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.tags
pp
.idea/

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[submodule "external/micropython"]
path = external/micropython
url = https://github.com/Coldcard/micropython.git
branch = mk4-base
branch = master
[submodule "external/modcryptocurrency"]
path = external/modcryptocurrency
url = https://github.com/Coldcard/modcryptocurrency.git
[submodule "external/crypto"]
path = external/crypto
url = https://github.com/peter-conalgo/trezor-crypto.git
[submodule "external/ckcc-protocol"]
path = external/ckcc-protocol
url = https://github.com/Coldcard/ckcc-protocol.git
[submodule "external/mpy-qr"]
path = external/mpy-qr
url = https://github.com/coinkite/mpy-qr.git
[submodule "external/libngu"]
path = external/libngu
url = https://github.com/switck/libngu.git
[submodule "stm32/mk4-bootloader/hal"]
path = stm32/mk4-bootloader/hal
url = https://github.com/STMicroelectronics/STM32CubeL4.git
[submodule "misc/gpu/external/stm32c0xx_hal_driver"]
path = misc/gpu/external/stm32c0xx_hal_driver
url = https://github.com/STMicroelectronics/stm32c0xx_hal_driver.git
[submodule "misc/gpu/external/cmsis_device_c0"]
path = misc/gpu/external/cmsis_device_c0
url = https://github.com/STMicroelectronics/cmsis_device_c0.git

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## Individual Contributor License Agreement (CLA)
**Thank you for submitting your contributions to this project.**
By signing this CLA, you agree that the following terms apply to all of your past, present and future contributions
to the project.
### License.
You hereby represent that all present, past and future contributions are governed by the
[COPYING-CC](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Coldcard/firmware/master/COPYING-CC)
copyright statement.
This entails that to the extent possible under law, you transfer all copyright and related or neighboring rights
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### Moral Rights.
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### Third Party Content.
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do not apply to any portion of a Project that is incorporated into your Contribution to that same Project.
### Representations.
You represent that, other than the Third Party Content and Third Party Rights identified by
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### Disclaimer.
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sole discretion of the maintainers or their authorized delegates.

674
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to choose that version for the Program.
Later license versions may give you additional or different
permissions. However, no additional obligations are imposed on any
author or copyright holder as a result of your choosing to follow a
later version.
15. Disclaimer of Warranty.
THERE IS NO WARRANTY FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY
APPLICABLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT
HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY
OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM
IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF
ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
16. Limitation of Liability.
IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MODIFIES AND/OR CONVEYS
THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES, INCLUDING ANY
GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THE
USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO LOSS OF
DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY YOU OR THIRD
PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER PROGRAMS),
EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
SUCH DAMAGES.
17. Interpretation of Sections 15 and 16.
If the disclaimer of warranty and limitation of liability provided
above cannot be given local legal effect according to their terms,
reviewing courts shall apply local law that most closely approximates
an absolute waiver of all civil liability in connection with the
Program, unless a warranty or assumption of liability accompanies a
copy of the Program in return for a fee.
END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
How to Apply These Terms to Your New Programs
If you develop a new program, and you want it to be of the greatest
possible use to the public, the best way to achieve this is to make it
free software which everyone can redistribute and change under these terms.
To do so, attach the following notices to the program. It is safest
to attach them to the start of each source file to most effectively
state the exclusion of warranty; and each file should have at least
the "copyright" line and a pointer to where the full notice is found.
<one line to give the program's name and a brief idea of what it does.>
Copyright (C) <year> <name of author>
This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper mail.
If the program does terminal interaction, make it output a short
notice like this when it starts in an interactive mode:
<program> Copyright (C) <year> <name of author>
This program comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type `show w'.
This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it
under certain conditions; type `show c' for details.
The hypothetical commands `show w' and `show c' should show the appropriate
parts of the General Public License. Of course, your program's commands
might be different; for a GUI interface, you would use an "about box".
You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or school,
if any, to sign a "copyright disclaimer" for the program, if necessary.
For more information on this, and how to apply and follow the GNU GPL, see
<http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
The GNU General Public License does not permit incorporating your program
into proprietary programs. If your program is a subroutine library, you
may consider it more useful to permit linking proprietary applications with
the library. If this is what you want to do, use the GNU Lesser General
Public License instead of this License. But first, please read
<http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/why-not-lgpl.html>.

View File

@ -1 +0,0 @@
COPYING-CC

16
LICENSE Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
(c) Copyright 2017-2020 by Coinkite Inc.
This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
in the file COPYING. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.

