = t_hat;
|
||||
|
||||
// tau_x = tau_2 * x^2 + tau_1 * x + z^2 * blinding
|
||||
@ -497,11 +503,12 @@ RangeProof range_prove(std::uint64_t value,
|
||||
std::memcpy(b_vec, r_x, sizeof(r_x));
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute modified generators: H'_i = H_i * y^{-i}
|
||||
Scalar y_inv = y.inverse();
|
||||
const Scalar y_inv = y.inverse();
|
||||
Scalar y_inv_powers[RANGE_PROOF_BITS];
|
||||
y_inv_powers[0] = Scalar::one();
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 1; i < RANGE_PROOF_BITS; ++i)
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 1; i < RANGE_PROOF_BITS; ++i) {
|
||||
y_inv_powers[i] = y_inv_powers[i - 1] * y_inv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Point G_vec[RANGE_PROOF_BITS];
|
||||
Point H_vec[RANGE_PROOF_BITS];
|
||||
@ -607,21 +614,25 @@ bool range_verify(const PedersenCommitment& commitment,
|
||||
// where delta(y,z) = (z - z^2) * <1, y^n> - z^3 * <1, 2^n>
|
||||
Scalar y_powers[RANGE_PROOF_BITS];
|
||||
y_powers[0] = Scalar::one();
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 1; i < RANGE_PROOF_BITS; ++i)
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 1; i < RANGE_PROOF_BITS; ++i) {
|
||||
y_powers[i] = y_powers[i - 1] * y;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Scalar two_powers[RANGE_PROOF_BITS];
|
||||
two_powers[0] = Scalar::one();
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 1; i < RANGE_PROOF_BITS; ++i)
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 1; i < RANGE_PROOF_BITS; ++i) {
|
||||
two_powers[i] = two_powers[i - 1] + two_powers[i - 1];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Scalar sum_y = Scalar::zero();
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < RANGE_PROOF_BITS; ++i)
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < RANGE_PROOF_BITS; ++i) {
|
||||
sum_y = sum_y + y_powers[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Scalar sum_2 = Scalar::zero();
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < RANGE_PROOF_BITS; ++i)
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < RANGE_PROOF_BITS; ++i) {
|
||||
sum_2 = sum_2 + two_powers[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Scalar const z3 = z2 * z;
|
||||
Scalar const delta = (z - z2) * sum_y - z3 * sum_2;
|
||||
@ -639,7 +650,7 @@ bool range_verify(const PedersenCommitment& commitment,
|
||||
Point poly_p[5] = {
|
||||
H_ped, Point::generator(), commitment.point, proof.T1, proof.T2
|
||||
};
|
||||
Point poly_check = msm(poly_s, poly_p, 5);
|
||||
const Point poly_check = msm(poly_s, poly_p, 5);
|
||||
if (!poly_check.is_infinity()) return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -658,22 +669,25 @@ bool range_verify(const PedersenCommitment& commitment,
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute scalar coefficients for each generator
|
||||
// s_i = product_{j: bit j of i is 0} x_j^{-1} * product_{j: bit j of i is 1} x_j
|
||||
Scalar y_inv = y.inverse();
|
||||
const Scalar y_inv = y.inverse();
|
||||
Scalar y_inv_powers[RANGE_PROOF_BITS];
|
||||
y_inv_powers[0] = Scalar::one();
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 1; i < RANGE_PROOF_BITS; ++i)
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 1; i < RANGE_PROOF_BITS; ++i) {
|
||||
y_inv_powers[i] = y_inv_powers[i - 1] * y_inv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Scalar x_inv_rounds[RANGE_PROOF_LOG2];
|
||||
for (std::size_t j = 0; j < RANGE_PROOF_LOG2; ++j)
|
||||
for (std::size_t j = 0; j < RANGE_PROOF_LOG2; ++j) {
|
||||
x_inv_rounds[j] = x_rounds[j].inverse();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute s_i via product tree (much faster than per-index loop)
|
||||
// s_0 = prod(x_inv_rounds[j]), then propagate: flip x_inv->x for each set bit
|
||||
Scalar s_coeff[RANGE_PROOF_BITS];
|
||||
s_coeff[0] = Scalar::one();
|
||||
for (std::size_t j = 0; j < RANGE_PROOF_LOG2; ++j)
|
||||
for (std::size_t j = 0; j < RANGE_PROOF_LOG2; ++j) {
|
||||
s_coeff[0] = s_coeff[0] * x_inv_rounds[j];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 1; i < RANGE_PROOF_BITS; ++i) {
|
||||
// s[i] = s[i-1] * x_rounds[j] / x_inv_rounds[j] = s[i-1] * x_rounds[j]^2
|
||||
@ -683,10 +697,12 @@ bool range_verify(const PedersenCommitment& commitment,
|
||||
// Use standard butterfly construction
|
||||
s_coeff[i] = Scalar::one();
|
||||
for (std::size_t jj = 0; jj < RANGE_PROOF_LOG2; ++jj) {
|
||||
if ((i >> (RANGE_PROOF_LOG2 - 1 - jj)) & 1)
|
||||
if ((i >> (RANGE_PROOF_LOG2 - 1 - jj)) & 1) {
|
||||
s_coeff[i] = s_coeff[i] * x_rounds[jj];
|
||||
else
|
||||
}
|
||||
else {
|
||||
s_coeff[i] = s_coeff[i] * x_inv_rounds[jj];
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -717,8 +733,9 @@ bool range_verify(const PedersenCommitment& commitment,
|
||||
// Product tree for batch inversion
|
||||
Scalar acc[RANGE_PROOF_BITS];
|
||||
acc[0] = s_coeff[0];
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 1; i < RANGE_PROOF_BITS; ++i)
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 1; i < RANGE_PROOF_BITS; ++i) {
|
||||
acc[i] = acc[i - 1] * s_coeff[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Scalar inv_acc = acc[RANGE_PROOF_BITS - 1].inverse(); // single inversion!
