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chore(sync): mirror docs from openclaw/openclaw@905f19230a

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openclaw-docs-sync[bot] 2026-04-10 18:36:09 +00:00
parent f5e8eb7724
commit 6506af2a7e
4 changed files with 11 additions and 11 deletions
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4
.openclaw-sync/source.json
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
{
"repository": "openclaw/openclaw",
"sha": "bac98d42188127d5458a2aaca75987523ca1fc10",
"syncedAt": "2026-04-10T16:31:51.379Z"
"sha": "905f19230a1379ae3a4f3230a42acf55c5f3c8b1",
"syncedAt": "2026-04-10T18:36:08.874Z"
}

6
docs/gateway/configuration-reference.md
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@ -2758,7 +2758,7 @@ See [Plugins](/tools/plugin).
evaluateEnabled: true,
defaultProfile: "user",
ssrfPolicy: {
dangerouslyAllowPrivateNetwork: true, // default trusted-network mode
// dangerouslyAllowPrivateNetwork: true, // opt in only for trusted private-network access
// allowPrivateNetwork: true, // legacy alias
// hostnameAllowlist: ["*.example.com", "example.com"],
// allowedHostnames: ["localhost"],
@ -2786,8 +2786,8 @@ See [Plugins](/tools/plugin).
```
- `evaluateEnabled: false` disables `act:evaluate` and `wait --fn`.
- `ssrfPolicy.dangerouslyAllowPrivateNetwork` defaults to `true` when unset (trusted-network model).
- Set `ssrfPolicy.dangerouslyAllowPrivateNetwork: false` for strict public-only browser navigation.
- `ssrfPolicy.dangerouslyAllowPrivateNetwork` is disabled when unset, so browser navigation stays strict by default.
- Set `ssrfPolicy.dangerouslyAllowPrivateNetwork: true` only when you intentionally trust private-network browser navigation.
- In strict mode, remote CDP profile endpoints (`profiles.*.cdpUrl`) are subject to the same private-network blocking during reachability/discovery checks.
- `ssrfPolicy.allowPrivateNetwork` remains supported as a legacy alias.
- In strict mode, use `ssrfPolicy.hostnameAllowlist` and `ssrfPolicy.allowedHostnames` for explicit exceptions.

8
docs/gateway/security/index.md
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@ -1149,13 +1149,13 @@ access those accounts and data. Treat browser profiles as **sensitive state**:
- Disable browser proxy routing when you don’t need it (`gateway.nodes.browser.mode="off"`).
- Chrome MCP existing-session mode is **not** “safer”; it can act as you in whatever that host Chrome profile can reach.
### Browser SSRF policy (trusted-network default)
### Browser SSRF policy (strict by default)
OpenClaw’s browser network policy defaults to the trusted-operator model: private/internal destinations are allowed unless you explicitly disable them.
OpenClaw’s browser navigation policy is strict by default: private/internal destinations stay blocked unless you explicitly opt in.
- Default: `browser.ssrfPolicy.dangerouslyAllowPrivateNetwork: true` (implicit when unset).
- Default: `browser.ssrfPolicy.dangerouslyAllowPrivateNetwork` is unset, so browser navigation keeps private/internal/special-use destinations blocked.
- Legacy alias: `browser.ssrfPolicy.allowPrivateNetwork` is still accepted for compatibility.
- Strict mode: set `browser.ssrfPolicy.dangerouslyAllowPrivateNetwork: false` to block private/internal/special-use destinations by default.
- Opt-in mode: set `browser.ssrfPolicy.dangerouslyAllowPrivateNetwork: true` to allow private/internal/special-use destinations.
- In strict mode, use `hostnameAllowlist` (patterns like `*.example.com`) and `allowedHostnames` (exact host exceptions, including blocked names like `localhost`) for explicit exceptions.
- Navigation is checked before request and best-effort re-checked on the final `http(s)` URL after navigation to reduce redirect-based pivots.

4
docs/tools/browser.md
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@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ Browser settings live in `~/.openclaw/openclaw.json`.
browser: {
enabled: true, // default: true
ssrfPolicy: {
dangerouslyAllowPrivateNetwork: true, // default trusted-network mode
// dangerouslyAllowPrivateNetwork: true, // opt in only for trusted private-network access
// allowPrivateNetwork: true, // legacy alias
// hostnameAllowlist: ["*.example.com", "example.com"],
// allowedHostnames: ["localhost"],
@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ Notes:
- `remoteCdpHandshakeTimeoutMs` applies to remote CDP WebSocket reachability checks.
- Browser navigation/open-tab is SSRF-guarded before navigation and best-effort re-checked on final `http(s)` URL after navigation.
- In strict SSRF mode, remote CDP endpoint discovery/probes (`cdpUrl`, including `/json/version` lookups) are checked too.
- `browser.ssrfPolicy.dangerouslyAllowPrivateNetwork` defaults to `true` (trusted-network model). Set it to `false` for strict public-only browsing.
- `browser.ssrfPolicy.dangerouslyAllowPrivateNetwork` is disabled by default. Set it to `true` only when you intentionally trust private-network browser access.
- `browser.ssrfPolicy.allowPrivateNetwork` remains supported as a legacy alias for compatibility.
- `attachOnly: true` means “never launch a local browser; only attach if it is already running.”
- `color` + per-profile `color` tint the browser UI so you can see which profile is active.