270
README.md
View File

@ -1,156 +1,37 @@
# COLDCARD Hardware Wallet
# Coldcard Wallet
Coldcard is an Affordable, Ultra-secure & Verifiable Hardware Wallet for Bitcoin.
Get yours at [Coldcard.com](http://coldcard.com)
Coldcard is a Cheap, Ultra-secure & Opensource Hardware Wallet for Bitcoin.
Get yours at [ColdcardWallet.com](http://coldcardwallet.com)
[Follow @COLDCARDwallet on Twitter](https://twitter.com/coldcardwallet) to keep up
with the latest updates and security alerts.
with the latest updates and security alerts.
![coldcard logo](https://coldcard.com/static/images/coldcard-logo-nav.png)
![Mk5 coldcard picture front](https://coldcard.com/static/images/mk5-front.png)
## Quick Links
- [Latest firmware changes and updates](releases/ChangeLog.md)
- [PGP signature file](releases/signatures.txt)
- [Firmware binaries](https://coldcard.com/downloads)
## Reproducible Builds
To have confidence this source code tree is the same as the binary on your device,
you can rebuild it from source and get **exactly the same bytes**. This process
has been automated using Docker. Steps are as follows:
1. Install [Docker](https://www.docker.com) and start it.
2. Install [make (GNUMake)](https://www.gnu.org/software/make/) if you don't already have it.
3. Checkout a specific version of the code, and start the process.
```shell
git clone https://github.com/Coldcard/firmware.git
cd firmware
# DOWNLOAD https://coldcard.com/downloads
# get a copy of binary into ./releases/2026-03-05T2052-v5.5.0-mk-coldcard.dfu
git checkout 2026-03-05T2052-v5.5.0
cd stm32
make -f MK4-Makefile repro
```
4. At the end of the process a clear confirmation message is shown, or the differences.
5. Build products can be found `firmware/stm32/built`.
6. If you do not trust the results of `make repro` refer to `docs/notes-on-repro.md`
which breaks down the process.
7. Process for Q firmware is the same, but change `MK4-Makefile` in last step to `Q1-Makefile`
## Long-Lived Branches
We are now maintaining two branches: `master` and `edge`.
"Edge" will contain features that may not be ready for prime time,
such as Taproot or Miniscript. Our standards for releasing new Edge
versions are lower, so we can iterate faster and get these advancements
out to other developers.
Q and Mk series share the same code base. Individual files that are added,
or removed, can be see in differences between `shared/manifest_mk4.py`
and `shared/manifest_q1.py`. Common files are in `shared/manifest.py`.
Firmware built for Mk5, supports the Mk4 without any functional differences.
![coldcard logo](https://coldcardwallet.com/static/images/coldcard-logo-nav.png)
![coldcard picture front](https://coldcardwallet.com/static/images/coldcard-front.png)
![coldcard picture back](https://coldcardwallet.com/static/images/coldcard-back.png)
## Check-out and Setup
**NOTE** This is the `master` branch and covers the latest hardware (Mk and Q).
See branch `v4-legacy` for firmware which supports only Mk3/Mk2 and earlier.
Do a checkout, recursively to get all the submodules:
Do a checkout, recursively, to get all the submodules:
```shell
git clone --recursive https://github.com/Coldcard/firmware.git
```
Already checked-out and getting git errors? Do this:
```shell
git fetch
git reset --hard origin/master
```
Alternatively, to get the latest release, you checkout a tagged branch:
```shell
git clone https://github.com/Coldcard/firmware.git
cd firmware
git checkout $(git describe --match "20*" --abbrev=0)
git submodule update --init --recursive
```
Do not use a path with any spaces in it. The Makefiles do not handle
that well and we're not planning to fix it.
Keep in mind that python requirements may change between versions,
so at the top level, do this command:
```shell
pip install -r requirements.txt
```
### macOS
[Python 3.5 or higher](https://www.python.org) and [Homebrew](https://brew.sh) is required.
If working on an ARM-based MacOS system, you may want to create a
new shell with `arch -x86_64 bash` before starting, or continuing
to work on this source tree.
#### Setup and run the desktop simulator
You'll probably need to install at least these packages:
```shell
brew install sdl2 xterm swig
brew install --cask xquartz gcc-arm-embedded
```
Used to be these were needed as well:
```shell
brew tap PX4/px4
brew search px4/px4/gcc-arm-none-eabi
```
Then install the newest version, currently 83:
```shell
brew install px4/px4/gcc-arm-none-eabi-83
```
You may need to `brew upgrade gcc-arm-embedded` because we need 10.2 or higher.
git clone --recursive https://github.com/Coldcard/firmware.git
Then:
```shell
brew install automake autogen virtualenv
virtualenv -p python3 ENV
source ENV/bin/activate (or source ENV/bin/activate.csh based on shell preference)
pip install -U pip
pip install -r requirements.txt
# apply micropython patch
pushd external/micropython
git apply ../../macos-mpy.patch
popd
make -C external/micropython/mpy-cross
cd unix; make setup && make ngu-setup && make && ./simulator.py
```
- `cd firmware`
- `git submodule update --init` _(if needed?)_
- `brew install autogen`
- `virtualenv -p python3 ENV` (Python > 3.5 is required)
- `source ENV/bin/activate` (or `source ENV/bin/activate.csh` based on shell preference)
- `pip install -r requirements.txt`
You may need to reboot to avoid a `DISPLAY is not set` error.
Setup and Run the Desktop-based Coldcard simulator:
The next time you want to run the simulator, you can simply do
- `cd unix; make setup && make; ./simulator.py`
```shell
source ENV/bin/activate && cd unix && ./simulator.py
```
#### Building the firmware
Building the firmware:
- `cd ../cli; pip install --editable .`
- `cd ../stm32; make setup && make; make firmware-signed.dfu`
@ -160,72 +41,42 @@ source ENV/bin/activate && cd unix && ./simulator.py
Which looks like this:
```shell
[ENV] [firmware/stm32 42] ckcc upgrade firmware-signed.dfu
675328 bytes (start @ 293) to send from 'firmware-signed.dfu'
Uploading [##########--------------------------] 29% 0d 00:01:04
```
[ENV] [firmware/stm32 42] ckcc upgrade firmware-signed.dfu
675328 bytes (start @ 293) to send from 'firmware-signed.dfu'
Uploading [##########--------------------------] 29% 0d 00:01:04
#### Big Sur Issues
`defaults write org.python.python ApplePersistenceIgnoreState NO` will suppress a warning about `Python[22580:10101559] ApplePersistenceIgnoreState: Existing state will not be touched. New state will be written to...`
### MacOS
See <https://bugs.python.org/issue32909>
You'll probably need to install at least these packages:
brew cask install xquartz
brew install sdl2
brew cask install gcc-arm-none-eabi
Used to be these were needed as well:
brew install sdl2
brew tap PX4/px4
brew search px4
brew install px4/px4/gcc-arm-none-eabi-80 (latest gcc-arm-none-eabi-XX, currently 80)
You may need to reboot to avoid a `DISPLAY is not set` error.
### Linux
All steps you need to install and run the Coldcard simulator on Ubuntu 20.04:
You'll probably need to install these (Ubuntu 16):
apt install libudev-dev python-sdl2 gcc-arm-none-eabi
```shell
# Install (system) requirements, tools and libraries
apt install build-essential git python3 python3-pip libudev-dev gcc-arm-none-eabi libffi-dev xterm swig libpcsclite-dev python-is-python3 autoconf libtool python3-venv
# Get sources, this takes a long time (because of external libraries), then open
git clone --recursive https://github.com/Coldcard/firmware.git
cd firmware
# Apply address patch
# if unix/linux_addr.patch exists use below command
# not needed in current revision
# git apply unix/linux_addr.patch
# * below is needed for ubuntu 24.04
pushd external/micropython
git apply ../../ubuntu24_mpy.patch
popd
# *
# Create Python virtual environment and activate it
python3 -m venv ENV # or virtualenv -p python3 ENV
source ENV/bin/activate
# Install dependencies
pip install -U pip setuptools
pip install -r requirements.txt #general requirements
pip install pysdl2-dll # Ubuntu needs this dependency
# Build the Coldcard simulator
cd unix
pushd ../external/micropython/mpy-cross/
make # mpy-cross
popd
make setup
make ngu-setup
make
# Run the simulator in the active virtualenv
./simulator.py
# Later, if you want to run it (after a reboot). This assumes you extracted the git repo in ~ (home)
cd ~/firmware
source ENV/bin/activate
cd unix
./simulator.py
If you get stuck on the "Skip PIN" screen after the startup, edit the `pyb.py` file located under `/unix/frozen-modules/` and follow the instructions from line 27 to line 31:
```
# If on linux, try commenting the following line
addr = bytes([len(fn)+2, socket.AF_UNIX] + list(fn))
# If on linux, try uncommenting the following two lines
#import struct
#addr = struct.pack('H108s', socket.AF_UNIX, fn)
```
Also make sure that you have your python3 symlinked to python.
## Code Organization
@ -235,55 +86,40 @@ Top-level dirs:
- shared code between desktop test version and real-deal
- expected to be largely in python, and higher-level
- code exclusive to the Mk4 or Mk5 will be listed in `manifest_mk4.py`, and
to the Q will be listed in `manifest_q1.py`
`unix`
- unix (macOS) version for testing/rapid dev
- unix (MacOS) version for testing/rapid dev
- this is a simulator for the product
`testing`
- test cases and associated data
`stm32`
- embedded binaries (and building), for actual product hardware
- embedded micro version, for actual product
- final target is a binary file for loading onto hardware
`external`
- code from other projects, ie. the dreaded submodules
`graphics`
- images which ship as part of the final product (icons)
`stm32/bootloader`
- 32k of factory-set code that you cannot change (Mk3)
- however, you can inspect what code is on your coldcard and compare to this.
`stm32/mk4-bootloader`
`stm32/q1-bootloader`
- 128k of factory-set code that you cannot change
- 32k of factory-set code that you cannot change
- however, you can inspect what code is on your coldcard and compare to this.
`hardware`
- schematic and bill of materials for the Coldcard, all versions.
- schematic and bill of materials for the Coldcard
`unix/work/...`
`unix/work/MicroSD`
- `/MicroSD/*` files on "simulated" microSD card
- files on "simulated" microSD card
- `/VirtDisk/*` simulated emulated virtual Disk files.
- `/settings/*.aes` persistent settings for Simulator
## Support
Found a bug? Email: support@coinkite.com

View File

@ -1,4 +1,15 @@
# only items needed for signit.py
# NOTE: much of this is implied by ckcc-protocol/setup
# may need "brew install hidapi" before this?
hidapi>=0.7.99.post21
click>=6.7
# required by signit.py and link-layer encryption in client.py
ecdsa>=0.13
# so pydfu.py can run?
pyusb
# for link-layer encryption
pyaes

View File

@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ from setuptools import setup
setup(
name='signit',
version='1.0',
py_modules=['signit', 'sigheader'],
#py_modules=['ckcc'],
install_requires=[
'Click',
],

View File

@ -1 +1 @@
../stm32/sigheader.py
../stm32/bootloader/sigheader.py

View File

@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ from ecdsa import SigningKey, VerifyingKey
from ecdsa.curves import SECP256k1
from sigheader import *
# list of hardware we are presently supporting
CURRENT_HARDWARE = MK_2_OK | MK_3_OK
# more details about header
header = namedtuple('header', FWH_PY_VALUES)
packed_len = struct.calcsize(FWH_PY_FORMAT)
@ -91,10 +94,6 @@ def show_version(fname):
# just dump the version number in a form that makes for good filenames
data = open(fname, 'rb').read()
if data[0:5] == b'DfuSe':
# Got DFU file, pulling out raw binary.
(_, _, data),*_ = dfu_parse(open(fname, 'rb'))
hdr = data[FW_HEADER_OFFSET:FW_HEADER_OFFSET+FW_HEADER_SIZE ]
hdr = header(**dict(zip(FWH_PY_VALUES.split(), struct.unpack(FWH_PY_FORMAT, hdr))))
@ -106,82 +105,13 @@ def show_version(fname):
print('{built}-v{ver}'.format(built=built, ver=ver))
def dfu_parse(fd):
# do just a little parsing of DFU headers, to find start/length of main binary
# - not trying to support anything but what ../stm32/Makefile will generate
# - see external/micropython/tools/pydfu.py for details
# - works sequentially only
import struct
from collections import namedtuple
fd.seek(0)
def consume(xfd, tname, fmt, names):
# Parses the struct defined by `fmt` from `data`, stores the parsed fields
# into a named tuple using `names`. Returns the named tuple.
size = struct.calcsize(fmt)
here = xfd.read(size)
ty = namedtuple(tname, names.split())
values = struct.unpack(fmt, here)
return ty(*values)
dfu_prefix = consume(fd, 'DFU', '<5sBIB', 'signature version size targets')
#print('dfu: ' + repr(dfu_prefix))
assert dfu_prefix.signature == b'DfuSe', "Not a DFU file (bad magic)"
for idx in range(dfu_prefix.targets):
prefix = consume(fd, 'Target', '<6sBI255s2I',
'signature altsetting named name size elements')
#print("target%d: %r" % (idx, prefix))
for ei in range(prefix.elements):
# Decode target prefix
# < little endian
# I uint32_t element address
# I uint32_t element size
elem = consume(fd, 'Element', '<2I', 'addr size')
#print("target%d: %r" % (ei, elem))
yield fd.tell(), elem.size, fd.read(elem.size)
@main.command('split')
@click.argument('dfu', metavar='202....-coldcard.dfu')
@click.argument('firmware', metavar='FIRMWARE.bin')
@click.argument('bootrom', metavar='BOOTROM.bin')
def split_dfu(dfu, firmware, bootrom):
"Pull out sections from DFU file for verification purposes"
with open(dfu, 'rb') as fd:
for n, (off, ln, data) in enumerate(dfu_parse(fd)):
if n == 0:
target = firmware
name = 'Firmware'
elif n == 1:
target = bootrom
name = 'Bootrom'
else:
raise ValueError(n)
# keep this printout so others can check our copy is faithful
print(f'start {off} for {ln} bytes: {name} => {target}')
open(target, 'wb').write(data)
@main.command('check')
@click.argument('fname', default='firmware-signed.bin')
def readback(fname):
"Verify pubkey and signature used in binary file"
data = open(fname, 'rb').read()
if data[0:5] == b'DfuSe':
click.secho("Got DFU file, pulling out raw binary.", fg='red')
(_, _, data),*_ = dfu_parse(open(fname, 'rb'))
assert data[0:5] != b'DfuSe', "got DFU, expect raw binary"
hdr = data[FW_HEADER_OFFSET:FW_HEADER_OFFSET+FW_HEADER_SIZE ]
@ -207,10 +137,7 @@ def readback(fname):
if v & MK_1_OK: d.append('Mk1')
if v & MK_2_OK: d.append('Mk2')
if v & MK_3_OK: d.append('Mk3')
if v & MK_4_OK: d.append('Mk4')
if v & MK_5_OK: d.append('Mk5')
if v & MK_Q1_OK: d.append('Q1')
if v & ~(MK_1_OK | MK_2_OK | MK_3_OK | MK_4_OK | MK_5_OK | MK_Q1_OK):
if v & ~(MK_1_OK | MK_2_OK | MK_3_OK):
d.append('?other?')
v = nv + '+'.join(d)
elif fld == 'timestamp':
@ -228,7 +155,7 @@ def readback(fname):
a.update(data[FW_HEADER_OFFSET+FW_HEADER_SIZE:])
chk = sha256(a.digest()).digest()
print("sha256^2: %s" % b2a_hex(chk).decode('ascii'))
#print("sha256^2: %s" % b2a_hex(chk).decode('ascii'))
# from pubkey
vk = VerifyingKey.from_pem(open("keys/%02d.pubkey.pem" % vals['pubkey_num']).read())
@ -246,29 +173,20 @@ def readback(fname):
@click.option('--pubkey-num', '-k', type=int, help='Which key # to use for signing', default=0)
@click.option('--high_water', '-h', is_flag=True, help='Mark version as new highwater mark (no downgrades below this version)')
@click.option('--verbose', '-v', default=False, is_flag=True, help='Show numbers related to signature')
@click.option('--hw-compat', '-m', type=str, metavar='mk', help="Set HW compat field (hw_label value)")
@click.option('--force-hw-compat', type=str, metavar='BITMASK', help="Override HW compat field (hex)")
@click.option('--backdate', type=int, metavar='DAYS',
help='Make downgrade attack test version', default=0)
@click.option('--build_dir', '-b', default='l-port/build-COLDCARD')
@click.option('--resign_file', '-r', type=click.File('rb'),
help='Replace existing signature', default=None)
@click.option('--outfn', '-o', type=click.Path(),
help='Output filename', default='firmware-signed.bin')
@click.option('--keydir', type=str, metavar='DIRPATH', help="Where to find priv keys for signing", default='keys')
def doit(keydir, outfn=None, build_dir=None, high_water=False,
current=False, hw_compat=None,
def doit(keydir, outfn=None, build_dir='l-port/build-COLDCARD', high_water=False,
current=False, force_hw_compat=None,
version='0.1a', pubkey_num=0, backdate=0, verbose=False, resign_file=None):
"Add signature into binary file before it becomes a DFU file."
assert len(version) < 8, "Version string limited to 8 bytes, got: %r" % version
# load key
try:
sk = SigningKey.from_pem(open(f"{keydir}/{pubkey_num:02d}.pem").read())
except FileNotFoundError:
click.secho(f"You don't have that key ({pubkey_num}), so using key zero instead!", fg='red')
pubkey_num = 0
sk = SigningKey.from_pem(open(f"{keydir}/{pubkey_num:02d}.pem").read())
if resign_file:
whole = resign_file.read()
@ -279,31 +197,17 @@ def doit(keydir, outfn=None, build_dir=None, high_water=False,
vectors = open(build_dir + '/firmware0.bin', 'rb').read()
body = open(build_dir + '/firmware1.bin', 'rb').read()
if hw_compat in { 'mk4', '4', 'mk5', '5', 'mk' }:
# Mk4 and 5 can run the same firmware, once Mk5 support was added
hw_compat = MK_4_OK | MK_5_OK
elif hw_compat == 'q1':
hw_compat = MK_Q1_OK
elif hw_compat in { 'mk3', '3'}:
hw_compat = MK_2_OK | MK_3_OK
else:
assert not "known"
assert len(vectors) <= FW_HEADER_OFFSET, "isr vectors area is too big!"
assert len(body) >= FW_MIN_LENGTH, "main firmware is too small: %d" % len(body)
body_len = align_to(len(body), 512)
if hw_compat & (MK_1_OK | MK_2_OK | MK_3_OK):
# bugfix: size must be non-page aligned, so extra bytes are erased past end
if (body_len % 4096) == 0:
body_len += 512
assert body_len % 512 == 0, body_len
if force_hw_compat is not None:
hw_compat = int(force_hw_compat, 16)
click.echo("Overriding hw_compat field: 0x%02x" % hw_compat)
else:
# bugfix: PSRAM-based products (Mk4, Q1) need to erase 4k blocks, so
# trouble happens if final binary isn't aligned to that size.
body_len = align_to(body_len, 4096)
assert body_len % 4096 == 0, body_len
hw_compat = CURRENT_HARDWARE
body_len = align_to(len(body), 512)
assert body_len % 512 == 0, body_len
# pad out
vectors = pad_to(vectors, FW_HEADER_OFFSET)
@ -315,22 +219,15 @@ def doit(keydir, outfn=None, build_dir=None, high_water=False,
firmware_length=FW_HEADER_OFFSET+FW_HEADER_SIZE+body_len,
install_flags=(FWHIF_HIGH_WATER if high_water else 0x0),
hw_compat=hw_compat,
best_ts=bytes(8),
future=b'\0'*(4*FWH_NUM_FUTURE),
signature=b'\xff'*64,
pubkey_num=pubkey_num,
timestamp=timestamp(backdate) )
assert FW_MIN_LENGTH <= hdr.firmware_length <= FW_MAX_LENGTH, hdr.firmware_length
if hw_compat & MK_3_OK:
# actual file length limited by size of SPI flash area reserved to txn data/uploads
assert FW_MIN_LENGTH <= hdr.firmware_length <= FW_MAX_LENGTH, hdr.firmware_length
USB_MAX_LEN = (786432-128)
else:
# new value for Mk4 and later: limited only by final binary size, not SPI flash
assert FW_MIN_LENGTH <= hdr.firmware_length <= FW_MAX_LENGTH_MK4, hdr.firmware_length
USB_MAX_LEN = 1472 * 1024
# actual file length limited by size of SPI flash area reserved to txn data/uploads
USB_MAX_LEN = (786432-128)
assert hdr.firmware_length <= USB_MAX_LEN, \
"too big for our USB upgrades: %d = %d bytes too big" % (
hdr.firmware_length, hdr.firmware_length-USB_MAX_LEN)
@ -339,6 +236,8 @@ def doit(keydir, outfn=None, build_dir=None, high_water=False,
binhdr = struct.pack(FWH_PY_FORMAT, *hdr)
assert len(binhdr) == FW_HEADER_SIZE
assert len(vectors + binhdr[:-64]) == 0x3fc0
assert len(vectors + binhdr[:-64]) == 0x3fc0
hashable = vectors + binhdr[:-64] + body
@ -350,6 +249,9 @@ def doit(keydir, outfn=None, build_dir=None, high_water=False,
print("Hdr: %s" % repr(hdr))
print('Hash: %s' % b2a_hex(fw_hash).decode('ascii'))
# load key
sk = SigningKey.from_pem(open(f"{keydir}/{pubkey_num:02d}.pem").read())
from ecdsa.util import sigencode_string
sig = sk.sign_digest(fw_hash, sigencode=sigencode_string)

View File

@ -3,32 +3,11 @@
These docs are meant for you hackers out there... but also for anyone who
wants to understand why it's safe to put your moneys into Coldcard.
- [`security-model.md`](security-model.md) The COLDCARD Mk4/Mk5/Q security model.
- [`pin-entry.md`](pin-entry.md) Huge and detailed discussion of PIN codes and the security element that holds the secrets.
- [`secure-elements.md`](secure-elements.md) How the dual secure elements work together.
- [`dev-access.md`](dev-access.md) How developers can modify Coldcard to extend it.
- [`memory-map.md`](memory-map.md) Memory map highlights
- [`notes-on-repro.md`](notes-on-repro.md) Detailed breakdown of the reproducible build process.
- [`upgrade-recovery.md`](upgrade-recovery.md) Firmware upgrade and recovery process.
- [`backup-files.md`](backup-files.md) Some details of our encrypted backup files.
- [`temporary-seeds.md`](temporary-seeds.md) Temporary (ephemeral) seeds and the Seed Vault.
- [`seed-xor.md`](seed-xor.md) More about _Seed XOR_ feature, including fully worked Seed XOR example, and useful XOR lookup chart.
- [`key-teleport.md`](key-teleport.md) Key Teleport: encrypted transfer of seeds and secrets between Q devices.
- [`spending-policy.md`](spending-policy.md) Spending policy: autonomous signing with configurable limits.
- [`microsd-2fa.md`](microsd-2fa.md) Using a MicroSD card as a second factor for login.
- [`web2fa.md`](web2fa.md) Web 2FA authentication.
- [`bip85-passwords.md`](bip85-passwords.md) Deriving deterministic passwords via BIP-85.
- [`msg-signing.md`](msg-signing.md) COLDCARD message signing.
- [`proof-of-reserves-bip-322.md`](proof-of-reserves-bip-322.md) BIP-322 generic signed message format and proof of reserves.
- [`generic-wallet-export.md`](generic-wallet-export.md) Generic JSON wallet export file format.
- [`bip-21-extensions.md`](bip-21-extensions.md) Coldcard's BIP-21 URI extensions, including multisig ownership address check.
- [`nfc-coldcard.md`](nfc-coldcard.md) NFC support on Coldcard Mk4 and Q.
- [`nfc-pushtx.md`](nfc-pushtx.md) NFC Push Transaction: broadcast a signed transaction via your phone.
- [`usb-batteries.md`](usb-batteries.md) Using USB battery packs with Coldcard.
- [`electrum-usage.md`](electrum-usage.md) Importing seed words into Electrum for funds usage (and other tips).
- [`bitcoin-core-usage.md`](bitcoin-core-usage.md) How to use with Bitcoin Core.
- [`bitcoin-core2of2desc.md`](bitcoin-core2of2desc.md) Airgapped 2-of-2 multisig with Bitcoin Core using descriptors.
- [`limitations.md`](limitations.md) Documented limitations, policy choices, and TODO items.
- [`paperwallet.pdf`](paperwallet.pdf) Example paper wallet template file.
- [`menu-tree.txt`](menu-tree.txt) Dump of the menu system. Incomplete, may be out of date.

View File

@ -34,33 +34,20 @@ process and that the data is in fact encrypted. Any 7z tool that
supports AES256-SHA256 encryption should be able to read the files
we make. Take the 12 words and put them together with a single space
between each word (all lowercase). The decoded archive will contain
a single file, which is a simple text file and
easy to read. Before version 4.0.0, this text file was always
called `ckcc-backup.txt`, but the filename is now picked randomly.
## BIP39 Passphrase
If BIP39 passphrase is active the default behavior is to back-up
main wallet - not BIP39 passphrase wallet. From version `5.2.0`
users can choose to back-up also BIP39 passphrase wallet.
## Ephemeral Seeds
If ephemeral seed is active the default behavior is to always
back-up ephemeral wallet instead of the main wallet.
a single file, `ckcc-backup.txt`, which is a simple text file and
easy to read.
## Limitations
- The archive file names are not encrypted. You can see there is a single
text file `word(number).txt` in the encrypted file without decrypting it.
- The archive file names are not encrypted. You can see `ckcc-backup.txt` in
the hex dump of the encrypted file, encoded as `utf-16-le` bytes.
- The device PIN code is not preserved during backup.
- We produce standards-compliant files, but do not support reading any
file except the ones produced by Coldcard.
- Do not attempt to edit the file and restore it onto a Coldcard.
- You cannot construct a file for the Coldcard to read because we implement only
enough to support reading files that we know that we've produced.
- There is limited plausible deniability here: if you are forced to decrypt
the file, it is clearly a Coldcard backup file.
- There is no plausible deniability here: the 7z file is clearly a Coldcard backup file.
## Example File
@ -122,14 +109,6 @@ If you are playing along at home, the passphrase for the above file is:
You can grab the [example file here](backup.7z) and test it yourself, or use
a real Coldcard to make your own.
## Internal Filenames
The internal filename in these examples is `ckcc-backup.txt`, but
starting in version 4.0.0 of the Coldcard firwmare, your backup
files will each have a different random filename inside. Use
`7z l backup.7z` to view the actual filename inside the 7z file.
### Archive Contents
```