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = RANGE_PROOF_BITS; i-- > 1; ) {
|
||||
@ -782,8 +799,9 @@ bool batch_range_verify(const PedersenCommitment* commitments,
|
||||
const RangeProof* proofs,
|
||||
std::size_t count) {
|
||||
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
|
||||
if (!range_verify(commitments[i], proofs[i]))
|
||||
if (!range_verify(commitments[i], proofs[i])) {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -24,16 +24,10 @@ static int tests_passed = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
static void hex_to_bytes(const char* hex, uint8_t* out, size_t len) {
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
|
||||
unsigned int byte = 0;
|
||||
#ifdef __clang__
|
||||
#pragma clang diagnostic push
|
||||
#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wdeprecated-declarations"
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
std::sscanf(hex + 2 * i, "%02x", &byte);
|
||||
#ifdef __clang__
|
||||
#pragma clang diagnostic pop
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
out[i] = static_cast<uint8_t>(byte);
|
||||
char pair[3] = { hex[2 * i], hex[2 * i + 1], '\0' };
|
||||
char* endptr = nullptr;
|
||||
const unsigned long val = std::strtoul(pair, &endptr, 16);
|
||||
out[i] = (endptr == pair + 2) ? static_cast<uint8_t>(val) : 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -42,7 +36,7 @@ static std::string bytes_to_hex(const uint8_t* data, size_t len) {
|
||||
result.reserve(len * 2);
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
|
||||
char buf[3];
|
||||
std::snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%02x", data[i]);
|
||||
(void)std::snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%02x", data[i]);
|
||||
result += buf;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return result;
|
||||
@ -96,6 +90,7 @@ static void test_wordlist() {
|
||||
|
||||
const char* const* wl = bip39_wordlist_english();
|
||||
CHECK(wl != nullptr, "wordlist not null");
|
||||
if (!wl) { return; }
|
||||
CHECK(std::strcmp(wl[0], "abandon") == 0, "first word = abandon");
|
||||
CHECK(std::strcmp(wl[2047], "zoo") == 0, "last word = zoo");
|
||||
CHECK(std::strcmp(wl[1], "ability") == 0, "word[1] = ability");
|
||||
@ -235,7 +230,7 @@ static void test_mnemonic_to_seed() {
|
||||
"abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon about";
|
||||
auto [seed, ok] = bip39_mnemonic_to_seed(mnemonic, "TREZOR");
|
||||
CHECK(ok, "TV1 seed: derivation ok");
|
||||
std::string hex = bytes_to_hex(seed.data(), 64);
|
||||
const std::string hex = bytes_to_hex(seed.data(), 64);
|
||||
CHECK(hex == "c55257c360c07c72029aebc1b53c05ed0362ada38ead3e3e9efa3708e5349553"
|
||||
"1f09a6987599d18264c1e1c92f2cf141630c7a3c4ab7c81b2f001698e7463b04",
|
||||
"TV1 seed: matches Trezor vector");
|
||||
@ -249,7 +244,7 @@ static void test_mnemonic_to_seed() {
|
||||
"abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon art";
|
||||
auto [seed, ok] = bip39_mnemonic_to_seed(mnemonic, "TREZOR");
|
||||
CHECK(ok, "TV5 seed: derivation ok");
|
||||
std::string hex = bytes_to_hex(seed.data(), 64);
|
||||
const std::string hex = bytes_to_hex(seed.data(), 64);
|
||||
CHECK(hex == "bda85446c68413707090a52022edd26a1c9462295029f2e60cd7c4f2bbd30971"
|
||||
"70af7a4d73245cafa9c3cca8d561a7c3de6f5d4a10be8ed2a5e608d68f92fcc8",
|
||||
"TV5 seed: matches Trezor vector");
|
||||
@ -261,7 +256,7 @@ static void test_mnemonic_to_seed() {
|
||||
"abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon about";
|
||||
auto [seed, ok] = bip39_mnemonic_to_seed(mnemonic, "");
|
||||
CHECK(ok, "no-passphrase seed: derivation ok");
|
||||
std::string hex = bytes_to_hex(seed.data(), 64);
|
||||
const std::string hex = bytes_to_hex(seed.data(), 64);
|
||||
// Known result with empty passphrase (salt = "mnemonic"):
|
||||
CHECK(hex == "5eb00bbddcf069084889a8ab9155568165f5c453ccb85e70811aaed6f6da5fc1"
|
||||
"9a5ac40b389cd370d086206dec8aa6c43daea6690f20ad3d8d48b2d2ce9e38e4",
|
||||
@ -337,7 +332,7 @@ static void test_edge_cases() {
|
||||
CHECK(ok, "160-bit entropy generates ok");
|
||||
// Count words
|
||||
int wc = 1;
|
||||
for (char c : mnemonic) if (c == ' ') ++wc;
|
||||
for (const char c : mnemonic) if (c == ' ') ++wc;
|
||||
CHECK(wc == 15, "160-bit entropy -> 15 words");
|
||||
CHECK(bip39_validate(mnemonic), "160-bit mnemonic validates");
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -349,7 +344,7 @@ static void test_edge_cases() {
|
||||
auto [mnemonic, ok] = bip39_generate(24, entropy);
|
||||
CHECK(ok, "192-bit entropy generates ok");
|
||||
int wc = 1;
|
||||
for (char c : mnemonic) if (c == ' ') ++wc;
|
||||
for (const char c : mnemonic) if (c == ' ') ++wc;
|
||||
CHECK(wc == 18, "192-bit entropy -> 18 words");
|
||||
CHECK(bip39_validate(mnemonic), "192-bit mnemonic validates");
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -362,7 +357,7 @@ static void test_edge_cases() {
|
||||
auto [mnemonic, ok] = bip39_generate(28, entropy);
|
||||
CHECK(ok, "224-bit entropy generates ok");
|
||||
int wc = 1;
|
||||
for (char c : mnemonic) if (c == ' ') ++wc;
|
||||
for (const char c : mnemonic) if (c == ' ') ++wc;
|
||||
CHECK(wc == 21, "224-bit entropy -> 21 words");
|
||||
CHECK(bip39_validate(mnemonic), "224-bit mnemonic validates");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -50,9 +50,10 @@ static int tests_failed = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
static void hex_to_bytes(const char* hex, uint8_t* out, size_t len) {
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
|
||||
unsigned int byte = 0;
|
||||
if (std::sscanf(hex + i * 2, "%02x", &byte) != 1) byte = 0;
|
||||
out[i] = static_cast<uint8_t>(byte);
|
||||
char pair[3] = { hex[i * 2], hex[i * 2 + 1], '\0' };
|
||||
char* endptr = nullptr;
|
||||
const unsigned long val = std::strtoul(pair, &endptr, 16);
|
||||
out[i] = (endptr == pair + 2) ? static_cast<uint8_t>(val) : 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -186,13 +187,19 @@ static void test_eth_sign_hash() {
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(!r_zero, "r should be non-zero");
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(!s_zero, "s should be non-zero");
|
||||
// v should be 27 or 28 for legacy
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(sig.v == 27 || sig.v == 28, "legacy v should be 27 or 28");
|
||||
{
|
||||
const bool v_ok = (sig.v == 27 || sig.v == 28);
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(v_ok, "legacy v should be 27 or 28");
|
||||
}
|
||||
PASS();
|
||||
|
||||
// Sign with Ethereum mainnet chain ID
|
||||
TEST("eth_sign_hash with chain_id=1 (Ethereum)");
|
||||
auto sig2 = eth_sign_hash(hash, sk, 1);
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(sig2.v == 37 || sig2.v == 38, "EIP-155 v should be 37 or 38");
|
||||
{
|
||||
const bool v2_ok = (sig2.v == 37 || sig2.v == 38);
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(v2_ok, "EIP-155 v should be 37 or 38");
|
||||
}
|
||||
PASS();
|
||||
|
||||
// Same hash + key should give same r,s
|
||||
@ -223,8 +230,8 @@ static void test_ecrecover() {
|
||||
