dcrd/txscript/sigcache.go
Ryan Staudt 380c8d512b txscript: Store short tx hash in sigcache.
This adds a uint64 short transaction hash to sigcache entries.  This can
be used to proactively evict entries from the sigcache based on the
transaction that they are associated with.
2020-09-24 12:19:59 -05:00

142 lines
5.5 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) 2015-2016 The btcsuite developers
// Copyright (c) 2016-2020 The Decred developers
// Use of this source code is governed by an ISC
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package txscript
import (
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/binary"
"sync"
"github.com/dchest/siphash"
"github.com/decred/dcrd/chaincfg/chainhash"
"github.com/decred/dcrd/dcrec/secp256k1/v3"
"github.com/decred/dcrd/dcrec/secp256k1/v3/ecdsa"
"github.com/decred/dcrd/wire"
)
// shortTxHashKeySize is the size of the byte array required for key material
// for the SipHash keyed shortTxHash function.
const shortTxHashKeySize = 16
// sigCacheEntry represents an entry in the SigCache. Entries within the
// SigCache are keyed according to the sigHash of the signature. In the
// scenario of a cache-hit (according to the sigHash), an additional comparison
// of the signature and public key will be executed in order to ensure a complete
// match. In the occasion that two sigHashes collide, the newer sigHash will
// simply overwrite the existing entry.
type sigCacheEntry struct {
sig *ecdsa.Signature
pubKey *secp256k1.PublicKey
shortTxHash uint64
}
// SigCache implements an ECDSA signature verification cache with a randomized
// entry eviction policy. Only valid signatures will be added to the cache. The
// benefits of SigCache are two fold. Firstly, usage of SigCache mitigates a DoS
// attack wherein an attack causes a victim's client to hang due to worst-case
// behavior triggered while processing attacker crafted invalid transactions. A
// detailed description of the mitigated DoS attack can be found here:
// https://bitslog.wordpress.com/2013/01/23/fixed-bitcoin-vulnerability-explanation-why-the-signature-cache-is-a-dos-protection/.
// Secondly, usage of the SigCache introduces a signature verification
// optimization which speeds up the validation of transactions within a block,
// if they've already been seen and verified within the mempool.
type SigCache struct {
sync.RWMutex
validSigs map[chainhash.Hash]sigCacheEntry
maxEntries uint
shortTxHashKey [shortTxHashKeySize]byte
}
// NewSigCache creates and initializes a new instance of SigCache. Its sole
// parameter 'maxEntries' represents the maximum number of entries allowed to
// exist in the SigCache at any particular moment. Random entries are evicted
// to make room for new entries that would cause the number of entries in the
// cache to exceed the max.
func NewSigCache(maxEntries uint) (*SigCache, error) {
// Create a cryptographically secure random key for generating short tx hashes.
shortTxHashKey, err := createShortTxHashKey()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &SigCache{
validSigs: make(map[chainhash.Hash]sigCacheEntry, maxEntries),
maxEntries: maxEntries,
shortTxHashKey: shortTxHashKey,
}, nil
}
// Exists returns true if an existing entry of 'sig' over 'sigHash' for public
// key 'pubKey' is found within the SigCache. Otherwise, false is returned.
//
// NOTE: This function is safe for concurrent access. Readers won't be blocked
// unless there exists a writer, adding an entry to the SigCache.
func (s *SigCache) Exists(sigHash chainhash.Hash, sig *ecdsa.Signature, pubKey *secp256k1.PublicKey) bool {
s.RLock()
entry, ok := s.validSigs[sigHash]
s.RUnlock()
return ok && entry.pubKey.IsEqual(pubKey) && entry.sig.IsEqual(sig)
}
// Add adds an entry for a signature over 'sigHash' under public key 'pubKey'
// to the signature cache. In the event that the SigCache is 'full', an
// existing entry is randomly chosen to be evicted in order to make space for
// the new entry.
//
// NOTE: This function is safe for concurrent access. Writers will block
// simultaneous readers until function execution has concluded.
func (s *SigCache) Add(sigHash chainhash.Hash, sig *ecdsa.Signature, pubKey *secp256k1.PublicKey, tx *wire.MsgTx) {
s.Lock()
defer s.Unlock()
if s.maxEntries == 0 {
return
}
// If adding this new entry will put us over the max number of allowed
// entries, then evict an entry.
if uint(len(s.validSigs)+1) > s.maxEntries {
// Remove a random entry from the map. Relying on the random
// starting point of Go's map iteration. It's worth noting that
// the random iteration starting point is not 100% guaranteed
// by the spec, however most Go compilers support it.
// Ultimately, the iteration order isn't important here because
// in order to manipulate which items are evicted, an adversary
// would need to be able to execute preimage attacks on the
// hashing function in order to start eviction at a specific
// entry.
for sigEntry := range s.validSigs {
delete(s.validSigs, sigEntry)
break
}
}
s.validSigs[sigHash] = sigCacheEntry{sig, pubKey, shortTxHash(tx, s.shortTxHashKey)}
}
// createShortTxHashKey returns a cryptographically secure random key of size
// shortTxHashKeySize that can be used for generating short transaction hashes
// with the shortTxHash function.
func createShortTxHashKey() ([shortTxHashKeySize]byte, error) {
var key [shortTxHashKeySize]byte
_, err := rand.Read(key[:])
if err != nil {
return key, err
}
return key, nil
}
// shortTxHash generates a short hash from the standard transaction hash. The
// hash function used is SipHash-2-4, a keyed function, and it produces a 64-bit
// hash. The key that is used must be a cryptographically secure random key.
func shortTxHash(msg *wire.MsgTx, key [shortTxHashKeySize]byte) uint64 {
k0 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[0:8])
k1 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[8:16])
txHash := msg.TxHash()
return siphash.Hash(k0, k1, txHash[:])
}