View File

@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
## Multisig Ownership address check: "wallet"
If the name of the multisig wallet related to an address is provided, address search
can be greatly accelerated. Just provide `wallet=name` parameter in a standard
[BIP-21](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0021.mediawiki) URL
shown in QR code or NFC record. If omitted, search will continue across
all multisig wallets known by COLDCARD.
### Examples
```
tb1q4d67p7stxml3kdudrgkg5mgaxsrgzcqzjrrj4gg62nxtvnsnvqjsxjkej0?wallet=goldmine
bitcoin:mtHSVByP9EYZmB26jASDdPVm19gvpecb5R?label=coldcard_purchase&amount=50&wallet=Haystack%20Four
```

View File

@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
# BIP-85 Passwords
This feature derives a deterministic password from your seed,
according to [BIP-85 PWD BASE64](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0085.mediawiki#pwd-base64).
Generated passwords can be sent as keystrokes via USB to the host computer,
effectively using Coldcard as specialized password manager.
In addition to deriving up to 10,000 distinct secure passwords, the Coldcard
can also type them into a computer by emulating a USB keyboard, and simulating the
keystrokes needed to type the password.
#### Requirements
* Coldcard Mk4 or Mk5 (firmware 5.0.5 or newer), or any Q
* USB-C with data link (won't work with power only cable from Coinkite)
## Type Passwords over USB
1. To enable "Type Passwords" feature, connect your Coldcard to host PC with USB cable (check requirements) and go to Settings -> Keyboard EMU -> Enable.
2. Go back to top menu and "Type Passwords" option will be shown below "Address Explorer".
3. When it is time to enter a secret password, select "Type Passwords" from the main menu. After
an information screen, the USB emulation will be switch to keyboard emulation
and `Switching...` shown on the screen.
4. Choose "Password index" (BIP-85 index) and press OK to generate that password.
5. It takes a moment to generate the password, and then you can scroll down to check BIP-85 path used and double-check password to be typed.
6. To send keystrokes, place mouse at required password prompt and press OK. This will send desired keystrokes plus hit enter at the end.
6. You are back at step 4, and can continue to generate passwords or you can press X
to exit. Exiting from "Type Passwords" will cause Coldcard to turn off keyboard emulation and enable normal USB mode if it was enabled before. Otherwise, USB stays disabled.
## View BIP-85 passwords
1. Go to Advanced/Tools -> Derive Seed B85 -> Passwords
2. Choose "Password/Index number" (BIP-85 index) and press OK to generate password.
3. Screen shows generated password, path, and entropy from which password was derived
4. A few different options are available at this point (on Mk; on Q the NFC and
QR buttons are used instead of (3)/(4)):
1. press (1) to save password backup file on MicroSD card (cleartext!)
2. press (2) to save to Virtual Disk (only when available)
3. press (3) to send over NFC (only appears when NFC is enabled)
4. press (4) to view password as QR code
5. press (6) to send keystrokes over USB (this enables keyboard emulation, sends keystrokes + enter, then disables keyboard emulation)
## Keyboard language settings
Emulated Keystrokes are mapped to specific characters based on your host PC keyboard
language settings. For Coldcard to be able to type the correct BIP-85
password your host computer MUST use language settings that
corresponds to a [QWERTY](https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/QWERTY) key layout,
including number row directly above QWERTY:
```
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 - =
Q W E R T Y U I O P [ ] \
A S D F G H J K L ; '
Z X C V B N M , . /
```
Passwords generated and shown on Coldcard will always be correct
with respect to BIP-85. However, when sending keystrokes, for example
on German keyboard, what was typed will not match the text that was
generated and shown on Coldcard's screen.
For example, if the correct password is `zYLoepugzdVJvdL56ogNV` but when used
with German keyboard language settings, what will be typed is
`yZLoepugydVJvdL56ogNV`. You can see that German keyboard is not
QWERTY, but it is QUERTZ (y and z are swapped).
Even with "non-standard" keyboard language settings, Coldcard always
sends exact same keystrokes for specific password index and it is
deterministic, as long the keyboard language setting do not change.
However, BIP-85 won't be respected in this case.
## Coldcard Specifics
Check [BIP-85](https://github.com/scgbckbone/bips/blob/passwords/bip-0085.mediawiki)
for complete specification of the new addition to BIP-85.
Coldcard does not allow you to specify password length - we always
use length of **21**. Passwords of this length generated according
to BIP will have approximately 126 bits of entropy. This is on par
with bitcoin security model and therefore all passwords the Coldcard
will generate are considered very strong.
## Examples
Using below seed, path and index, we generate passwords shown in the table:
```shell
wife shiver author away frog air rough vanish fantasy frozen noodle athlete pioneer citizen symptom firm much faith extend rare axis garment kiwi clarify
```
| Index | Path | Password |
|-------|----------------------------|----------|
| 0 | m/83696968'/707764'/21'/0' | BSdrypS+J4Wr1q8DWjbFE |
| 1 | m/83696968'/707764'/21'/1' | TkDX7d9fnX9FZ9QEpjFDB |
| 2 | m/83696968'/707764'/21'/2' | cvfdmoZL3BcIpJ7G+Rb8k |
| 3 | m/83696968'/707764'/21'/3' | wsCALdN+GgbSOGyGE9aRN |
| 4 | m/83696968'/707764'/21'/4' | HfYbWx7gVmUmb2Bw4o4QD |
| 5 | m/83696968'/707764'/21'/5' | vLOf9WPO5QiPbOTEbz/yJ |
| 6 | m/83696968'/707764'/21'/6' | 1oSUs7Cy3fnpdh/fAS7EK |
| 7 | m/83696968'/707764'/21'/7' | seh9WN6mlvPPB5jdVz3xN |
| 8 | m/83696968'/707764'/21'/8' | U4RD0R0A0RjpHOFtwnv9k |
## Incompatible Applications
Although the Coldcard is emulating a keyboard at the lowest possible level,
for some reason occasionally high-level applications have
trouble with our high-speed typing.
- KeePass2 2.45 (under Ubuntu). Capital/lowercase letters may be incorrectly typed. Use KeePassXC instead.

View File

@ -5,40 +5,8 @@ needs a USB connection and additional software such as [HWI](https://github.com/
## Setup Steps
### Bitcoin Core v0.21.0+
As of Coldcard firmware v4.1.3, we recommend using the "importdescriptors"
command with a native descriptor wallet in Core, so Core can generate
and receive PSBT files natively from the GUI. The resulting wallet is
no longer just a watch wallet, but can be used for spending by creating
PSBT files for signing offline at the Coldcard.
Step 1: Create a new descriptor-based wallet in Bitcoin Core
- File -> Create Wallet ...
- give it a unique name
- check "Disable Private Keys"
- check "Make Blank Wallet"
- check "Descriptor Wallet"
Step 2: Export descriptor from Coldcard to Core
- (singlesig) on Coldcard, go to Advanced -> MicroSD card -> Export Wallet -> Bitcoin Core
- (multisig) on Coldcard, go to Settings -> Multisig Wallets -> Choose desired multisig wallet -> Descriptors -> Bitcoin Core
- on your computer, open `bitcoin-core-XX.txt`, copy the `importdescriptor` command line
- in Bitcoin Core, go to Windows -> Console
- select your newly created descriptor wallet in the wallet pulldown (top left)
- paste the `importdescriptor` command. It should respond with a success message
- in Bitcoin Core v24.1, the console response will include `"message": "Ranged descriptors should not have a label"` and Bitcoin Core won't allow address generation. Removing the entry `"label": "Coldcard x0x0x0x0"` from the .txt file fixes this issue.
NOTE: If you are importing an existing wallet this way, with UTXO on the blockchain,
you may need to rescan and/or delete "timestamp=now" from the command. If the
balance is zero this is why.
### Bitcoin Core v0.19.0+
(no longer recommended)
For compatibility with other wallet software we use the BIP84 address derivation
(m/84'/0'/{account}'/{change}/{index}) and native SegWit (bech32) addresses. It's
recommended to set `addresstype=bech32` in [bitcoin.conf](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/9546a785953b7f61a3a50e2175283cbf30bc2151/doc/bitcoin-conf.md).
@ -51,8 +19,8 @@ The public keys can exported via an SD card, or via USB.
To export via SD card:
- go to Advanced -> MicroSD card -> Export Wallet -> Bitcoin Core
- on your computer open `bitcoin-core-XX.txt`, copy the `importmulti` command line
- go to Advanced -> MicroSD card -> Bitcoin Core
- on your computer open public.txt, copy the `importmulti` command
- in Bitcoin Core, go to Windows -> Console
- select Coldcard in the wallet dropdown
- paste the `importmulti` command. It should respond with a success message
@ -78,11 +46,6 @@ createwallet Coldcard true
## Day-to-day Operation
### Bitcoin Core v0.21.0+
PSBT files can be directly created and loaded from the Bitcoin Core Qt GUI! HWI is not
required, and air-gap via MicroSD is easy to use.
### Bitcoin Core v0.18.0+
See HWI [instructions for usage](https://github.com/bitcoin-core/HWI/blob/master/docs/bitcoin-core-usage.md#usage).