hex_to_bytes("c6b506e21f3c26dfe9b3a15a40d2dde0ab9ee4bb9e6f7e6e49f7ef9fd9b3a3d5",
|
||||
sk_bytes.data(), 32);
|
||||
Scalar const sk = Scalar::from_bytes(sk_bytes);
|
||||
Point pk = Point::generator().scalar_mul(sk);
|
||||
auto expected_addr = ethereum_address_bytes(pk);
|
||||
const Point pk = Point::generator().scalar_mul(sk);
|
||||
const auto expected_addr = ethereum_address_bytes(pk);
|
||||
|
||||
// Hash a message
|
||||
std::array<uint8_t, 32> hash{};
|
||||
@ -261,7 +268,7 @@ static void test_ecrecover() {
|
||||
|
||||
// ecrecover with invalid r=0 should fail
|
||||
TEST("ecrecover invalid r=0");
|
||||
std::array<uint8_t, 32> zero{};
|
||||
const std::array<uint8_t, 32> zero{};
|
||||
auto [_, ok4] = ecrecover(hash, zero, sig.s, sig.v);
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(!ok4, "ecrecover with r=0 should fail");
|
||||
PASS();
|
||||
@ -284,7 +291,7 @@ static void test_personal_sign() {
|
||||
hex_to_bytes("4c0883a69102937d6231471b5dbb6204fe512961708279f8f30ab5c5dbe3a2b7",
|
||||
sk_bytes.data(), 32);
|
||||
Scalar const sk = Scalar::from_bytes(sk_bytes);
|
||||
Point pk = Point::generator().scalar_mul(sk);
|
||||
const Point pk = Point::generator().scalar_mul(sk);
|
||||
auto addr = ethereum_address_bytes(pk);
|
||||
|
||||
const char* msg = "I agree to the terms of service";
|
||||
@ -295,18 +302,21 @@ static void test_personal_sign() {
|
||||
bool r_zero = true;
|
||||
for (auto b : sig.r) { if (b != 0) r_zero = false; }
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(!r_zero, "r should be non-zero");
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(sig.v == 27 || sig.v == 28, "v should be 27 or 28");
|
||||
{
|
||||
const bool v_ok2 = (sig.v == 27 || sig.v == 28);
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(v_ok2, "v should be 27 or 28");
|
||||
}
|
||||
PASS();
|
||||
|
||||
TEST("personal_verify valid");
|
||||
bool valid = eth_personal_verify(
|
||||
const bool valid = eth_personal_verify(
|
||||
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(msg), msg_len, sig, addr);
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(valid, "signature should verify");
|
||||
PASS();
|
||||
|
||||
TEST("personal_verify wrong message");
|
||||
const char* wrong_msg = "I disagree to the terms of service";
|
||||
bool wrong = eth_personal_verify(
|
||||
const bool wrong = eth_personal_verify(
|
||||
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(wrong_msg), std::strlen(wrong_msg), sig, addr);
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(!wrong, "wrong message should not verify");
|
||||
PASS();
|
||||
@ -314,7 +324,7 @@ static void test_personal_sign() {
|
||||
TEST("personal_verify wrong address");
|
||||
std::array<uint8_t, 20> wrong_addr{};
|
||||
wrong_addr[0] = 0xFF;
|
||||
bool wrong2 = eth_personal_verify(
|
||||
const bool wrong2 = eth_personal_verify(
|
||||
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(msg), msg_len, sig, wrong_addr);
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(!wrong2, "wrong address should not verify");
|
||||
PASS();
|
||||
@ -330,8 +340,8 @@ static void test_multi_chain() {
|
||||
std::array<uint8_t, 32> sk_bytes{};
|
||||
sk_bytes[31] = 7;
|
||||
Scalar const sk = Scalar::from_bytes(sk_bytes);
|
||||
Point pk = Point::generator().scalar_mul(sk);
|
||||
auto expected_addr = ethereum_address_bytes(pk);
|
||||
const Point pk = Point::generator().scalar_mul(sk);
|
||||
const auto expected_addr = ethereum_address_bytes(pk);
|
||||
|
||||
std::array<uint8_t, 32> hash{};
|
||||
hash[0] = 0xAB; hash[1] = 0xCD;
|
||||
@ -349,7 +359,7 @@ static void test_multi_chain() {
|
||||
|
||||
for (auto& chain : chains) {
|
||||
char buf[64];
|
||||
std::snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Round-trip chain_id=%lu (%s)",
|
||||
(void)std::snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Round-trip chain_id=%lu (%s)",
|
||||
static_cast<unsigned long>(chain.id), chain.name);
|
||||
TEST(buf);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ using namespace secp256k1;
|
||||
using namespace secp256k1::coins;
|
||||
using namespace secp256k1::coins::wallet;
|
||||
using fast::Scalar;
|
||||
using fast::Point;
|
||||
|
||||
static int tests_passed = 0;
|
||||
static int tests_failed = 0;
|
||||
@ -64,9 +63,10 @@ static int tests_failed = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
static void hex_to_bytes(const char* hex, uint8_t* out, size_t len) {
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
|
||||
unsigned int byte = 0;
|
||||
if (std::sscanf(hex + i * 2, "%02x", &byte) != 1) byte = 0;
|
||||
out[i] = static_cast<uint8_t>(byte);
|
||||
char pair[3] = { hex[i * 2], hex[i * 2 + 1], '\0' };
|
||||
char* endptr = nullptr;
|
||||
const unsigned long val = std::strtoul(pair, &endptr, 16);
|
||||
out[i] = (endptr == pair + 2) ? static_cast<uint8_t>(val) : 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -194,7 +194,10 @@ static void test_export_privkey_bitcoin_wif() {
|
||||
auto wif = export_private_key(Bitcoin, key);
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(!wif.empty(), "non-empty WIF");
|
||||
// Compressed mainnet WIF starts with 'K' or 'L'
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(wif[0] == 'K' || wif[0] == 'L', "WIF starts with K or L");
|
||||
{
|
||||
const bool wif_prefix_ok = (wif[0] == 'K' || wif[0] == 'L');
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(wif_prefix_ok, "WIF starts with K or L");
|
||||
}
|
||||
PASS();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -287,15 +290,15 @@ static void test_bitcoin_sign_verify() {
|
||||
auto scalar = Scalar::from_bytes(priv);
|
||||
auto pubkey = derive_public_key(scalar);
|
||||
const uint8_t msg[] = "Test message for signing";
|
||||
size_t msg_len = sizeof(msg) - 1; // no null terminator
|
||||
const size_t msg_len = sizeof(msg) - 1; // no null terminator
|
||||
|
||||
auto rsig = bitcoin_sign_message(msg, msg_len, scalar);
|
||||
bool ok = bitcoin_verify_message(msg, msg_len, pubkey, rsig.sig);
|
||||
const bool ok = bitcoin_verify_message(msg, msg_len, pubkey, rsig.sig);
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(ok, "verify should pass");
|
||||
|
||||
// Tamper: different message should fail
|
||||
const uint8_t bad_msg[] = "Wrong message";
|
||||
bool bad = bitcoin_verify_message(bad_msg, sizeof(bad_msg) - 1, pubkey, rsig.sig);
|
||||
const bool bad = bitcoin_verify_message(bad_msg, sizeof(bad_msg) - 1, pubkey, rsig.sig);
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(!bad, "tampered msg should fail");
|
||||
PASS();
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -311,7 +314,7 @@ static void test_bitcoin_sign_recover() {
|
||||
auto scalar = Scalar::from_bytes(priv);
|
||||
auto pubkey = derive_public_key(scalar);
|
||||
const uint8_t msg[] = "Recovery test message";
|
||||
size_t msg_len = sizeof(msg) - 1;
|
||||
const size_t msg_len = sizeof(msg) - 1;
|
||||
|
||||
auto rsig = bitcoin_sign_message(msg, msg_len, scalar);
|
||||
auto [recovered, ok] = bitcoin_recover_message(msg, msg_len, rsig.sig, rsig.recid);
|
||||
@ -333,7 +336,7 @@ static void test_base64_round_trip() {
