Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Justin
35b1441397 fix: update remaining clawdbot references to openclaw
- Update LICENSE copyright from Clawdbot to OpenClaw Contributors
- Change CLAWDBOT_DEV_DIR to OPENCLAW_DEV_DIR in docs and upgrade notes
- Update security.md overview text
- Update UPGRADE_NOTES.md section heading

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-13 14:15:22 -06:00
Justin
aa084466b7 fix: use canonical authorized_key FQCN and update remaining clawdbot refs
- Add ansible.posix collection to requirements.yml (>=1.5.0)
- Change ansible.builtin.authorized_key to ansible.posix.authorized_key
- Update documentation references from clawdbot to openclaw
- Fix Jinja2 template lstrip_blocks to use boolean instead of string

Addresses PR #16 maintainer feedback for clawdbot → openclaw rename.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-13 14:11:11 -06:00
Andy Lauppe
1f60554617 Merge main into rename PR with security improvements
Resolves conflicts between OpenClaw rename and security hardening:
- Applied scoped sudo permissions with openclaw naming
- Added dynamic UID to service template
- Merged security features (fail2ban, unattended-upgrades)
- Added ansible.posix collection and fixed authorized_key FQCN
- Updated comments to reference OpenClaw instead of Clawdbot

Co-Authored-By: olsonale <olsonale@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-10 08:46:53 -05:00
Alec Olson
dd50f73d85 docs: update documentation for OpenClaw rename
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-02 21:33:04 -07:00
Andrew Lauppe
a7d6c9b89d fix(security): harden installation with scoped sudo, fail2ban, and auto-updates
Security improvements:

1. CRITICAL: Scope sudo access for clawdbot user
   - Changed from 'ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL' to specific commands only
   - Now limited to: systemctl for clawdbot service, tailscale, journalctl
   - Prevents full root compromise if application is exploited

2. CRITICAL: Fix hardcoded UID in systemd template
   - Changed XDG_RUNTIME_DIR from /run/user/1000 to dynamic
   - Uses clawdbot_uid_value variable with fallback

3. Add fail2ban for SSH brute-force protection
   - 5 failed attempts = 1 hour ban
   - Protects against automated attacks on exposed SSH

4. Add unattended-upgrades for automatic security updates
   - Security-only updates enabled by default
   - Automatic reboots disabled (manual control)

5. Update documentation
   - security.md: Document all 8 security layers
   - README.md: Add security features to list
   - AGENTS.md: Document security rationale and known limitations

Known limitations documented:
- macOS support incomplete (no launchd/pf)
- IPv6 disabled in Docker
- curl|bash pattern inherent risks

Signed-off-by: Andrew Lauppe <andy@t5tele.com>
2026-01-31 19:29:45 -05:00
sheeek
476829c8a5 Initial commit: Hardened Clawdbot installer with Tailscale + UFW + Docker isolation 2026-01-08 17:44:49 +01:00