View File

@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
## Airgapped 2of2 Multisig with Bitcoin Core (and descriptors)
#### Prerequisites
* Coldcard Mk4 signing device
* SD card and SD card reader (or NFC reader)
* bitcoind (version v23.0)
* [jq](https://stedolan.github.io/jq/)
### Tutorial 1
2of2 with two Mk4 signing devices (+ bitcoin-qt watch only wallet as a coordinator)
* full tutorial now on [coldcard.com](https://coldcard.com/docs/bitcoin-core-2of2desc)
### Tutorial 2
2of2 with one Mk4 signing device and bitcoind sww (+ bitcoind watch only wallet as a coordinator)
1. start bitcoind (here I will use regtest)
```shell
bitcoind -regtest
```
2. Create descriptor wallet with private keys enabled. This wallet will be used for signing (1of2)
```shell
bitcoin-cli -regtest createwallet "signer"
# if using core older than v23.0 you need to specify descriptor wallet as below
bitcoin-cli -regtest help createwallet "signer" false false "__strong-random_password&%4568479" false true
```
3. Fill keypool for signer as we will generate addresses with watch_only wallet (this is needed, otherwise signer will not be able to sign other than index 0). If you spend more than 100 adress, you will need to refill keypool again with same command.
```shell
$ bitcoin-cli -regtest -rpcwallet="signer" keypoolrefill 100
```
4. Create watch-only descriptor wallet. This wallet will contain watch-only multisig descriptor (coordinator)
```shell
bitcoin-cli -regtest createwallet "watch_only" true true
# if older than v23.0
bitcoin-cli -regtest createwallet "watch_only" true true "" false true
```
5. Get descriptor from Coldcard Mk4 (Settings->Multisig Wallets->Eport XPUB + choose account number -> in our case 0)
6. Step 4. produced a text file on SD card or in your .... as we will be creating wsh multisig get `p2wsh_desc` key from produced file (should start with ccxp-<xfp>.json). Should look like this:
```shell
"wsh(sortedmulti(M,[0F056943/48'/1'/0'/2']tpubDF2rnouQaaYrXF4noGTv6rQYmx87cQ4GrUdhpvXkhtChwQPbdGTi8GA88NUaSrwZBwNsTkC9bFkkC8vDyGBVVAQTZ2AS6gs68RQXtXcCvkP/0/*,...))"
```
7. Above descriptor template needs to be filled with information form other signers (in our case only bitcoind). Specifically one must add all extended keys with key origin info and substitute `M` with threshold value.
8. Bitcoin (unfortunately) does not support deriving xpubs at will, so we will use legacy derivations path which we can get from `listdescriptors`
```shell
$ bitcoin-cli -regtest -rpcwallet="signer" listdescriptors
{
"wallet_name": "signer",
"descriptors": [
{
"desc": "pkh([122b6f56/44'/1'/0']tpubDCmC5bJAfQxjCFrRCG9qzBmz4FDy6SVieb4KZaPD5D8AFx5vYjngiRfJSCds4LzKcpy9Mx3he4uSdfdkJHGZBG2gJqz63ndKj9miiVbYzfc/0/*)#ryqp0qxp",
"timestamp": 1656067182,
"active": true,
"internal": false,
"range": [
0,
999
],
"next": 0
},
{
"desc": "wpkh([122b6f56/84'/1'/0']tpubDCSoM4w4NXN5sAorw6pnEcwho1dJRiyLTjgK9FTkgc25RguDZ2Vnk3dt9bCdFt9oU5YHNWkjEaYERXbLro8HMTbF9ze7Shn15xdKNa2umkG/0/*)#pg8w9ku3",
"timestamp": 1656067182,
"active": true,
"internal": false,
"range": [
0,
999
],
"next": 0
},
...
]
}
```
9. Copy extended key (with key origin and derivation information) from `pkh` descriptor (shown below)
```shell
[122b6f56/44'/1'/0']tpubDCmC5bJAfQxjCFrRCG9qzBmz4FDy6SVieb4KZaPD5D8AFx5vYjngiRfJSCds4LzKcpy9Mx3he4uSdfdkJHGZBG2gJqz63ndKj9miiVbYzfc/0/*
```
10. Insert above to the multisig descriptor from step 5. and replace M with 2
11. Use bitcoind to calculate descriptor checksum
```shell
$ bitcoin-cli -regtest getdescriptorinfo "wsh(sortedmulti(2,[0f056943/48'/1'/0'/2']tpubDF2rnouQaaYrXF4noGTv6rQYmx87cQ4GrUdhpvXkhtChwQPbdGTi8GA88NUaSrwZBwNsTkC9bFkkC8vDyGBVVAQTZ2AS6gs68RQXtXcCvkP/0/*,[122b6f56/44'/1'/0']tpubDCmC5bJAfQxjCFrRCG9qzBmz4FDy6SVieb4KZaPD5D8AFx5vYjngiRfJSCds4LzKcpy9Mx3he4uSdfdkJHGZBG2gJqz63ndKj9miiVbYzfc/0/*))"
{
"descriptor": "wsh(sortedmulti(2,[0f056943/48'/1'/0'/2']tpubDF2rnouQaaYrXF4noGTv6rQYmx87cQ4GrUdhpvXkhtChwQPbdGTi8GA88NUaSrwZBwNsTkC9bFkkC8vDyGBVVAQTZ2AS6gs68RQXtXcCvkP/0/*,[122b6f56/44'/1'/0']tpubDCmC5bJAfQxjCFrRCG9qzBmz4FDy6SVieb4KZaPD5D8AFx5vYjngiRfJSCds4LzKcpy9Mx3he4uSdfdkJHGZBG2gJqz63ndKj9miiVbYzfc/0/*))#flsx3jj8",
"checksum": "flsx3jj8",
"isrange": true,
"issolvable": true,
"hasprivatekeys": false
}
```
12. Copy descriptor with checksum to new file (2of2core.txt) on SD card (descriptor has to be in single line)
13. Insert SD card to Coldcard and import multisig wallet.(Settings->Multisig Wallets->Import from file) select 2of2core.txt and approve.
14. Export imported multisig wallet for bitcoin core (Settings->Multisig Wallets->2/2: 2of2core->Descriptors->Bitcoin Core)
15. Step 14. will produce `bitcoin-core-2of2core.txt` file on SD card. Copy command from file.
16. Import descriptor to watch_only wallet (signer would not allow us as he has private keys)
```shell
bitcoin-cli -regtest -rpcwallet=watch_only importdescriptors '[{"active": true, "timestamp": "now", "range": [0, 100], "internal": true, "desc": "wsh(sortedmulti(2,[0f056943/48h/1h/0h/2h]tpubDF2rnouQaaYrXF4noGTv6rQYmx87cQ4GrUdhpvXkhtChwQPbdGTi8GA88NUaSrwZBwNsTkC9bFkkC8vDyGBVVAQTZ2AS6gs68RQXtXcCvkP/1/*,[122b6f56/44h/1h/0h]tpubDCmC5bJAfQxjCFrRCG9qzBmz4FDy6SVieb4KZaPD5D8AFx5vYjngiRfJSCds4LzKcpy9Mx3he4uSdfdkJHGZBG2gJqz63ndKj9miiVbYzfc/1/*))#tv5t5plj"}, {"active": true, "timestamp": "now", "range": [0, 100], "internal": false, "desc": "wsh(sortedmulti(2,[0f056943/48h/1h/0h/2h]tpubDF2rnouQaaYrXF4noGTv6rQYmx87cQ4GrUdhpvXkhtChwQPbdGTi8GA88NUaSrwZBwNsTkC9bFkkC8vDyGBVVAQTZ2AS6gs68RQXtXcCvkP/0/*,[122b6f56/44h/1h/0h]tpubDCmC5bJAfQxjCFrRCG9qzBmz4FDy6SVieb4KZaPD5D8AFx5vYjngiRfJSCds4LzKcpy9Mx3he4uSdfdkJHGZBG2gJqz63ndKj9miiVbYzfc/0/*))#zyueunr0"}]'
```
15. Get address and get some funds
```shell
$ bitcoin-cli -regtest -rpcwallet=watch_only getnewaddress
bcrt1q6u8s97fnd6ggad4apqs8vvcgup0d085ttd9v0c6fmpf38tf6q0ysgfh4vm
```
16. If you use regtest as I do, make sure to set Coldcard to regtest (Advanced/Tools-> Danger Zone->Testnet Mode->Regtest)
17. Check that core generated address matches with address generated by Coldcard (Address Explorer->multi_2of2_core)
18. Fund address
```shell
# this is only useful for those who use regtest - if you're on testnet use faucet
bitcoin-cli -regtest -rpcwallet=watch_only generatetoaddress 101 "bcrt1q6u8s97fnd6ggad4apqs8vvcgup0d085ttd9v0c6fmpf38tf6q0ysgfh4vm"
```
19. Generate destination address to send to (in our case another `getnewaddress` -> self spend)
```shell
`bitcoin-cli -regtest -rpcwallet=watch_only getnewaddress`
```
20. Create PSBT
```shell
# we need to use change address as we do not support change descriptor - yet
psbt=$(bitcoin-cli -regtest -rpcwallet=watch_only walletcreatefundedpsbt '[]' '[{"bcrt1qagwmv5706xm8da8fh2dldk6rsjcxv06zae9w2nm8yex6rsvanf6s5re53w": 1.0}]' 0 '{"fee_rate": 20}' | jq -r '.psbt')
```
21. Sign with core (signer wallet)
```shell
psbt_core_signed=$(bitcoin-cli -regtest -rpcwallet=signer walletprocesspsbt $psbt true "ALL" | jq -r '.psbt')
```
22. Get half signed PSBT to Coldcard (via SD card or NFC) for signing
```shell
# move half signed PSBT to micro SD card (must end with .psbt)
echo $psbt_core_signed > /media/MicroSD/core_signed.psbt
```
23. On Coldcard (Ready To Sign) verify transaction (check addresses, amounts...) and sign. Coldcard will produce `core_signed-part.psbt`. Copy this file back to PC.
24. Finalize and send
```shell
$ tx_hex=$(bitcoin-cli -regtest finalizepsbt $(cat /media/MicroSD/core_signed-part.psbt | head -n 1) | jq -r ".hex")
$ bitcoin-cli -regtest sendrawtransaction $tx_hex
93fcd4e926978260406844ffb73a2e506cd427b0e0c3ee2882bffd6c2855d7a5 # tx id returned
```

View File

@ -1,81 +1,93 @@
# Developing on COLDCARD
# Developers on Coldcard
Yes, external developers can modify COLDCARD and make their own versions!
Yes, external developers can modify Coldcard... We've saved 128k of flash just for you!
## Approaches
### Hard Core
- build a new image, all the way to a DFU file (see `../stm32/Makefile`)
- sign with non-production key, provided in github tree (key zero)
- install your DFU file using existing upgrade methods (microSD, usb upload, VirtDisk)
- sign with non-production key, provided in github tree
- install your DFU file using existing upgrade methods (microSD, usb upload)
- you can replace any part of the python code, and even the mpy interpreter itself
- you cannot change the bootrom, and it still runs first
- since your code is not signed by a factory key, a warning and forced delay always occurs:
- your code will not be signed by the factory key, so warning and delay, is shown:
![custom warning screen](dev-custom.png)
![dev-warning screen](dev-warning.png)
- to get green light, the user (who knows the main PIN) must do the "bless" operation
- you can distrubute your DFU file to the world
- you can take factory-fresh Coldcards, destroy the tamper-evident bag, and load your
firmware onto them before shipping to your customers.
- in versions before the Mk4, if you had the green light set, via blessing the custom firmware,
this delay/warning could be avoided, but that is no longer the case.
- you can distribute your DFU file to the world, but everyone who runs it will see above warning
- remember the main PIN has to be set and provided correctly before new firmware can be installed
- your COLDCARD will be bricked if your code crashes before it gets running "enough" that you
can upload a corrected version. Bugs in the boot & login sequence are fatal in that sense.
### Medium Core
- develop your changes using the Simulator (see `../unix`)
- submit a PR (pull request) explaining your new feature or fix.
- Coinkite team will review for security and other code-quality issues
- your PR could get merged into the next Coinkite firmware release for all to use.
- install any published dev version (or build your own, see above)
- enable the virtual disk feature:
Advanced > Danger Zone > I Am Developer. > Enable USB Disk
- REPL and mass-storage emulation will now be active
- or you can just enable the REPL, and connect there and experiment first
- expect to find helpful file: `/Volumes/COLDCARD/README.txt`
- write code and save into `.../COLDCARD/lib`
- any same-named file will replace built-in stock module
- `lib/boot2.py` and `lib/main2.py` are loaded if they exist during boot sequence
- the only python you cannot override is `main.py`
- RAM limits complexity of the override you can do (but freezing your micropython helps)
- you cannot change the bootrom, and it still runs first
- changes to the virtual disk cause the light to go red, you'll need to bless after
each change you make.
- distribute your version by capturing an image of your working virtual disk drive,
and then putting just that into a DFU file (128k)
- users will have to have a similar dev version of main firmware, but
you would probably give it to them, as separate DFU file.
- both files could be put into a single DFU, but that's not supported by
MicroSD upgrade method
### Soft Core
- send an email to support asking for your improvements to be implemented.
- await reply patiently.
## Corrupt Flash
If the red/green light is red, this means some part of flash was
changed without the secure checksum inside SE1 being first updated.
The upgrade process does this correctly in Mk4, and there is no
point in time the checksum is wrong, so there should be no way to see this
screen:
![warning screen](dev-warning.png)
But it will be shown if the COLDCARD finds its flash checksum does
not match the checksum held in SE1, secured by the main PIN. This
can be false positive, but in Mk4 we've worked hard to avoid those cases.
A checksum error on the firmware itself (the main code) will always
fail with a "(lemon icon) Firmware?" screen. The broken firmware is not
started, but it's possible to recover the COLDCARD using a firmware loaded
from an SD Card.
You cannot load *new* code via the SD Card firmware recovery mode.
It requires the new firmware (based on whatever is found on SD Card)
to have a checksum that already matches the value found in SE1.
This means only the signed firmware that was attempting to be
installed during the power-fail can be loaded, and not new code you
may have written.
- Send an email to support asking for your altcoin to be supported. Await reply patiently.
## Shortcuts and Accelerations
## Shortcuts and Accerations
- You can access a micropython REPL if you are willing to break your case
and attach to the test points along right edge of board, marked: G=Gnd, R=Rx, T=Tx.
It's a serial port with 3.3v TTL signals running
at 115,200 bps. Enter the REPL by pressing `^C` after enabling the REPL in
Advanced > Danger Zone > I Am Developer. > Serial REPL
- To skip the prompts for the PIN, assuming correct PIN is '12-12'... run this code
in the REPL:
- You can enable USB, or USB disk emulation, automatically at the end of `boot2.py`.
Mount the emulated disk, and create this file, as `/Volumes/COLDCARD/lib/boot2.py`
```python
from nvstore import SettingsObject
s=SettingsObject()
s.set('_skip_pin', '12-12')
s.save()
# start the REPL very early
import uasyncio.core as asyncio
from usb import enable_usb
loop = asyncio.get_event_loop()
enable_usb(loop, True)
```
- To skip the prompts for the PIN, assuming correct PIN is '12-12'... add this code
to `boot2.py` or run once when the system hasn't yet logged in.
```python
from main import settings
settings.set('_skip_pin', '12-12')
```
- For max crash-change-rerun speed, enable the mass storage all the
time, and work directly in `/COLDCARD/lib` files. After making a
change, you just need to do a warm reboot (^D in REPL, 'warm reset'
on menus). At that point, `main.py` runs, and your code will be
used again. The USB doesn't disconnect, and the drive will still
be mounted, ready for more changes.
## Limitations
- You cannot enable mass storage, virtual comm port (VCP = REPL access) and also HID
for the Coldcard protocol at the same time. Pick any two.
- `.py` files in `/lib` will be interpreted at runtime. This is slow, and bytecode
takes large amounts of RAM. Some files in the normal code are too big to even
fit in RAM. The solution is to freeze your code before copying onto Coldcard. See the
`stm32/Makefile` target `up` which does a build (freezing all the files, using
`mpy-cross`) and then rsyncs the changed `.mpy` files into place. You'll want to do
this on a smaller scale, and probably only for the files you are working on.