|
||||
hex_to_bytes(TEST_PRIVKEY_HEX, priv, 32);
|
||||
auto scalar = Scalar::from_bytes(priv);
|
||||
const uint8_t msg[] = "Base64 test";
|
||||
size_t msg_len = sizeof(msg) - 1;
|
||||
const size_t msg_len = sizeof(msg) - 1;
|
||||
|
||||
auto rsig = bitcoin_sign_message(msg, msg_len, scalar);
|
||||
auto b64 = bitcoin_sig_to_base64(rsig, true);
|
||||
@ -363,10 +366,10 @@ static void test_wallet_sign_verify_bitcoin() {
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(ok, "key creation");
|
||||
|
||||
const uint8_t msg[] = "Wallet API test message";
|
||||
size_t msg_len = sizeof(msg) - 1;
|
||||
const size_t msg_len = sizeof(msg) - 1;
|
||||
|
||||
auto sig = sign_message(Bitcoin, key, msg, msg_len);
|
||||
bool verified = verify_message(Bitcoin, key.pub, msg, msg_len, sig);
|
||||
const bool verified = verify_message(Bitcoin, key.pub, msg, msg_len, sig);
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(verified, "verify should pass");
|
||||
|
||||
// Wrong message should fail
|
||||
@ -394,7 +397,10 @@ static void test_wallet_sign_hash_recover() {
|
||||
|
||||
// Reconstruct: for raw hash verification, manually hash + verify
|
||||
// sign_hash with Bitcoin coin uses ecdsa_sign_recoverable directly
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(sig.recid >= 0 && sig.recid <= 3, "valid recid");
|
||||
{
|
||||
const bool recid_ok = (sig.recid >= 0 && sig.recid <= 3);
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(recid_ok, "valid recid");
|
||||
}
|
||||
bool r_nonzero = false, s_nonzero = false;
|
||||
for (auto b : sig.r) if (b) { r_nonzero = true; break; }
|
||||
for (auto b : sig.s) if (b) { s_nonzero = true; break; }
|
||||
@ -415,7 +421,7 @@ static void test_wallet_sign_recover_ethereum() {
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(ok, "key creation");
|
||||
|
||||
const uint8_t msg[] = "Ethereum wallet test";
|
||||
size_t msg_len = sizeof(msg) - 1;
|
||||
const size_t msg_len = sizeof(msg) - 1;
|
||||
|
||||
auto sig = sign_message(Ethereum, key, msg, msg_len);
|
||||
auto [addr, recovered] = recover_address(Ethereum, msg, msg_len, sig);
|
||||
@ -434,7 +440,7 @@ static void test_wallet_sign_recover_tron() {
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(ok, "key creation");
|
||||
|
||||
const uint8_t msg[] = "Tron wallet test";
|
||||
size_t msg_len = sizeof(msg) - 1;
|
||||
const size_t msg_len = sizeof(msg) - 1;
|
||||
|
||||
auto sig = sign_message(Tron, key, msg, msg_len);
|
||||
auto [addr, recovered] = recover_address(Tron, msg, msg_len, sig);
|
||||
@ -502,7 +508,10 @@ static void test_multi_coin_addresses() {
|
||||
auto ltc = get_address(Litecoin, key);
|
||||
auto doge = get_address(Dogecoin, key);
|
||||
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(!btc.empty() && !ltc.empty() && !doge.empty(), "all non-empty");
|
||||
{
|
||||
const bool coins_non_empty = !btc.empty() && !ltc.empty() && !doge.empty();
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(coins_non_empty, "all non-empty");
|
||||
}
|
||||
// All addresses should be different (different prefixes/encoding)
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(btc != ltc, "BTC != LTC");
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(btc != doge, "BTC != DOGE");
|
||||
@ -599,8 +608,10 @@ static void test_wallet_all_btc_formats() {
|
||||
auto p2tr = get_address_p2tr(Bitcoin, key);
|
||||
|
||||
// All four formats should be non-empty and different
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(!p2pkh.empty() && !p2wpkh.empty() && !p2sh.empty() && !p2tr.empty(),
|
||||
"all non-empty");
|
||||
{
|
||||
const bool addrs_non_empty = !p2pkh.empty() && !p2wpkh.empty() && !p2sh.empty() && !p2tr.empty();
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(addrs_non_empty, "all non-empty");
|
||||
}
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(p2pkh != p2wpkh, "P2PKH != P2WPKH");
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(p2pkh != p2sh, "P2PKH != P2SH-P2WPKH");
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(p2pkh != p2tr, "P2PKH != P2TR");
|
||||
|
||||
@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ static void test_knowledge_proof_wrong_key() {
|
||||
auto pubkey = Point::generator().scalar_mul(secret);
|
||||
auto wrong_pubkey = Point::generator().scalar_mul(Scalar::from_uint64(43));
|
||||
|
||||
std::array<std::uint8_t, 32> msg{};
|
||||
const std::array<std::uint8_t, 32> msg{};
|
||||
std::array<std::uint8_t, 32> aux{};
|
||||
aux[0] = 0x02;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static void test_knowledge_proof_serialization() {
|
||||
auto secret = Scalar::from_uint64(999);
|
||||
auto pubkey = Point::generator().scalar_mul(secret);
|
||||
|
||||
std::array<std::uint8_t, 32> msg{};
|
||||
const std::array<std::uint8_t, 32> msg{};
|
||||
std::array<std::uint8_t, 32> aux{};
|
||||
aux[0] = 0x04;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ static void test_knowledge_proof_serialization() {
|
||||
auto serialized = proof.serialize();
|
||||
|
||||
zk::KnowledgeProof deserialized{};
|
||||
bool ok = zk::KnowledgeProof::deserialize(serialized.data(), deserialized);
|
||||
const bool ok = zk::KnowledgeProof::deserialize(serialized.data(), deserialized);
|
||||
CHECK(ok, "deserialization_succeeds");
|
||||
|
||||
CHECK(zk::knowledge_verify(deserialized, pubkey, msg), "deserialized_proof_verifies");
|
||||
@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static void test_knowledge_proof_custom_base() {
|
||||
const auto& H = pedersen_generator_H();
|
||||
auto point = H.scalar_mul(secret);
|
||||
|
||||
std::array<std::uint8_t, 32> msg{};
|
||||
const std::array<std::uint8_t, 32> msg{};
|
||||
std::array<std::uint8_t, 32> aux{};
|
||||
aux[0] = 0x05;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static void test_knowledge_proof_deterministic() {
|
||||
auto secret = Scalar::from_uint64(42);
|
||||
auto pubkey = Point::generator().scalar_mul(secret);
|
||||
|
||||
std::array<std::uint8_t, 32> msg{};
|
||||
const std::array<std::uint8_t, 32> msg{};
|
||||
std::array<std::uint8_t, 32> aux{};
|
||||
aux[0] = 0x06;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ static void test_range_proof_generators() {
|
||||
static void test_range_proof_basic() {
|
||||
std::printf("\n=== Range Proof: Basic (value=42) ===\n");
|
||||
|
||||
std::uint64_t value = 42;
|
||||
const std::uint64_t value = 42;
|
||||
auto blinding = Scalar::from_uint64(12345);
|
||||
auto commitment = pedersen_commit(Scalar::from_uint64(value), blinding);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ static void test_range_proof_basic() {
|
||||
static void test_range_proof_zero() {
|
||||
std::printf("\n=== Range Proof: Edge Case (value=0) ===\n");
|
||||
|
||||
std::uint64_t value = 0;
|
||||
const std::uint64_t value = 0;
|
||||
auto blinding = Scalar::from_uint64(99999);
|
||||
auto commitment = pedersen_commit(Scalar::from_uint64(value), blinding);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ static void test_range_proof_zero() {
|
||||
static void test_range_proof_max() {
|
||||