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@ -5,12 +5,9 @@ wallet systems, but we also have a file format for general purpose
exports, which we hope future wallet makers will leverage.
It contains master XPUB, XFP for that, and derived values for the top hardened
position of the single-signature schemes BIP44, BIP49 and BIP84, plus the
multisig schemes BIP48 (`bip48_1` = `.../1h` P2SH-P2WSH and `bip48_2` = `.../2h` P2WSH).
When the account number is zero, a BIP45 (`m/45h`) multisig section is also included
(it is omitted for non-zero accounts, as in the example below).
position of BIP44, BIP84 and BIP49.
The feature can be found here: _Advanced/Tools > Export Wallet > Generic JSON_
The feature can be found here: _Advanced > MicroSD > Export Wallet > Generic JSON_
Please contact us (or better yet, make a pull request), if you need something
more in this file.
@ -21,51 +18,32 @@ Here is an example, produced by the Simulator for account number 123.
```javascript
{
"chain": "BTC",
"chain": "XTN",
"xfp": "0F056943",
"xpub": "tpubD6NzVbkrYhZ4XzL5Dhayo67Gorv1YMS7j8pRUvVMd5odC2LBPLAygka9p7748JtSq82FNGPppFEz5xxZUdasBRCqJqXvUHq6xpnsMcYJzeh",
"account": 123,
"xpub": "xpub661MyMwAqRbcGC9DmWbtbAmuUjpMYxw4BWE88NSDHB3jSjfUK7KtYJuKa52GbowD3DVLkgsxH9QwPnTx5mjdHykYFEncnmAsNsCTbWzBhA7",
"bip44": {
"deriv": "m/44'/1'/123'",
"first": "n44vs1Rv7T8SANrg2PFGQhzVkhr5Q6jMMD",
"name": "p2pkh",
"xfp": "5F898064",
"deriv": "m/44h/0h/123h",
"xpub": "xpub6DStQXfAgHuLbMpCf86ruVkF4yT9pSLyWsFiqQTWY9osuinq8Dyee4W5jCjMfyku5LNkRB9oFinrY5ufn9XXEn8Vvzc2jnifKMaQCNV7RBZ",
"desc": "pkh([0f056943/44h/0h/123h]xpub6DStQXfAgHuLbMpCf86ruVkF4yT9pSLyWsFiqQTWY9osuinq8Dyee4W5jCjMfyku5LNkRB9oFinrY5ufn9XXEn8Vvzc2jnifKMaQCNV7RBZ/<0;1>/*)#4tl8jryn",
"first": "1GTNtzG5xX2UhdD5e3Nu7i1WPxFdjxQMJt"
"xfp": "B7908B26",
"xpub": "tpubDCiHGUNYdRRGoSH22j8YnruUKgguCK1CC2NFQUf9PApeZh8ewAJJWGMUrhggDNK73iCTanWXv1RN5FYemUH8UrVUBjqDb8WF2VoKmDh9UTo"
},
"bip49": {
"name": "p2sh-p2wpkh",
"xfp": "A748B1FC",
"deriv": "m/49h/0h/123h",
"xpub": "xpub6DDm8WzH5a9qjKkttzqSB3uGofNohU9D3n3UG8WMxkUZzJEMPTYiQRf1dvTFCQR82MjGW4LUMVuTtnW4hF17RpzCqVwhf6Z2fnJPWtjG164",
"desc": "sh(wpkh([0f056943/49h/0h/123h]xpub6DDm8WzH5a9qjKkttzqSB3uGofNohU9D3n3UG8WMxkUZzJEMPTYiQRf1dvTFCQR82MjGW4LUMVuTtnW4hF17RpzCqVwhf6Z2fnJPWtjG164/<0;1>/*))#5j7t2n2u",
"_pub": "ypub6Y42SBfCEFhKacx1jMd4P8zmydXFe68hxtZh3XQFLkrT3Q3ae7iH2VK9f8QqCK53Rzr5FXw2pAG1n57dQwR8E4fohqe8F1NWwWN2uVRfBry",
"first": "3CeBRbJKCpg7BpJME2vM8ZxhCjBnhG4toy"
"_pub": "upub5DMRSsh6mNak9KbcVjJ7xAgHJvbE3Nx22CBTier5C35kv8j7g2q58ywxskBe6JCcAE2VH86CE2aL4MifJyKbRw8Gj9ay7SWvUBkp2DJ7y52",
"deriv": "m/49'/1'/123'",
"first": "2N87V39riUUCd4vmXfDjMWAu9gUCiBji5jB",
"name": "p2wpkh-p2sh",
"xfp": "CEE1D809",
"xpub": "tpubDCDqt7XXvhAdy1MpSze5nMJA9x8DrdRaKALRRPasfxyHpiqWWEAr9cbDBQ9BcX7cB3up98Pk97U2QQ3xrvQsi5dNPmRYYhdcsKY9wwEY87T"
},
"bip84": {
"_pub": "vpub5Y5a91QvDT45EnXQaKeuvJupVvX8f9BiywDcadSTtaeJ1VgJPPXMitnYsqd9k7GnEqh44FKJ5McJfu6KrihFXhAmvSWgm7BAVVK8Gupu4fL",
"deriv": "m/84'/1'/123'",
"first": "tb1qc58ys2dphtphg6yuugdf3d0kufmk0tye044g3l",
"name": "p2wpkh",
"xfp": "2C5207AA",
"deriv": "m/84h/0h/123h",
"xpub": "xpub6CaWStGvcXqSW9BzU2vpCoP7aWjz9VfR5DS2nuYWVvKV2nug2dESg3HdFsaWHeoZaxuAhNcPB3TH2gq8MugS3JX1yGuhB4QbC2BneaYqB16",
"desc": "wpkh([0f056943/84h/0h/123h]xpub6CaWStGvcXqSW9BzU2vpCoP7aWjz9VfR5DS2nuYWVvKV2nug2dESg3HdFsaWHeoZaxuAhNcPB3TH2gq8MugS3JX1yGuhB4QbC2BneaYqB16/<0;1>/*)#yk84tprf",
"_pub": "zpub6rF34DckutvQCjaE8kW4cya7vT2t2jeQuSUUMhLHFw5F8zY8XwZZvAbuJHVgHU7QQF8nCKoW6NANoG4FoJWTdmtDhxJYLt3ZjUK5RqUSMdF",
"first": "bc1qhj6avwmp5lhpgqwm6dgxrf3v5lf67rjm99a8an"
},
"bip48_1": {
"name": "p2sh-p2wsh",
"xfp": "845A3542",
"deriv": "m/48h/0h/123h/1h",
"xpub": "xpub6EkcQSTygvxVnBP2X2fM6HY5D7wv46tWbBc54ADaypuCr47vQh1GPdPAZFdx81ou5Rp4vBnzeJT5MDWDZstzijxkHfrofXRycpt1ASfg1La",
"desc": "sh(wsh(sortedmulti(M,[0f056943/48h/0h/123h/1h]xpub6EkcQSTygvxVnBP2X2fM6HY5D7wv46tWbBc54ADaypuCr47vQh1GPdPAZFdx81ou5Rp4vBnzeJT5MDWDZstzijxkHfrofXRycpt1ASfg1La/0/*,...)))",
"_pub": "Ypub6kUxqLsLQa4M43jXJ3ux8SyP6t8dD5ZbpZmxkpP1jc7VXLW4RkZ76ouEPAZ1gMgiiXzrYFPfzBC8MfjYaoTxfTm1zUfdeqiTnHDX8raCfeg"
},
"bip48_2": {
"name": "p2wsh",
"xfp": "2A01C6B0",
"deriv": "m/48h/0h/123h/2h",
"xpub": "xpub6EkcQSTygvxVneXmk3ywiS2PFhBdiPxeMxYf6RFxHCHH36NxdcN7DjUpudCppAAxs58CG6DQLjtqZNmyC3MpgVob6wpdeATjpZZ1woX92EF",
"desc": "wsh(sortedmulti(M,[0f056943/48h/0h/123h/2h]xpub6EkcQSTygvxVneXmk3ywiS2PFhBdiPxeMxYf6RFxHCHH36NxdcN7DjUpudCppAAxs58CG6DQLjtqZNmyC3MpgVob6wpdeATjpZZ1woX92EF/0/*,...))",
"_pub": "Zpub75KE91YFZFbpup5PMS2AxgZCKRWnozdEWTEmaUKGQysSmUaKuL5WYyf2kk5UNQhhupRnddQe9GzST7crvfLoRTHTg6KtDPZiFjxBJobzcUz"
"xfp": "78CF94E5",
"xpub": "tpubDC7jGaaSE66VDB6VhEDFYQSCAyugXmfnMnrMVyHNzW9wryyTxvha7TmfAHd7GRXrr2TaAn2HXn9T8ep4gyNX1bzGiieqcTUNcu2poyntrET"
}
}
```
@ -73,23 +51,16 @@ Here is an example, produced by the Simulator for account number 123.
## Notes
1. The `first` address is formed by added `/0/0` onto the given derivation, and is assumed
to be the first (non-change) receive address for the wallet. It is only present on the
single-signature sections (`bip44`, `bip49`, `bip84`); multisig sections omit it.
1a. Each section includes a `desc` field: a ready-to-import Bitcoin output descriptor
(with `#checksum`). Single-sig descriptors use the `<0;1>/*` multipath form. Multisig
sections (`bip48_1`, `bip48_2`, and `bip45` when present) emit a `sortedmulti(...)`
template with `M` and a trailing `...` as placeholders, to be completed with your
threshold and the other co-signers' keys.
to be the first (non-change) receive address for the wallet.
2. The user may specify any value (up to 9999) for the account number, and it's meant to
segregate funds into sub-wallets. Don't assume it's zero.
3. When making your PSBT files to spend these amounts, remember that the XFP of the master
(`0F056943` in this example) is the root of the subkey paths found in the file, and
(`0F056943` in this example) is is the root of the subkey paths found in the file, and
you must include the full derivation path from master. So based on this example,
to spend a UTXO on `bc1qhj6avwmp5lhpgqwm6dgxrf3v5lf67rjm99a8an`, the input section
of your PSBT would need to specify `(m=0F056943)/84'/0'/123'/0/0`.
to spend a UTXO on `tb1qc58ys2dphtphg6yuugdf3d0kufmk0tye044g3l`, the input section
of your PSBT would need to specify `(m=0F056943)/84'/1'/123'/0/0`.
4. The `_pub` value is the [SLIP-132](https://github.com/satoshilabs/slips/blob/master/slip-0132.md) style "ypub/zpub/etc" which some systems might want. It implies
a specific address format.

23
docs/installing.md Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
# Check-out and build
- clone repo
- do submodule magic in `external`
- make top-level virtual env: `virtualenv -p python3 ENV`
- activate it
- then:
cd external/ckcc-protocol
pip install -r requirements.txt
pip install --editable .
cd ../..
pip install -r requirements.txt
pip install -r unix/requirements.txt
- should give you a command-line program "ckcc" in your path
- should be able to do:
cd unix
make && ./simulator.py

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@ -1,224 +0,0 @@
# Key Teleport
Purpose: Send a small quantity of very secret data between two COLDCARD Q systems, with
no risk of anything in the middle learning the secret.
Method: ECDH and AES-256-CTR plus an extra wrapping layer, transmitted over a mixture of
NFC, passive websites, and QR/BBQr codes.
# Protocol Overview
## Steps
- Receiver picks an EC keypair, stores it in settings, and publishes the pubkey via a QR/NFC
- The pubkey is encrypted by a short 8-digit numeric code, which should be
sent by a different channel.
- Sender gets QR and numeric code, picks own keypair, and does ECDH to arrive at a
shared session key
- Sender picks a human-readable secret which is independent of anything else (P key)
- The secret data (perhaps a seed phrase, XPRV, secure note, full backup, etc) is
AES-256-CTR encrypted with P key, then encrypted + MAC added with session key
- Data packet is sent to receiver (via BBQr), who can reconstruct the session key via ECDH
- Prompt user for the P key to finish decoding
- Decoded secret value is saved to Seed Vault or secure notes as appropriate
- Receiver destroys EC keypair used in transfer
### When used for PSBT Multisig
- No action required on receiver
- Sender uses the pubkey derived from pre-shared XPUB involved in the multisig wallet.
- Same steps, but drops immediately into signing process when decoded correctly
## Notes and Limitations
- max 4k (after encoding) of data is possible due to HTTP limitations
- all transfers are "data typed" and decode only on COLDCARD
- Q model is required due to the use of QR codes to ultimately get data into the COLDCARD
# Details
## Data Type Codes
The first byte encodes what the package contents (under all the encryption).
- `s` - 12/18/24 words/raw master/xprv - 17-72 bytes follow, encoded in an internal format
- `x` - XPRV mode, full details - 4 bytes (XPRV) + base58 *decoded* binary-XPRV follows
- `n` - one or many notes export (JSON array)
- `v` - seed vault export (JSON: one secret key but includes name, source of key)
- `p` - binary PSBT to be signed, perhaps multisig but not required.
- `b` - complete system backup file (text lines, internal format)
## QR details
BBQr is always used for the QR's involved in this process, even if
they are short enough for a normal QR code. Because the BBQr is
being generated by the COLDCARD embedded firmware, it will not be
compressed and will always be Base32 encoded.
New type codes for BBQr are defined for the purposes of this application:
- `R` contains `(pubkey)` ... begins the process from receiver; compressed pubkey is 33 bytes
- `S` contains `(pubkey)(data)` ... data from sender; first 33 bytes are sender's pubkey
- `E` for Multisig PSBT: `(randint)(data)` ... randint (4 byte nonce) indicates which
derived subkey from pre-shared xpub associated with receiver
All the data is encrypted with the exception randint. Keep in mind
this is a nonce value picked uniquely for each transfer. The
receiver's pubkey is only weakly encrypted by the 8-digit numeric
password, but is also a nonce effectively.
### PSBT Key Selection
When sending PSBT data, a nonce is picked at random by the sender
in range: `0..(2^28)`
This nonce is called `randint`. The receiver's pubkey will be
.../20250317/(randint)
where `...` is the derivation used in the multisig wallet for the co-signer who will
receive the package. The sender's keypair has the same sub key path assuming all
co-signers have same derivation path from root (not required).
Because both the sender and receiver already have each other's XPUB they can derive
the appropriate pubkeys (and privkey for their side) without communicating
more than `randint`. The sending COLDCARD will pick a new random value each time.
When receiving a multisig PSBT encrypted this way, the receiver does not need
to do any setup (nor numeric password) and can receive a QR code at any time.
This works because the shared multisig wallet is already setup. Receiver will
take the nonce value (randint) and seach all pre-defined multisig wallets for
any pubkey that can decrypt the package successfully (based on checksum inside
first layer of ECDH encryption).
The next layer of encryption (paranoid password) is unchanged.
## Encryption Details
AES-256-CTR is used exclusively. Session key is picked via ECDH with final
key value being the SHA256 over 64 bytes of coordinate X (concat) Y.
While ECDH is enough to assure privacy from men in the middle, we
add an additional layer of encryption. We call this the "paranoid key" internally
and in the UX it is called "Teleport Password".
The user sees a random 8-character password, generated as a random 40-bit value, but
shown in Base32 (8 chars) for the human to enter. We apply PBKDF2-SHA512 with
an iteration count of 5000 to stretch that to 512 bits, of which we use half.
The session key is used as the key for the KDF, and the entered value as salt.
- ECDH arrives at session key
- decrypt (AES-256-CTR) the binary body of message
- verify checksum:
- final 2 bytes should be `== SHA256(decrypted body[0:-2])[-2:]`
- if not, corruption, truncation, or wrong keys
- if that decryption is correct, then prompt user for the paranoid key (8 chars)
- stretch that value using session key and 5000 iterations of PBKDF2-SHA512
- use upper 256 bits and run AES-256-CTR again
- same checksum of 2 bytes of SHA256 are found inside after decryption
Encryption adds 4 bytes of overhead because of these MAC values,
but should catch truncation and bitrot. There are no other
protections against truncation as length data is not transmitted.
# Receiver Password
When the teleport process is started, the receiver shares his pubkey
as QR. However, we also show an 8-digit numeric password. The
purpose of this is force the receiver to share this separately from
the pubkey QR on another channel. The code is randomly picked, but
only represents about 26 bits of entropy and is stretched with
a single round of SHA256 before being used as a AES-256-CTR key
to decrypt the pubkey. No checksum verifies correct
decryption, so any code is accepted, and will with near-50% odds,
decrypt to a valid pubkey.
When the sender is given the receiver's pubkey via QR code, it
prompts for the numeric code and uses it to decrypt the pubkey.
Thus a MiTM who injects their pubkey will be detected and blocked.
The "paranoid key" serves the same role in the other direction but
it is Base32 character set, so it will not look similar or be
confusing as to its purpose.
# Web Component
In order to "teleport" the contents of a QR code over NFC, we will
publish a static website directly from an open Github repository.
The single-page website contains javascript code which looks at the
"hash" part of the incoming URL (`window.location.hash`) and if it
meets the requirements, renders a large QR. The QR data must look like
a correctly-encoded BBQr with one of the 3 type-codes above (`R` `S` or `E`).
Otherwise the website could render any QR, which we don't want to
support.
The page will offer "copy to clipboard" features for the data inside
the QR as a URL (ie. same URL as shown) and as an image and of course,
the COLDCARD Q can scan from the web browser screen itself.
When the BBQr data is larger than comfortable for a single QR, the
website can split into a multi-frame BBQr. The website can
do this without understanding the contents of the BBQr data (all
of which is encrypted). Download options will be provided for
single-frame QR, animated PNG, and "stacked BBQr" (a single tall
PNG with each QR frame stacked).
On the COLDCARD side, when NFC is tapped, it will offer a long URL
to this site with the data to be transferred "after the hash". This
is optional since the QR can be shown on the Q itself, and would
pass the same data.
Since the website is running on Github, Coinkite does not have
access to IP addresses or other access log details. Because the data for
teleport is "after the hash" it is never sent to Github's servers
but remains in the browser only. All JS resources referenced by the
webpage will have content hashes applied to prevent interference,
and the site will be served over SSL.
Visit [keyteleport.com](https://keyteleport.com/), or an
[example small QR](https://keyteleport.com/#B$2R0100VHT2AGUUH7KUZUUSTOWOIWHJX3XM7GA2N4BHQOXDFHXLVHVA7K6ZO)
and [view source code](https://github.com/coinkite/keyteleport.com).
# UX Details
- When the receive process is started by the user, a pubkey is picked
and stored, so that they can come back later (after a power cycle)
and make use of the data encoded by the sender. However once a package
is decoded successfully, that key is deleted.
- Sender must start by scanning the QR from a receiver. Then can pick what
to send, from secure notes to seeds and so on.
- For PSBT multisig, user must pick a single co-signer (who hasn't already
signed) and the QR is prepared for that receiver. Because we
cannot do arbitary combining, it's best if the next signer continues
to teleport the updated PSBT to further signers. In other words,
a daisy-chain pattern is prefered to a star pattern. The signer
who completes the Mth (of N) signature will be able to finalize
the transaction, and ideally with PushTx feature, broadcast it.
# Security Comments
## Such short passwords?
We are using 8-character passwords because we want them to be
practical to share over non-digital channels such as a voice phone
call, or hand-written note.
It is very important to remind users that the passwords should be sent
by a different channel from the QR itself. Best is to call up your
other party and say the letters to them directly.
## Is it safe to save image of QR to cloud?
Yes, this seems safe. Of course, if you can control it, perhaps not
a risk to accept... but the QR is encrypted via ECDH using a key
that is forgotten after the transfer, so forward privacy is protected.
Also your cloud service (or photo roll, chat app log, etc) will not
have the 8-character password which is also required unpack the secrets.
The QR codes themselves are fully random and do not reveal the
identity of your COLDCARD, your on chain funds or anything linked
to you.

View File

@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
# BIP-39 Import
# BIP39 Import
- there must be 12, 18 or 24 words in your mnemonic
- there must be 12, 16 or 24 words in your mnemonic
- we have only the English word list
- we support BIP-39 passwords during import
- ~~we do not support BIP39 passwords during import~~ (full support added in version 2.0.0)
# XPRV Import
- we can import a BIP-32 HD-wallet root private key in XPRV format
- we can import a BIP32 HD-wallet root private key in XPRV format
- it's assumed to be top-level, and we don't store the parent fingerprint or depth value
- SLIP-132 format HD-wallet keys are also supported (xprv/yprv/zprv), but we strip
the implied address format
@ -14,12 +14,11 @@
# PIN Codes
- 2-2 through 6-6 in size, numeric digits only
- pin code 999999-999999 was reserved (meaning 'clear pin'), but now available again
- pin code 999999-999999 is reserved (means 'clear pin')
# Backup Files
- we don't know what day it is, so meta data on files will not have correct date/time
- release date of the firmware version that made the file is used instead of true date
- encrypted files produced cannot be changed, and we don't support other tools making them
# Micro SD
@ -33,78 +32,51 @@
- with Electrum, we support classic payment addresses (p2pkh), Bech32 Segwit and P2SH/Segwit
- however, each wallet must be of a single address type; cannot be mixed (their limitation)
- the same Coldcard could be used in each of the three modes (we don't care about address format)
- with Bitcoin Core (version 0.17+), we can do PSBT transactions, which support all address types
- we don't support signing coinbase transactions, so don't mine directly into a Coldcard wallet
- with Bitcoin Core (version 0.17?), we can do PSBT transactions, which support all address types
- we don't support coinbase transactions, so don't mine directly into a Coldcard wallet
# Max Transaction Size
- mk3:
- we support transactions up to 384k-bytes in size when serialized into PSBT format
- we can handle transactions with up to 20 inputs to be signed at one time.
- a maximum of 250 outputs per transaction is supported (will attempt more if memory allows)
- mk4/Q:
- we support PSBT files up to 2M bytes in size.
- any number of inputs and outputs are supported, limited only by final transaction size (100k)
- tested with: 250 inputs, 2000 outputs
- we support transactions up to 384k-bytes in size when serialized into PSBT format
- bitcoin limits transactions to 100k, but there could be large input transactions
inside the PSBT. Reduce this by using segwit signatures and provide only the
individual UTXO ("out points").
- every transaction needs to have at least one output, or we reject it
- we can handle transactions with up to 20 inputs to be signed at one time.
- a maximum of 250 outputs per transaction is supported (will attempt more if memory allows)
# P2SH / Multisig
- only one signature will be added per input. However, if needed the partly-signed
PSBT can be given again, and the "next" leg will be signed.
- finalizing of multisig transactions involving P2SH signatures:
* SD/Vdisk signing exports both signed PSBT and finalized txn ready for broadcast (if txn is complete)
* QR/NFC outputs finalized txn ready for broadcast if txn is complete otherwise signed PSBT only
* USB signing requires `--finalize` parameter (as for standard single signature wallets)
- we do not support PSBT combining or finalizing of transactions involving
P2SH signatures (so the combine step must be off-device)
- we can sign for P2SH and P2WSH addresses that represent multisig (M of N) but
we cannot sign for non-standard scripts because we don't know how to present
that to the user for approval.
- during USB "show address" for multisig, we limit subkey paths to
16 levels deep (including master fingerprint)
- max of 15 co-signers due to 1650 byte `scriptSig` limitation in policy with classic P2SH (same limit applies to segwit even though consensus allows up to 20 co-signers).
note: the consensus layer sets an upper bound of 520 bytes for the length of each stack element
- (mk3) we have space for up to 8 M-of-3 wallets, or a single M-of-15 wallet. YMMV
- max of 15 co-signers due to 520 byte script limitation in consensus layer with classic P2SH
- we have space for up to 8 M-of-3 wallets, or a single M-of-15 wallet. YMMV
- only a single multisig wallet can be involved in a PSBT; can't sign inputs from two different
multisig wallets at the same time.
- we always store xpubs in BIP-32 format, although we can read SLIP132 format (Ypub/Zpub/etc)
- we always store xpubs in BIP32 format, although we can read SLIP132 format (Ypub/Zpub/etc)
- change outputs (indicated with paths, scripts in output section) must correspond to
the active multisig wallet, and cannot be used to describe an unrelated (multisig) wallet.
- derivation path for each cosigner must be known and consistent with PSBT
- XFP values (fingerprints) MUST be unique for each of the co-signers
- multisig wallet `name` can only contain printable ASCII characters `range(32, 127)`
### BIP-67
- importing multisig from PSBT can ONLY create `sortedmulti(...)` multisig according to BIP-67, DO NOT use with `multi(...)`
- creating airgapped multisig using COLDCARD as coordinator always produces `sortedmulti(...)` multisig according to BIP-67
- COLDCARD import/export [format](https://coldcard.com/docs/multisig/#configuration-text-file-for-multisig) only supports `sortedmulti(...)` multisig according to BIP-67. To import multisig wallet with `multi(...)` use descriptor import [format](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0383.mediawiki)
- encrypted COLDCARD backups that contains multisig wallets with `multi(...)` MUST only be restored on firmware versions with `multi(...)` support
- all imported `multi(...)` must differ in keys (same as `sortedmulti(...)`). If `wsh(multi(2,A,B))` is already registered, `wsh(multi(2,B,A))` will be rejected upon import as duplicate, even thought they are actually different script/wallet.
- just BIP67 difference is also treated as duplicate. If `wsh(multi(2,A,B)` is registered, `wsh(sortedmulti(2,A,B))` will be rejected as duplicate and vice-versa.
- fixed: XFP values (fingerprints) for each of the co-signers must be unique (limitation removed)
# SIGHASH types
- all sighash flags are supported:
- `ALL`
- `NONE`
- `SINGLE`
- `ALL|ANYONECANPAY`
- `NONE|ANYONECANPAY`
- `SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY`
- any value other than ALL will cause a warning to be shown to user
- by default, we reject `NONE` and `NONE|ANYONECANPAY` but there is a setting to allow
- only `SIGHASH_ALL` is supported at this time
- in time, we will add support for others, especially to support Coinjoin usage
# U2F Protocol / Web Access to USB / WebUSB
- we do not support U2F protocol, WebUSB or any other means for random websites to talk to us
- only native desktop/mobile apps, or helpers for those, will be able to talk USB to Coldcard
# Fee Limits / Warnings
# Policy Stuff
- Coldcard will, by default, reject any txn that pays a fee of more than 10% of its total
value to miners. This limit is a setting: 10% (default), 25%, 50% or 'no limit'.
@ -117,9 +89,9 @@
# Change Outputs
We will summarize transaction outputs as "change" back into same wallet, however:
We will hide transaction outputs if they are "change" back into same wallet, however:
- PSBT must specify BIP-32 path in corresponding output section for us to treat as change
- PSBT must specify BIP32 path in corresponding output section for us to treat as change
- for p2sh-wrapped segwit outputs, redeem script must be provided when needed
- any incorrect values here are assumed to be fraud attempts, and are highlighted to user
- the _redeemScript_ for `p2wsh-p2sh` is optional, but if provided must be
@ -140,84 +112,5 @@ We will summarize transaction outputs as "change" back into same wallet, however
- key derivatation paths must be 12 or less in depth (`MAX_PATH_DEPTH`)
# Pay-to-Pubkey
- although we have some code for "pay to pubkey" (P2PK not P2PKH), it is untested
and unused since this style of payment address is obsolete and largely unused today
# NFC Feature
- can share up to 8000 bytes of PSBT or signed transaction data.
- NFC-V (ISO-15693) radio/modulation is common on mobile phones but very rare on desktops
# Fast Wipe
- each use of "fast wipe" feature consumes a MCU key slot, of which there are 256.
- use _Advanced > Danger Zone > MCU Key Slots_ to view usage
# Trick Pins
- "deltamode" PIN must be same length as true pin, and differ only in final 4 positions.
- there are 14 trick "slots", but on mk4, we avoid slot 10, so 13 available. (Q: 14)
- duress wallets consume 2 slots (or 3 slots for legacy duress wallet) which must be contiguous
- when restoring trick pins from backup files, "forgotten" pins are not restored,
and any trick pin which matches the true PIN of the restored system will be dropped
- deltamode PIN requirements are checked during wallet restore, and if the new true PIN
is not compatible, the deltamode trick PIN is dropped and not restored
- duress wallets are supported when derived from 24- or 12-word seed phrases
# Debug Serial Port
- virtual USB serial port disabled completely by default, and even if enabled
in Danger Zone, only echos output, and does not accept any input
- use hardware serial port for interactive REPL access (3.3v TTL levels)
# BBQr Scanning (Q)
- files up to 2MiB in size can be accepted
- when 14 or less parts, we display status of each part, if more, just percent complete
# QR Scanning (Q)
- if not BBQr (or sent as unicode inside BBQr) we auto detect these data types:
- PSBT in Base64 or hex
- Wire Transaction in Base64 or hex
- XPRV, XPUB, bare payment addresses, BIP-21 invoices
- seed words (truncated, or full)
- SeedQR (but not Compact SeedQR)
- for Base58, Bech32 encoded values, if checksum is wrong then it is shown as text
- binary QR codes are not supported
- when pasting into a secure note, if the QR's data is > 60 chars long, we assume done
# Secure Notes & Passwords (Q)
- when Q picks a password for you (using F1 thru F5), the entropy is 126 bits or more,
except F3 which makes an easier to type password of around 48 bits entropy.
- Title, Sitename and Username fields are limited to 32 characters in length.
- Passwords are limited to 128 characters.
- Note text is unlimited, but storing very large notes may affect performance system-wide.
- Q Backup files restored onto Mk4 will lose their notes, since notes feature is not supported.
# Address Ownership
- only the first 1528 addresses (764 each from internal and external (change/not) paths)
are considered
- if you have used an sub-account, without ever exploring it in the Address Explorer, nor
signing a PSBT with those account numbers, we do not search it.
- does not search Seed Vault, you'll need to load each of those and re-search
- if you have an XFP collision between multiple wallets in SeedVault (ie. two wallets
with same descriptors, but different seeds) you will get false negatives
# Spending Policy
- (Cosign mode) only 12 or 24 word seeds (not XPRV) are accepted for "key C"
- velocity limit:
- based on a max magnitude per txn, and a required minimum block height
gap, based on previous `nLockTime` value in last-signed PSBT.
- if you sign a transaction, but never broadcast it, you will still have to wait out
the velocity policy.
- PSBT creator must put in `nLockTime` block heights (most already do to avoid fee sniping)
- maximum of 25 whitelisted addresses can be stored
- Web2FA: any number of mobile devices can be enrolled, but all will have the same shared secret
- any warning from the PSBT, such as huge fees, will cause the transaction to be rejected