std::printf("\n=== Range Proof: Edge Case (value=2^64-1) ===\n");
|
||||
|
||||
std::uint64_t value = UINT64_MAX;
|
||||
const std::uint64_t value = UINT64_MAX;
|
||||
auto blinding = Scalar::from_uint64(77777);
|
||||
auto commitment = pedersen_commit(Scalar::from_uint64(value), blinding);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ static void test_range_proof_max() {
|
||||
static void test_range_proof_wrong_commitment() {
|
||||
std::printf("\n=== Range Proof: Wrong Commitment ===\n");
|
||||
|
||||
std::uint64_t value = 100;
|
||||
const std::uint64_t value = 100;
|
||||
auto blinding = Scalar::from_uint64(11111);
|
||||
auto commitment = pedersen_commit(Scalar::from_uint64(value), blinding);
|
||||
auto wrong_commitment = pedersen_commit(Scalar::from_uint64(200), blinding);
|
||||
@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static void test_range_proof_wrong_commitment() {
|
||||
static void test_range_proof_deterministic() {
|
||||
std::printf("\n=== Range Proof: Deterministic ===\n");
|
||||
|
||||
std::uint64_t value = 42;
|
||||
const std::uint64_t value = 42;
|
||||
auto blinding = Scalar::from_uint64(12345);
|
||||
auto commitment = pedersen_commit(Scalar::from_uint64(value), blinding);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1239,14 +1239,17 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_pubkey_add(ufsecp_ctx* ctx,
|
||||
if (!ctx || !a33 || !b33 || !out33) return UFSECP_ERR_NULL_ARG;
|
||||
ctx_clear_err(ctx);
|
||||
auto pa = point_from_compressed(a33);
|
||||
if (pa.is_infinity())
|
||||
if (pa.is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY, "invalid pubkey a");
|
||||
}
|
||||
auto pb = point_from_compressed(b33);
|
||||
if (pb.is_infinity())
|
||||
if (pb.is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY, "invalid pubkey b");
|
||||
}
|
||||
auto sum = pa.add(pb);
|
||||
if (sum.is_infinity())
|
||||
if (sum.is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_ARITH, "sum is point at infinity");
|
||||
}
|
||||
point_to_compressed(sum, out33);
|
||||
return UFSECP_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -1257,8 +1260,9 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_pubkey_negate(ufsecp_ctx* ctx,
|
||||
if (!ctx || !pubkey33 || !out33) return UFSECP_ERR_NULL_ARG;
|
||||
ctx_clear_err(ctx);
|
||||
auto p = point_from_compressed(pubkey33);
|
||||
if (p.is_infinity())
|
||||
if (p.is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY, "invalid pubkey");
|
||||
}
|
||||
auto neg = p.negate();
|
||||
point_to_compressed(neg, out33);
|
||||
return UFSECP_OK;
|
||||
@ -1271,15 +1275,18 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_pubkey_tweak_add(ufsecp_ctx* ctx,
|
||||
if (!ctx || !pubkey33 || !tweak || !out33) return UFSECP_ERR_NULL_ARG;
|
||||
ctx_clear_err(ctx);
|
||||
auto p = point_from_compressed(pubkey33);
|
||||
if (p.is_infinity())
|
||||
if (p.is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY, "invalid pubkey");
|
||||
}
|
||||
Scalar tw;
|
||||
if (!scalar_parse_strict(tweak, tw))
|
||||
if (!scalar_parse_strict(tweak, tw)) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_INPUT, "tweak >= n");
|
||||
}
|
||||
auto tG = Point::generator().scalar_mul(tw);
|
||||
auto result = p.add(tG);
|
||||
if (result.is_infinity())
|
||||
if (result.is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_ARITH, "tweak_add resulted in infinity");
|
||||
}
|
||||
point_to_compressed(result, out33);
|
||||
return UFSECP_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -1291,14 +1298,17 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_pubkey_tweak_mul(ufsecp_ctx* ctx,
|
||||
if (!ctx || !pubkey33 || !tweak || !out33) return UFSECP_ERR_NULL_ARG;
|
||||
ctx_clear_err(ctx);
|
||||
auto p = point_from_compressed(pubkey33);
|
||||
if (p.is_infinity())
|
||||
if (p.is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY, "invalid pubkey");
|
||||
}
|
||||
Scalar tw;
|
||||
if (!scalar_parse_strict_nonzero(tweak, tw))
|
||||
if (!scalar_parse_strict_nonzero(tweak, tw)) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_INPUT, "tweak is zero or >= n");
|
||||
}
|
||||
auto result = p.scalar_mul(tw);
|
||||
if (result.is_infinity())
|
||||
if (result.is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_ARITH, "tweak_mul resulted in infinity");
|
||||
}
|
||||
point_to_compressed(result, out33);
|
||||
return UFSECP_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -1311,16 +1321,19 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_pubkey_combine(ufsecp_ctx* ctx,
|
||||
if (n == 0) return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_INPUT, "need >= 1 pubkey");
|
||||
ctx_clear_err(ctx);
|
||||
auto acc = point_from_compressed(pubkeys);
|
||||
if (acc.is_infinity())
|
||||
if (acc.is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY, "invalid pubkey[0]");
|
||||
}
|
||||
for (size_t i = 1; i < n; ++i) {
|
||||
auto pi = point_from_compressed(pubkeys + i * 33);
|
||||
if (pi.is_infinity())
|
||||
if (pi.is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY, "invalid pubkey in array");
|
||||
}
|
||||
acc = acc.add(pi);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (acc.is_infinity())
|
||||
if (acc.is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_ARITH, "combined pubkey is infinity");
|
||||
}
|
||||
point_to_compressed(acc, out33);
|
||||
return UFSECP_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -1337,13 +1350,16 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_bip39_generate(ufsecp_ctx* ctx,
|
||||
if (!ctx || !mnemonic_out || !mnemonic_len) return UFSECP_ERR_NULL_ARG;
|
||||
ctx_clear_err(ctx);
|
||||
if (entropy_bytes != 16 && entropy_bytes != 20 && entropy_bytes != 24 &&
|
||||
entropy_bytes != 28 && entropy_bytes != 32)
|
||||
entropy_bytes != 28 && entropy_bytes != 32) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_INPUT, "entropy must be 16/20/24/28/32");
|
||||
}
|
||||
auto [mnemonic, ok] = secp256k1::bip39_generate(entropy_bytes, entropy_in);
|
||||
if (!ok)
|
||||
if (!ok) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_INTERNAL, "BIP-39 generation failed");
|
||||
if (*mnemonic_len < mnemonic.size() + 1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (*mnemonic_len < mnemonic.size() + 1) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BUF_TOO_SMALL, "mnemonic buffer too small");
|
||||
}
|
||||
std::memcpy(mnemonic_out, mnemonic.c_str(), mnemonic.size() + 1);
|
||||
*mnemonic_len = mnemonic.size();
|
||||
return UFSECP_OK;
|
||||
@ -1352,8 +1368,9 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_bip39_generate(ufsecp_ctx* ctx,
|
||||
ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_bip39_validate(const ufsecp_ctx* ctx,
|
||||
const char* mnemonic) {
|
||||
if (!ctx || !mnemonic) return UFSECP_ERR_NULL_ARG;
|
||||
if (!secp256k1::bip39_validate(std::string(mnemonic)))
|
||||
if (!secp256k1::bip39_validate(std::string(mnemonic))) {
|
||||
return UFSECP_ERR_BAD_INPUT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return UFSECP_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1363,10 +1380,11 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_bip39_to_seed(ufsecp_ctx* ctx,