View File

@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
## Background
The microprocess on the Coldcard is from the STM32L4 family. It comes with
one or 2 megabytes of flash, and 128k to 512k of SRAM depending on Mk2/3/4.
All types of memory share the same 32-bit address space.
The microprocess on the Coldcard is the STM32L476R?. It comes with
one megabyte of flash, and 128k of SRAM. All types of memory share
the same 32-bit address space.
The bootloader code runs first, and enables specific hardware
firewall features, which cover various parts of the address space.
@ -13,15 +13,11 @@ so for example, you cannot see any of the flash used by the boot loader.
If you want to verify the contents of the boot loader, you can give
it a 32-bit nonce and it will provide a SHA256 of itself with that
nonce as a prefix. That hash covers `0x0800 0000` to `0x0800 7800`
(to `0x0801 c000` for mk4).
Flash above `0x0800 8000` (Mk4: `0x0802 0000`) can be examined
directly from python programs.
nonce as a prefix. That hash covers `0x0800 0000` to `0x0800 7800`.
Flash above `0x0800 8000` can be examined directly from python programs.
## Memory Layout
(Mk3)
| Start | Size | Notes
|---------------|-----------|--------------------------
| 0x0800 0000 | 0x7800 | Mapped at zero briefly at boot time. Code. see `stm32/bootloader`
@ -34,33 +30,18 @@ directly from python programs.
| 0x1000 7c00 | 0x0400 | Read-only. "Root seed" (once per bootup nonce), copy of firmware sig
| 0x2000 0000 | 96k | SRAM1: heap and working SRAM for micropython
(Mk4)
| Start | Size | Notes
|---------------|-----------|--------------------------
| 0x0800 0000 | 112k | Bootloader code, including reset vector. See `stm32/mk4-bootloader`
| 0x0801 c000 | 8k | Sensitive "pairing secrets" for SE1 and SE2
| 0x0801 e000 | 8k | MCU keys, consumable; 256 32-bit write-once slots.
| 0x0802 0000 | 16k | Interrupt handlers, file header (Micropython and Coldcard code)
| 0x0802 4000 | (~2m) | Main flash area for Micropython / Coldcard C code.
| 0x0818 0000 | 512k | Internal LFS filesystem (holds settings)
| 0x2000 0000 | 640k | SRAM1,2,3: used by micropython code: disk caches, byte arrays, stack
| 0x2009 e000 | 8k | Top of SRAM3 reserved for bootloader
## Security Measures
- (Mk1-3) On entry the bootloader always wipes its entire working SRAM2 area. You may change
- On entry the bootloader always wipes its entire working SRAM2 area. You may change
it, or even use it for very temporary storage, but it will be destroyed once the callgate
into the bootloader is accessed.
- (Mk4) On entry the bootloader wipes the SRAM it's allocated before and after use.
- All of SRAM is cleared on boot up, and when the "secure logout" feature is used.
- DFU firmware updates can only affect areas at and above the bootrom. Upgrade process will
have not effect if you give a DFU file which changes another area. Built-in DFU is disabled
- All of SRAM1 and SRAM2 is cleared on boot up, and when the "secure logout" feature is used.
- DFU firmware updates can only affect areas at and above 0x08008000. Upgrade process will
crash (harmlessly) if you give a DFU file which changes another area. DFU is disabled
once the system leaves the factory.
- If you manage to erase the entire chip's flash (not clear that's possible), then you will
lose the pairing secret (0x0800 7800 / 0x0800 c000) and be unable to communicate with the
secure element(s).
lose the pairing secret (0x0800 7800) and be unable to communicate with the secure element.
- Boot up verification process does a double-SHA256 over all of flash (including the pairing
secret area) and also a few registers that are loaded from flash cells.
See `verify.c` in `stm32/bootloader`.

View File

@ -1,724 +0,0 @@
[IF NO PIN SET]
Choose PIN Code
Advanced/Tools
View Identity
Paper Wallets
Perform Selftest
Secure Logout
Bag Number
Help
---
[IF BLANK WALLET]
New Seed Words
12 Words
24 Words
Advanced
12 Word Dice Roll
24 Word Dice Roll
Import Existing
12 Words
[SEED WORD ENTRY]
18 Words
[SEED WORD ENTRY]
24 Words
[SEED WORD ENTRY]
Scan QR Code [IF QR SCANNER]
Restore Backup
Clone Coldcard
Import XPRV
Tapsigner Backup
Seed XOR
Migrate Coldcard
Key Teleport (start)
Help
Advanced/Tools
View Identity
Temporary Seed
Generate Words
12 Words
24 Words
12 Word Dice Roll
24 Word Dice Roll
Import from QR Scan [IF QR SCANNER]
Import Words
12 Words
18 Words
24 Words
Import via NFC [IF NFC ENABLED]
Import XPRV
Tapsigner Backup
Coldcard Backup
Restore Seed XOR
Upgrade Firmware [IF NOT TMP SEED]
Show Version
From MicroSD
From VirtDisk [IF VIRTDISK ENABLED]
File Management
Verify Backup
List Files
Verify Sig File
NFC File Share [IF NFC ENABLED]
BBQr File Share [IF QR SCANNER]
QR File Share [IF QR SCANNER]
Format SD Card
Format RAM Disk [IF VIRTDISK ENABLED]
Key Teleport (start)
Paper Wallets
Perform Selftest
I Am Developer.
Serial REPL
Warm Reset
Restore Bkup
Reflash GPU [IF QWERTY KEYBOARD]
Secure Logout
Settings
Login Settings
Change Main PIN
Set Nickname
Scramble Keys
Kill Key
Login Countdown
Disabled
5 minutes
15 minutes
30 minutes
1 hour
2 hours
4 hours
8 hours
12 hours
24 hours
48 hours
3 days
1 week
28 days later
MicroSD 2FA [IF SECRET AND NOT TMP SEED]
Add Card
Check Card
Remove Card #1
Calculator Login [IF QWERTY KEYBOARD]
Default Off
Calculator Login
Test Login Now
Hardware On/Off
USB Port
Default On
Disable USB
Virtual Disk
Default Off
Enable
Enable & Auto
NFC Sharing
Default Off
Enable NFC
NFC Push Tx
coldcard.com
mempool.space
Custom URL...
Disable
Display Units
BTC
mBTC
bits
sats
Max Network Fee
10% (default)
25%
50%
no limit
Idle Timeout
2 minutes
5 minutes
15 minutes
1 hour
4 hours
8 hours
Never
Idle Timeout (on battery) [IF BATTERIES]
30 seconds
60 seconds
2 minutes
5 minutes
10 minutes
15 minutes
30 minutes
1 hour
4 hours
Never
LCD Brightness (on battery) [IF BATTERIES]
25%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
95% (default)
100%
Delete PSBTs
Default Keep
Delete PSBTs
Buried Settings
Home Menu XFP [IF SECRET AND NOT TMP SEED]
Only Tmp
Always Show
Menu Wrapping
Default
Always Wrap
[QR key shortcut] [IF QR SCANNER]
---
[NORMAL OPERATION]
Ready To Sign
Passphrase [IF WORD BASED SEED]
Restore Saved
c*******
[3A14F788]
Restore
Delete
Edit Phrase
Scan Any QR Code [IF QR SCANNER]
Start HSM Mode [IF HSM POLICY]
Address Explorer
Classic P2PKH
↳ mtHSVByP9EYZ⋯Vm19gvpecb5R
P2SH-Segwit
↳ 2NCAJ5wD4Gvm⋯NphNU8UYoEJv
Segwit P2WPKH
↳ tb1qupyd58nd⋯vu9jtdyws9n9
Applications
Samourai
Post-mix
Pre-mix
Wasabi
Account Number
Custom Path
CC-2-of-4
Secure Notes & Passwords [IF ENBALED] [MAYBE]
1: note0
"note0"
View Note
Edit
Delete
Export
Sign Note Text
2: secret-PWD
"secret-PWD"
↳ satoshi
↳ abc.org
View Password
Send Password [MAYBE]
Export
Edit Metadata
Delete
Change Password
Sign Note Text
New Note
New Password
Export All
Sort By Title
Import
Type Passwords [MAYBE]
Seed Vault [MAYBE]
1: [7126EB3C]
[7126EB3C]
Use This Seed
Rename
Delete
2: [CCEE13B9]
[CCEE13B9]
Use This Seed
Rename
Delete
3: [03EE9989]
[03EE9989]
Use This Seed
Rename
Delete
Advanced/Tools
Backup
Backup System
Verify Backup
Restore Backup
Clone Coldcard
Export Wallet
Sparrow
Cove
Bitcoin Core
Nunchuk
Bull Bitcoin
Blue Wallet
Electrum Wallet
Wasabi Wallet
Fully Noded
Unchained
Theya
Bitcoin Safe
Zeus
Samourai Postmix
Samourai Premix
Descriptor
Generic JSON
Export XPUB
Segwit (BIP-84)
Classic (BIP-44)
P2WPKH/P2SH (BIP-49)
Master XPUB
Current XFP
Key Expression
Dump Summary
Upgrade Firmware [IF NOT TMP SEED]
Show Version
From MicroSD
From VirtDisk [IF VIRTDISK ENABLED]
File Management
Verify Backup
Backup System
Export Wallet
Sparrow
Cove
Bitcoin Core
Nunchuk
Bull Bitcoin
Blue Wallet
Electrum Wallet
Wasabi Wallet
Fully Noded
Unchained
Theya
Bitcoin Safe
Zeus
Samourai Postmix
Samourai Premix
Descriptor
Generic JSON
Export XPUB
Segwit (BIP-84)
Classic (BIP-44)
P2WPKH/P2SH (BIP-49)
Master XPUB
Current XFP
Key Expression
Dump Summary
Sign Text File
Batch Sign PSBT
Teleport Multisig PSBT
List Files
Verify Sig File
NFC File Share [IF NFC ENABLED]
BBQr File Share [IF QR SCANNER]
QR File Share [IF QR SCANNER]
Clone Coldcard
Format SD Card
Format RAM Disk [IF VIRTDISK ENABLED]
Secure Notes & Passwords [IF QWERTY KEYBOARD]
1: note0
"note0"
View Note
Edit
Delete
Export
Sign Note Text
2: secret-PWD
"secret-PWD"
↳ satoshi
↳ abc.org
View Password
Send Password [MAYBE]
Export
Edit Metadata
Delete
Change Password
Sign Note Text
New Note
New Password
Export All
Sort By Title
Import
Derive Seeds (BIP-85)
View Identity
Temporary Seed
Generate Words
12 Words
24 Words
12 Word Dice Roll
24 Word Dice Roll
Import from QR Scan [IF QR SCANNER]
Import Words
12 Words
18 Words
24 Words
Import via NFC [IF NFC ENABLED]
Import XPRV
Tapsigner Backup
Coldcard Backup
Restore Seed XOR
Key Teleport (start)
Spending Policy [IF SECRET AND NOT TMP SEED]
Single-Signer [IF SECRET AND NOT TMP SEED]
Co-Sign Multisig (CCC) [IF NOT TMP SEED]
HSM Mode [IF HSM AND SECRET]
Default Off
Enable
User Management [MAYBE]
Paper Wallets
WIF Store
NFC Tools [IF NFC ENABLED]
Sign PSBT
Show Address
Sign Message
Verify Sig File
Verify Address
File Share
Import Multisig
Push Transaction [IF PUSHTX ENABLED]
Danger Zone
Debug Functions
Seed Functions
View Seed Words
Seed XOR
Split Existing [IF WORD BASED SEED]
Restore Seed XOR
Destroy Seed [IF SECRET AND NOT TMP SEED]
Lock Down Seed [MAYBE]
Export SeedQR [IF WORD BASED SEED]
I Am Developer.
Serial REPL
Warm Reset
Restore Bkup
BKPW Override
Reflash GPU [IF QWERTY KEYBOARD]
Seed Vault [IF SECRET AND NOT TMP SEED]
Default Off
Enable
Perform Selftest
Set High-Water
Wipe HSM Policy [IF HSM POLICY]
Clear OV cache
Clear Address cache
Sighash Checks
Default: Block
Warn
Testnet Mode
Bitcoin
Testnet4
Regtest
AE Start Index
Default Off
Enable
B85 Idx Values
Default Off
Unlimited
Settings Space
MCU Key Slots
Bless Firmware
Wipe LFS
Nuke Device
Settings
Login Settings
Change Main PIN
Trick PINs [IF SECRET AND NOT TMP SEED]
Trick PINs:
↳11-11
PIN 11-11
↳Bricks CC
Hide Trick
Delete Trick
Change PIN
↳333-3334
PIN 333-3334
↳Duress Wallet
Activate Wallet
Hide Trick
Delete Trick
Change PIN
↳WRONG PIN
After 3 wrong:
↳Wipes seed
↳Reboots
Hide Trick
Delete Trick
Add New Trick
Delete All
Set Nickname
Scramble Keys
Kill Key
Login Countdown
Disabled
5 minutes
15 minutes
30 minutes
1 hour
2 hours
4 hours
8 hours
12 hours
24 hours
48 hours
3 days
1 week
28 days later
MicroSD 2FA [IF SECRET AND NOT TMP SEED]
Add Card
Check Card
Remove Card #1
Calculator Login [IF QWERTY KEYBOARD]
Default Off
Calculator Login
Test Login Now
Hardware On/Off
USB Port
Default On
Disable USB
Virtual Disk
Default Off
Enable
Enable & Auto
NFC Sharing
Default Off
Enable NFC
Multisig Wallets
2/4: CC-2-of-4
"CC-2-of-4"
View Details
Delete
Coldcard Export
Electrum Wallet
Descriptors
View Descriptor
Export
Bitcoin Core
Import
Export XPUB
Create Airgapped
Trust PSBT?
Skip Checks?
Full Address View?
Partly Censor
Show Full
Unsorted Multisig?
NFC Push Tx
coldcard.com
mempool.space
Custom URL...
Disable
Display Units
BTC
mBTC
bits
sats
Max Network Fee
10% (default)
25%
50%
no limit
Idle Timeout
2 minutes
5 minutes
15 minutes
1 hour
4 hours
8 hours
Never
Idle Timeout (on battery) [IF BATTERIES]
30 seconds
60 seconds
2 minutes
5 minutes
10 minutes
15 minutes
30 minutes
1 hour
4 hours
Never
LCD Brightness (on battery) [IF BATTERIES]
25%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
95% (default)
100%
Delete PSBTs
Default Keep
Delete PSBTs
Keyboard EMU
Default Off
Enable
Buried Settings
Home Menu XFP [IF SECRET AND NOT TMP SEED]
Only Tmp
Always Show
Menu Wrapping
Default
Always Wrap
Secure Logout
[NFC key shortcut] [IF NFC ENABLED]
Sign PSBT
Show Address
Sign Message
Verify Sig File
Verify Address
File Share
Import Multisig
Push Transaction [IF PUSHTX ENABLED]
---
[FACTORY MODE]
Bag Me Now
Version: 5.x.x
DFU Upgrade
Ship W/O Bag
Debug Functions
Perform Selftest
---
[SSSP]
Ready To Sign
Passphrase [IF WORD BASED SEED & SSSP RELATED KEYS ENABLED]
Restore Saved
c*******
[3A14F788]
Restore
Delete
Edit Phrase
Scan Any QR Code [IF QR SCANNER]
Address Explorer
Classic P2PKH
↳ mtHSVByP9EYZ⋯Vm19gvpecb5R
P2SH-Segwit
↳ 2NCAJ5wD4Gvm⋯NphNU8UYoEJv
Segwit P2WPKH
↳ tb1qupyd58nd⋯vu9jtdyws9n9
Applications
Samourai
Post-mix
Pre-mix
Wasabi
Account Number
Custom Path
CC-2-of-4
Secure Notes & Passwords[IF ENABLED & SSSP ALLOW NOTES]
1: note0
"note0"
View Note
Sign Note Text
2: secret-PWD
"secret-PWD"
↳ satoshi
↳ abc.org
View Password
Send Password [MAYBE]
Sign Note Text
Type Passwords [MAYBE]
Seed Vault[IF ENABLED & SSSP RELATED KEYS ENABLED]
1: [7126EB3C]
[7126EB3C]
Use This Seed
2: [CCEE13B9]
[CCEE13B9]
Use This Seed
3: [03EE9989]
[03EE9989]
Use This Seed
Advanced/Tools
File Management
Sign Text File
Batch Sign PSBT
List Files
Export Wallet
Sparrow
Cove
Bitcoin Core
Nunchuk
Bull Bitcoin
Blue Wallet
Electrum Wallet
Wasabi Wallet
Fully Noded
Unchained
Theya
Bitcoin Safe
Zeus
Samourai Postmix
Samourai Premix
Descriptor
Generic JSON
Export XPUB
Segwit (BIP-84)
Classic (BIP-44)
P2WPKH/P2SH (BIP-49)
Master XPUB
Current XFP
Key Expression
Dump Summary
Verify Sig File
NFC File Share [IF NFC ENABLED]
BBQr File Share [IF QR SCANNER]
QR File Share [IF QR SCANNER]
Format SD Card
Format RAM Disk [IF VIRTDISK ENABLED]
Export Wallet
Sparrow
Cove
Bitcoin Core
Nunchuk
Bull Bitcoin
Blue Wallet
Electrum Wallet
Wasabi Wallet
Fully Noded
Unchained
Theya
Bitcoin Safe
Zeus
Samourai Postmix
Samourai Premix
Descriptor
Generic JSON
Export XPUB
Segwit (BIP-84)
Classic (BIP-44)
P2WPKH/P2SH (BIP-49)
Master XPUB
Current XFP
Key Expression
Dump Summary
Teleport Multisig PSBT [MAYBE]
View Identity
Temporary Seed [IF SSSP RELATED KEYS ENABLED]
Import from QR Scan [IF QR SCANNER]
Import Words
12 Words
18 Words
24 Words
Import via NFC [IF NFC ENABLED]
Import XPRV
Tapsigner Backup
Coldcard Backup
Restore Seed XOR
Paper Wallets
WIF Store
NFC Tools [IF NFC ENABLED]
Sign PSBT
Show Address
Sign Message
Verify Sig File
Verify Address
File Share
Push Transaction [IF PUSHTX ENABLED]
Show Firmware Version
Destroy Seed [IF SECRET AND NOT TMP SEED]
Secure Logout
EXIT TEST DRIVE [MAYBE]
[NFC key shortcut] [IF NFC ENABLED]
Sign PSBT
Show Address
Sign Message
Verify Sig File
Verify Address
File Share
Push Transaction [IF PUSHTX ENABLED]
---