|
||||
uint8_t seed64_out[64]) {
|
||||
if (!ctx || !mnemonic || !seed64_out) return UFSECP_ERR_NULL_ARG;
|
||||
ctx_clear_err(ctx);
|
||||
std::string pass = passphrase ? passphrase : "";
|
||||
const std::string pass = passphrase ? passphrase : "";
|
||||
auto [seed, ok] = secp256k1::bip39_mnemonic_to_seed(std::string(mnemonic), pass);
|
||||
if (!ok)
|
||||
if (!ok) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_INPUT, "invalid mnemonic");
|
||||
}
|
||||
std::memcpy(seed64_out, seed.data(), 64);
|
||||
return UFSECP_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -1409,11 +1427,13 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_schnorr_batch_verify(ufsecp_ctx* ctx,
|
||||
}
|
||||
std::memcpy(batch[i].pubkey_x.data(), e, 32);
|
||||
std::memcpy(batch[i].message.data(), e + 32, 32);
|
||||
if (!secp256k1::SchnorrSignature::parse_strict(e + 64, batch[i].signature))
|
||||
if (!secp256k1::SchnorrSignature::parse_strict(e + 64, batch[i].signature)) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_SIG, "invalid Schnorr sig in batch");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!secp256k1::schnorr_batch_verify(batch))
|
||||
if (!secp256k1::schnorr_batch_verify(batch)) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_VERIFY_FAIL, "batch verify failed");
|
||||
}
|
||||
return UFSECP_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1428,15 +1448,18 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_ecdsa_batch_verify(ufsecp_ctx* ctx,
|
||||
const uint8_t* e = entries + i * 129;
|
||||
std::memcpy(batch[i].msg_hash.data(), e, 32);
|
||||
batch[i].public_key = point_from_compressed(e + 32);
|
||||
if (batch[i].public_key.is_infinity())
|
||||
if (batch[i].public_key.is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY, "invalid pubkey in batch");
|
||||
}
|
||||
std::array<uint8_t, 64> compact;
|
||||
std::memcpy(compact.data(), e + 65, 64);
|
||||
if (!secp256k1::ECDSASignature::parse_compact_strict(compact, batch[i].signature))
|
||||
if (!secp256k1::ECDSASignature::parse_compact_strict(compact, batch[i].signature)) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_SIG, "invalid ECDSA sig in batch");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!secp256k1::ecdsa_batch_verify(batch))
|
||||
if (!secp256k1::ecdsa_batch_verify(batch)) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_VERIFY_FAIL, "batch verify failed");
|
||||
}
|
||||
return UFSECP_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1454,13 +1477,15 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_schnorr_batch_identify_invalid(
|
||||
}
|
||||
std::memcpy(batch[i].pubkey_x.data(), e, 32);
|
||||
std::memcpy(batch[i].message.data(), e + 32, 32);
|
||||
if (!secp256k1::SchnorrSignature::parse_strict(e + 64, batch[i].signature))
|
||||
if (!secp256k1::SchnorrSignature::parse_strict(e + 64, batch[i].signature)) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_SIG, "invalid Schnorr sig in batch");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
auto invalids = secp256k1::schnorr_batch_identify_invalid(batch.data(), n);
|
||||
*invalid_count = invalids.size();
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < invalids.size(); ++i)
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < invalids.size(); ++i) {
|
||||
invalid_out[i] = invalids[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
return UFSECP_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1474,17 +1499,20 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_ecdsa_batch_identify_invalid(
|
||||
const uint8_t* e = entries + i * 129;
|
||||
std::memcpy(batch[i].msg_hash.data(), e, 32);
|
||||
batch[i].public_key = point_from_compressed(e + 32);
|
||||
if (batch[i].public_key.is_infinity())
|
||||
if (batch[i].public_key.is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY, "invalid pubkey in batch");
|
||||
}
|
||||
std::array<uint8_t, 64> compact;
|
||||
std::memcpy(compact.data(), e + 65, 64);
|
||||
if (!secp256k1::ECDSASignature::parse_compact_strict(compact, batch[i].signature))
|
||||
if (!secp256k1::ECDSASignature::parse_compact_strict(compact, batch[i].signature)) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_SIG, "invalid ECDSA sig in batch");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
auto invalids = secp256k1::ecdsa_batch_identify_invalid(batch.data(), n);
|
||||
*invalid_count = invalids.size();
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < invalids.size(); ++i)
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < invalids.size(); ++i) {
|
||||
invalid_out[i] = invalids[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
return UFSECP_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1511,19 +1539,24 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_shamir_trick(ufsecp_ctx* ctx,
|
||||
if (!ctx || !a || !P33 || !b || !Q33 || !out33) return UFSECP_ERR_NULL_ARG;
|
||||
ctx_clear_err(ctx);
|
||||
Scalar sa, sb;
|
||||
if (!scalar_parse_strict(a, sa))
|
||||
if (!scalar_parse_strict(a, sa)) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_INPUT, "scalar a >= n");
|
||||
if (!scalar_parse_strict(b, sb))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!scalar_parse_strict(b, sb)) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_INPUT, "scalar b >= n");
|
||||
}
|
||||
auto P = point_from_compressed(P33);
|
||||
if (P.is_infinity())
|
||||
if (P.is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY, "invalid point P");
|
||||
}
|
||||
auto Q = point_from_compressed(Q33);
|
||||
if (Q.is_infinity())
|
||||
if (Q.is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY, "invalid point Q");
|
||||
}
|
||||
auto result = secp256k1::shamir_trick(sa, P, sb, Q);
|
||||
if (result.is_infinity())
|
||||
if (result.is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_ARITH, "result is infinity");
|
||||
}
|
||||
point_to_compressed(result, out33);
|
||||
return UFSECP_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -1539,15 +1572,18 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_multi_scalar_mul(ufsecp_ctx* ctx,
|
||||
std::vector<Scalar> svec(n);
|
||||
std::vector<Point> pvec(n);
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
|
||||
if (!scalar_parse_strict(scalars + i * 32, svec[i]))
|
||||
if (!scalar_parse_strict(scalars + i * 32, svec[i])) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_INPUT, "scalar >= n");
|
||||
}
|
||||
pvec[i] = point_from_compressed(points + i * 33);
|
||||
if (pvec[i].is_infinity())
|
||||
if (pvec[i].is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY, "invalid point in array");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
auto result = secp256k1::multi_scalar_mul(svec, pvec);
|
||||
if (result.is_infinity())
|
||||
if (result.is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_ARITH, "MSM result is infinity");
|
||||
}
|
||||
point_to_compressed(result, out33);
|
||||
return UFSECP_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -1564,18 +1600,20 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_musig2_key_agg(ufsecp_ctx* ctx,
|
||||
if (n < 2) return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_INPUT, "need >= 2 pubkeys");
|
||||
ctx_clear_err(ctx);
|
||||
std::vector<std::array<uint8_t, 32>> pks(n);
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; ++i)
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
|
||||
std::memcpy(pks[i].data(), pubkeys + i * 32, 32);
|
||||
}
|
||||
auto kagg = secp256k1::musig2_key_agg(pks);
|
||||
std::memcpy(agg_pubkey32_out, kagg.Q_x.data(), 32);
|
||||
/* Serialize key agg ctx: n(4) | Q_negated(1) | Q_compressed(33) | coefficients(n*32) */
|
||||
std::memset(keyagg_out, 0, UFSECP_MUSIG2_KEYAGG_LEN);
|
||||
uint32_t nk = static_cast<uint32_t>(kagg.key_coefficients.size());
|
||||
const auto nk = static_cast<uint32_t>(kagg.key_coefficients.size());
|
||||
std::memcpy(keyagg_out, &nk, 4);
|
||||
keyagg_out[4] = kagg.Q_negated ? 1 : 0;
|
||||
point_to_compressed(kagg.Q, keyagg_out + 5);
|
||||
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < nk && (38u + (i+1)*32u <= UFSECP_MUSIG2_KEYAGG_LEN); ++i)
|
||||
scalar_to_bytes(kagg.key_coefficients[i], keyagg_out + 38 + i * 32);
|
||||
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < nk && (38u + (i+1)*32u <= UFSECP_MUSIG2_KEYAGG_LEN); ++i) {
|
||||
scalar_to_bytes(kagg.key_coefficients[i], keyagg_out + 38 + static_cast<size_t>(i) * 32);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return UFSECP_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1591,8 +1629,9 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_musig2_nonce_gen(ufsecp_ctx* ctx,
|
||||
!secnonce_out || !pubnonce_out) return UFSECP_ERR_NULL_ARG;
|
||||
ctx_clear_err(ctx);
|
||||
Scalar sk;
|
||||
if (!scalar_parse_strict_nonzero(privkey, sk))
|
||||
if (!scalar_parse_strict_nonzero(privkey, sk)) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_KEY, "privkey is zero or >= n");
|
||||
}
|
||||
std::array<uint8_t, 32> pk_arr, agg_arr, msg_arr;
|
||||
std::memcpy(pk_arr.data(), pubkey32, 32);
|
||||
std::memcpy(agg_arr.data(), agg_pubkey32, 32);
|
||||
@ -1652,7 +1691,7 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_musig2_start_sign_session(
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Deserialize key agg context */
|
||||
secp256k1::MuSig2KeyAggCtx kagg;
|
||||
uint32_t nk;
|
||||
uint32_t nk = 0;
|
||||
std::memcpy(&nk, keyagg, 4);
|
||||
kagg.Q_negated = (keyagg[4] != 0);
|
||||
kagg.Q = point_from_compressed(keyagg + 5);
|
||||
@ -1688,22 +1727,26 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_musig2_partial_sign(
|
||||
const uint8_t session[UFSECP_MUSIG2_SESSION_LEN],
|
||||
size_t signer_index,
|
||||
uint8_t partial_sig32_out[32]) {
|
||||
if (!ctx || !secnonce || !privkey || !keyagg || !session || !partial_sig32_out)
|
||||
if (!ctx || !secnonce || !privkey || !keyagg || !session || !partial_sig32_out) {
|
||||
return UFSECP_ERR_NULL_ARG;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx_clear_err(ctx);
|
||||
Scalar sk;
|
||||
if (!scalar_parse_strict_nonzero(privkey, sk))
|
||||
if (!scalar_parse_strict_nonzero(privkey, sk)) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_KEY, "privkey is zero or >= n");
|
||||
}
|
||||
secp256k1::MuSig2SecNonce sn;
|
||||
Scalar k1, k2;
|
||||
if (!scalar_parse_strict_nonzero(secnonce, k1))
|
||||
if (!scalar_parse_strict_nonzero(secnonce, k1)) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_INPUT, "invalid secnonce k1");
|
||||
if (!scalar_parse_strict_nonzero(secnonce + 32, k2))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!scalar_parse_strict_nonzero(secnonce + 32, k2)) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_INPUT, "invalid secnonce k2");
|
||||
}
|
||||
sn.k1 = k1;
|
||||
sn.k2 = k2;
|
||||
secp256k1::MuSig2KeyAggCtx kagg;
|
||||
{ uint32_t nk; std::memcpy(&nk, keyagg, 4); kagg.Q_negated = (keyagg[4] != 0);
|
||||
{ uint32_t nk = 0; std::memcpy(&nk, keyagg, 4); kagg.Q_negated = (keyagg[4] != 0);
|
||||
kagg.Q = point_from_compressed(keyagg + 5);
|
||||
if (kagg.Q.is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_KEY, "invalid aggregated key");
|
||||
@ -1746,19 +1789,21 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_musig2_partial_verify(
|
||||
const uint8_t keyagg[UFSECP_MUSIG2_KEYAGG_LEN],
|
||||
const uint8_t session[UFSECP_MUSIG2_SESSION_LEN],
|
||||
size_t signer_index) {
|
||||
if (!ctx || !partial_sig32 || !pubnonce || !pubkey32 || !keyagg || !session)
|
||||
if (!ctx || !partial_sig32 || !pubnonce || !pubkey32 || !keyagg || !session) {
|
||||
return UFSECP_ERR_NULL_ARG;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx_clear_err(ctx);
|
||||
Scalar psig;
|
||||
if (!scalar_parse_strict(partial_sig32, psig))
|
||||
if (!scalar_parse_strict(partial_sig32, psig)) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_SIG, "partial sig >= n");
|
||||
}
|
||||
std::array<uint8_t, 66> pn_buf;
|
||||
std::memcpy(pn_buf.data(), pubnonce, 66);
|
||||
auto pn = secp256k1::MuSig2PubNonce::deserialize(pn_buf);
|
||||
std::array<uint8_t, 32> pk_arr;
|
||||
std::memcpy(pk_arr.data(), pubkey32, 32);
|
||||
secp256k1::MuSig2KeyAggCtx kagg;
|
||||
{ uint32_t nk; std::memcpy(&nk, keyagg, 4); kagg.Q_negated = (keyagg[4] != 0);
|
||||
{ uint32_t nk = 0; std::memcpy(&nk, keyagg, 4); kagg.Q_negated = (keyagg[4] != 0);
|
||||
kagg.Q = point_from_compressed(keyagg + 5);
|
||||
if (kagg.Q.is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_KEY, "invalid aggregated key");
|
||||
@ -1784,8 +1829,9 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_musig2_partial_verify(
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_INPUT, "invalid session scalar e");
|
||||
}
|
||||
sess.R_negated = (session[97] != 0);
|
||||
if (!secp256k1::musig2_partial_verify(psig, pn, pk_arr, kagg, sess, signer_index))
|
||||
if (!secp256k1::musig2_partial_verify(psig, pn, pk_arr, kagg, sess, signer_index)) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_VERIFY_FAIL, "partial sig verify failed");
|
||||
}
|
||||
return UFSECP_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1798,8 +1844,9 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_musig2_partial_sig_agg(
|
||||
ctx_clear_err(ctx);
|
||||
std::vector<Scalar> psigs(n);
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
|
||||
if (!scalar_parse_strict(partial_sigs + i * 32, psigs[i]))
|
||||
if (!scalar_parse_strict(partial_sigs + i * 32, psigs[i])) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_SIG, "partial sig >= n");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
secp256k1::MuSig2Session sess;
|
||||
sess.R = point_from_compressed(session);
|
||||
@ -1828,11 +1875,13 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_frost_keygen_begin(
|
||||
const uint8_t seed[32],
|
||||
uint8_t* commits_out, size_t* commits_len,
|
||||
uint8_t* shares_out, size_t* shares_len) {
|
||||
if (!ctx || !seed || !commits_out || !commits_len || !shares_out || !shares_len)
|
||||
if (!ctx || !seed || !commits_out || !commits_len || !shares_out || !shares_len) {
|
||||
return UFSECP_ERR_NULL_ARG;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx_clear_err(ctx);
|
||||
if (threshold < 2 || threshold > num_participants)
|
||||
if (threshold < 2 || threshold > num_participants) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_INPUT, "invalid threshold");
|
||||
}
|
||||
std::array<uint8_t, 32> seed_arr;
|
||||
std::memcpy(seed_arr.data(), seed, 32);
|
||||
auto [commit, shares] = secp256k1::frost_keygen_begin(
|
||||
@ -1841,9 +1890,10 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_frost_keygen_begin(
|
||||
/* Serialize commitment: coeff count(4) + from(4) + coeffs(33 each) */
|
||||
const size_t coeff_count = commit.coeffs.size();
|
||||
const size_t needed_commits = 8 + coeff_count * 33;
|
||||
if (*commits_len < needed_commits)
|
||||
if (*commits_len < needed_commits) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BUF_TOO_SMALL, "commits buffer too small");
|
||||
uint32_t cc32 = static_cast<uint32_t>(coeff_count);
|
||||
}
|
||||
const auto cc32 = static_cast<uint32_t>(coeff_count);
|
||||
std::memcpy(commits_out, &cc32, 4);
|
||||
std::memcpy(commits_out + 4, &commit.from, 4);
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < coeff_count; ++i) {
|
||||
@ -1852,9 +1902,10 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_frost_keygen_begin(
|
||||
}
|
||||
*commits_len = 8 + coeff_count * 33;
|
||||
/* Serialize shares */
|
||||
size_t needed_shares = shares.size() * UFSECP_FROST_SHARE_LEN;
|
||||
if (*shares_len < needed_shares)
|
||||
const size_t needed_shares = shares.size() * UFSECP_FROST_SHARE_LEN;
|
||||
if (*shares_len < needed_shares) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BUF_TOO_SMALL, "shares buffer too small");
|
||||
}
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < shares.size(); ++i) {
|
||||
uint8_t* s = shares_out + i * UFSECP_FROST_SHARE_LEN;
|
||||
std::memcpy(s, &shares[i].from, 4);
|
||||
@ -1902,7 +1953,7 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_frost_keygen_finalize(
|
||||
commits.push_back(std::move(fc));
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Deserialize shares */
|
||||
size_t n_shares = shares_len / UFSECP_FROST_SHARE_LEN;
|
||||
const size_t n_shares = shares_len / UFSECP_FROST_SHARE_LEN;
|
||||
std::vector<secp256k1::FrostShare> shares(n_shares);
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < n_shares; ++i) {
|
||||
const uint8_t* s = received_shares + i * UFSECP_FROST_SHARE_LEN;
|
||||
@ -1971,8 +2022,9 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_frost_sign(
|
||||
const uint8_t msg32[32],
|
||||
const uint8_t* nonce_commits, size_t n_signers,
|
||||
uint8_t partial_sig_out[36]) {
|
||||
if (!ctx || !keypkg || !nonce || !msg32 || !nonce_commits || !partial_sig_out)
|
||||
if (!ctx || !keypkg || !nonce || !msg32 || !nonce_commits || !partial_sig_out) {
|
||||
return UFSECP_ERR_NULL_ARG;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx_clear_err(ctx);
|
||||
secp256k1::FrostKeyPackage kp;
|
||||
std::memcpy(&kp.id, keypkg, 4);
|
||||
@ -2044,8 +2096,9 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_frost_verify_partial(
|
||||
}
|
||||
psig.z_i = z;
|
||||
auto vs = point_from_compressed(verification_share33);
|
||||
if (vs.is_infinity())
|
||||
if (vs.is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY, "invalid verification share");
|
||||
}
|
||||
std::vector<secp256k1::FrostNonceCommitment> ncs(n_signers);
|
||||
secp256k1::FrostNonceCommitment signer_commit{};
|
||||
bool found_signer = false;
|
||||
@ -2065,16 +2118,19 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_frost_verify_partial(
|
||||
found_signer = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!found_signer)
|
||||
if (!found_signer) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_INPUT, "partial_sig.id not found in nonce_commits");
|
||||
}
|
||||
auto gp = point_from_compressed(group_pubkey33);
|
||||
if (gp.is_infinity())
|
||||
if (gp.is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY, "invalid group public key");
|
||||
}
|
||||
std::array<uint8_t, 32> msg_arr;
|
||||
std::memcpy(msg_arr.data(), msg32, 32);
|
||||
bool ok = secp256k1::frost_verify_partial(psig, signer_commit, vs, msg_arr, ncs, gp);
|
||||
if (!ok)
|
||||
const bool ok = secp256k1::frost_verify_partial(psig, signer_commit, vs, msg_arr, ncs, gp);
|
||||
if (!ok) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_VERIFY_FAIL, "FROST partial signature verification failed");
|
||||
}
|
||||
return UFSECP_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2135,8 +2191,9 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_schnorr_adaptor_sign(
|
||||
const uint8_t adaptor_point33[33],
|
||||
const uint8_t aux_rand[32],
|
||||
uint8_t pre_sig_out[UFSECP_SCHNORR_ADAPTOR_SIG_LEN]) {
|
||||
if (!ctx || !privkey || !msg32 || !adaptor_point33 || !aux_rand || !pre_sig_out)
|
||||
if (!ctx || !privkey || !msg32 || !adaptor_point33 || !aux_rand || !pre_sig_out) {
|
||||
return UFSECP_ERR_NULL_ARG;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx_clear_err(ctx);
|
||||
Scalar sk;
|
||||
if (!scalar_parse_strict_nonzero(privkey, sk)) {
|
||||
@ -2829,10 +2886,12 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_coin_wif_encode(ufsecp_ctx* ctx,
|
||||
}
|
||||
auto wif = secp256k1::coins::coin_wif_encode(sk, *coin, true, testnet != 0);
|
||||
secp256k1::detail::secure_erase(&sk, sizeof(sk));
|
||||
if (wif.empty())
|
||||
if (wif.empty()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_INTERNAL, "WIF encode failed");
|
||||
if (*wif_len < wif.size() + 1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (*wif_len < wif.size() + 1) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BUF_TOO_SMALL, "WIF buffer too small");
|
||||
}
|
||||
std::memcpy(wif_out, wif.c_str(), wif.size() + 1);
|
||||
*wif_len = wif.size();
|
||||
return UFSECP_OK;
|
||||
@ -3144,7 +3203,7 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_eth_address(ufsecp_ctx* ctx,
|
||||
if (!ctx || !pubkey33 || !addr20_out) return UFSECP_ERR_NULL_ARG;
|
||||
ctx_clear_err(ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
Point pk = point_from_compressed(pubkey33);
|
||||
const Point pk = point_from_compressed(pubkey33);
|
||||
if (pk.is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY, "invalid compressed pubkey");
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -3164,12 +3223,12 @@ ufsecp_error_t ufsecp_eth_address_checksummed(ufsecp_ctx* ctx,
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BUF_TOO_SMALL, "need >= 43 bytes for ETH address");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Point pk = point_from_compressed(pubkey33);
|
||||
const Point pk = point_from_compressed(pubkey33);
|
||||
if (pk.is_infinity()) {
|
||||
return ctx_set_err(ctx, UFSECP_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY, "invalid compressed pubkey");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
std::string addr_str = secp256k1::coins::ethereum_address(pk);
|
||||
const std::string addr_str = secp256k1::coins::ethereum_address(pk);
|
||||
std::memcpy(addr_out, addr_str.c_str(), addr_str.size());
|
||||
addr_out[addr_str.size()] = '\0';
|
||||
*addr_len = addr_str.size();
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user