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@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
# MicroSD as a Second Factor for Login
When enabled, this feature requires a specially prepared MicroSD
card to be inserted during login process. After correct PIN is
provided, if card slot is empty or unknown card present, the seed
is wiped.
## How it Works
To "enroll" a card, a small encrypted file is written to the card.
During login, after the correct (true) PIN is entered, we use
the master secret to construct an AES key which is used to decrypt
the file found on the card. If the file is JSON and contains a nonce,
we check that in our list of acceptable cards.
The AES key includes the master secret and also a hash of the
unique serial number of the card, retrieved using low-level
protocols. This prevents moving the file to another card.
To allow the same card to unlock multiple Coldcards, we write the
file using a filename derived from the serial number of the Coldcard
(hashed). Thus there could be a number of 2FA-enabling files on a
single card.
The file name starts with a dot, and has extension `.2fa`. Your
tools may or may not hide it from you based on Unix filename
conventions. Reformating the card will certainly remove this file,
so keep that in mind when managing your "special" cards.
If using COLDCARD Q and both card slot are populated during login
make sure that enrolled card is in top slot (slot A).
## Menu Settings
See menu in: `Settings -> Login Settings -> MicroSD 2FA`
The option is enabled only once the main secret is picked. It cannot
be used with ephemeral seeds, as that secret will not be in effect
during boot time.
The menu initially contains only "Add Card". Once one or more
cards are enabled (and the feature is activated), additional
options appear: "Check Card" and "Remove Card #N" (for each
enrolled card).
"Check Card" validates the card inserted and indicates if it would
be accepted or not.
Use "Remove Card #N" is remove cards from the approved list. When
the last card is removed, the feature is disabled and no card will
be required for login. Access to the card in question is not required
to remove it.
## During Login
After the PIN is entered, and if it is the true PIN (or the main
code thinks it is, in Delta Mode or Duress Wallet cases) the main
settings are read. After this point, if there are one or more card
enrolled, then the check is performed. If the slot is empty or
the card fails the check, a fast wipe of the seed is done and shown
on screen. The memory is wipe and system stops. You must power cycle
to continue.
## Tricky Thinking
Because settings are encrypted by the master seed, if you have a
duress wallet, it could have required cards set as well. Generally,
we do not see a good use for this, and assume that typically only
the "true" PIN will have required cards associated with it. Remember
any Trick PIN can wipe the seed directly.
In Delta Mode, the usual card policy is in effect. However, if you
are relying on this 2FA feature to wipe the seed in a case of duress,
there doesn't seem to be any need for Delta Mode.
## Duress Defenses
We recommend simply keeping no card in your Coldcard once activating
this feature. Your attacker, or yourself under duress, will login
normally and trigger this defense without you taking any explicit
action.
If you were being forced to prepare a PSBT under duress, you can
choose which SD card to use (so pick a normal one, which isn't
enrolled) and you may also have a chance to clear your card of the
special file. Either way would be an opportunity to ensure the
automatic wipe occurs, even as you comply and provide the PIN code.
Your enrolled SD cards can also be stored at another location away
from your Coldcard. This could be a bank safety deposit box, since
it contains no sensitive data.
If you are closely surveilled when logging and using your Coldcard,
the PIN code might already be known to your attacker. However, there
is no indication on the screen during a normal (successful) login
that this feature is in effect, so they would not know if the SD
card was inserted by chance or necessity.

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@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
# COLDCARD Message Signing
COLDCARD can sign messages send to it via USB with the help of `ckcc` utility,
sign messages provided via specially crafted file on SD card or Vdisk,
and NFC-equipped models (Mk4, Mk5, and Q) can also sign messages sent to COLDCARD via NFC.
The resulting signature can be returned over SD card/Vdisk, NFC, or — on Q — as a QR code.
Signature format follows [BIP-0137](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0137.mediawiki) specification.
COLDCARD Mk3 and COLDCARD Mk4 up to version `5.1.0` used compressed P2PKH header byte for all script types.
From version `5.1.0` correct header byte is used for corresponding script type.
### Verification
From version `5.1.0` users can verify signed messages directly on the device.
If signature file is on SD card or Virtual disk `Advanced/Tools -> File Management -> Verify Sig File`. In case
signature file is detached signature of signed export (or any other file), COLDCARD can check if digest of file
specified in the message matches contents of file. This requires file signed to be available on SD card or Vdisk.
File size limit for signature files is approximately 10KB.
If signature file is imported via NFC `Advance/Tools -> NFC Tools -> Verify Sig File`.
To cross-verify COLDCARD verification use https://www.verifybitcoinmessage.com/ as it supports multiple script types.
Bitcoin core can only verify P2PKH.
## Signed Exports
From version `5.1.0` most of SD card and Virtual disk exports are accompanied by detached signature file.
If exported file name is `addresses.csv` signature file name will be `addresses.sig`.
### Message construction and signature file format
1. contents of the exported file are hashed with single SHA256 hash
2. `msg = hash from step 1. + two spaces + exported filename (basename)`
3. msg from step 2. is hashed again with Bitcoin msg hash `"Bitcoin Signed Message:" + ser_compact_size(len(msg)) + msg`
4. detached signature file format:
```text
-----BEGIN BITCOIN SIGNED MESSAGE-----
f1591bfb04a89f723e1f14eb01a6b2f6f507eb0967d0a5d7822b329b98018ae4 coldcard-export.json
-----BEGIN BITCOIN SIGNATURE-----
mtHSVByP9EYZmB26jASDdPVm19gvpecb5R
IFOvGVJrm31S0j+F4dVfQ5kbRKWKcmhmXIn/Lw8iIgaCG5QNZswjrN4X673R7jTZo1kvLmiD4hlIrbuLh/HqDuk=
-----END BITCOIN SIGNATURE-----
```
### What Is Signed
1. **Single sig address explorer exports:** Signed by the key corresponding to the first (0th) address on the exported list.
2. **Specific single sig exports:** Signed by the key corresponding to the external address at index zero of chosen application specific derivation `m/<app_deriv>h/<coin_type>'h/<account>h/0/0`.
* Bitcoin Core
* Electrum Wallet
* Wasabi Wallet
* Samourai Postmix
* Samourai Premix
* Descriptor
3. **Generic single sig exports:** Signed by key that corresponds to first (0th) external address at derivation `m/44h/<coin_type>h/<account>h/0/0`.
* Lily Wallet
* Generic JSON
* Dump Summary
4. **BIP85 derived entropy exports:** Signed by path that corresponds to specific BIP85 application.
5. **Paper wallet exports:** Signed by key and address exported as paper wallet itself.
6. **Multisig exports:** public keys are encoded as P2PKH address for all multisg signature exports
* Multisig wallet descriptor: signed by the key corresponding to the first external address of own enrolled extended key `my_key/0/0`
* Generic XPUBs export: signed by the key corresponding to the first external address of own standard P2WSH derivation `m/48h/<coin_type>h/<account>h/2h/0/0`
* Multisig address explorer export: Signed by own key at the same derivation as first (0th) row on exported list. `my_key/<change>/<start_index>`

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@ -1,228 +0,0 @@
# NFC and Coldcard
(Applies to NFC-equipped models: Mk4, Mk5, and Q)
## Usage
The NFC antenna location depends on the hardware:
- **Mk4**: a PCB trace loop, centered under number `8` on the keypad.
- **Mk5**: a discrete coil (`L6`) in the **top-right corner** of the device
- **Q1**: a flexible "sticker" antenna behind the display. The green LED below the
bottom-right of the display (`D12`) lights up while an NFC transfer is active —
it is the activity indicator, not the antenna.
![nfc tap sweet-spots per model](nfc-tap-locations.png)
Before using NFC,
it is important to locate the position of NFC antenna on your device and point it
correctly towards the Coldcard NFC antenna. Picture below shows an example with iPhone
that has NFC antenna located at the top right edge. The NFC smartphone antenna
can be positioned almost anywhere on the device, but mostly on the top, middle,
or bottom of the back side of the phone, and it is rarely indicated on the phone case.
It is always best to look up your specific phone model on the internet to find
the exact antenna location.
![iphone_nfc](iphone_nfc.jpg)
## Standards Background
NFC is a layer of protocols on top of ISO standards for short-range
radio communications.
Unfortunately, both ISO and NFC Forum bodies are so poor they must
sell their standards. Membership starts at a few thousand dollars,
or you must buy each PDF for a few hundred dollars. Every single
thing is behind a paywall.
This policy does not allow us to link to reference standards. Instead
we have to hand-wave about our interpretation of their standards
documents.
In our opinion, this policy is not in the public interest and is
hindering adoption of their standards and even technological progress
in general. Good interoperability is critical with radio standards.
## Lower Layers
The Coldcard has a chip that acts as a Type 5 NFC tag. The
radio standard is called "NFC-V" or ISO-15693, and operates on a
13.56 Mhz carrier wave.
The tag chip implements NFC standards to support reading and writing
commands appropriate to a typical Type 5 tag.
Effectively it exposes a flash memory chip, of up to 8k Bytes in
size. NDEF standards describes the organization of the data in that
memory. This document will describe what bytes are needed in those
records.
## Security
All NFC features of the Coldcard can be disabled from the settings
menu, and when that is done, the tag chip is completely disabled,
and there is no way to probe, detect or access the Coldcard over
RF. Even when NFC features are enabled, we keep the tag chip disabled
unless we are actively sharing something. We disable the "energy
harvesting" features of the chip, so it will not do anything when
the Coldcard is powered-down, regardless of the NFC setting.
If the above is not enough for you, the antenna can be destroyed:
- **Mk4**: cut the trace labeled "NFC" inside the hole for the MicroSD card,
using the point of a sharp knife to cut and peel up the trace.
- **Mk5**: has no such trace — its antenna is the discrete coil `L6` in the
top-right corner, which would have to be physically removed instead.
- **Q1**: cut the trace labeled "NFC DATA" under the batteries.
The NFC traffic is not encrypted and is subject to eavesdropping.
While the NFC feature is active, your Coldcard can be uniquely
identified because the NFC protocol requires a unique ID (64 bits)
that is defined by the NFC tag chip and shared automatically as
part of the anti-collision protocol. Again, that happens only during
active transfers, not when idle.
## Desktop Testing
Most USB-powered desktop contactless card readers will not work
with the Coldcard because they do not implement NFC-V (ISO-15693).
Instead they are doing ISO-14443A or B.
Smartphones, on the other hand, all support NFC-V and they are the
intended targets. Generic NFC tag reading apps can view the data
we share, and that may be enough to be useful. Our long-term goal
is integration with mobile wallets.
# Types of Records
## Background
The "NDEF message" is a list of values ("NDEF records"). In most
cases we share only a a single value, but for more complex object
data we will use multiple records. The order is not defined and may
change. Each NDEF record has data-type information and a payload
of bytes.
If we can use "text" or "URI" records, we will, but we generally
need our own Bitcoin-specific types.
We are using "NFC Forum Local Types" for new stuff. Other Bitcoin
developers are welcome to use the same types as long as it doesn't
create interoperation problems.
Types are shown in full URN format (RFC 2141) but only the final
two parts are sent as part of the NDEF record (ie. `bitcoin.org:psbt`).
We are using TNF=4 (NFC Forum external type) to communicate the
prefix of `urn:nfc:ext:`
# Simple Data
## General QR Replacement
Anytime there is a QR displayed on the Coldcard screen, you can
press (3) and the same data will be shared over NFC. In these cases,
it will be shared as a simple text record, regardless of the content.
Type: `urn:nfc:wkt:T` (text)
Body: varies, but always ascii text.
Many values can be exported this way, include xpub and even seed
words after enough warning screens.
## Payment Address
This is typically a deposit address, generated on the Coldcard via
the address explorer. We share these by themselves as simple text
records for max compatibility.
Type: `urn:nfc:wkt:T` (text)
Body: bech32 or base58 encoded Bitcoin payment address
If there are multiple addresses (10 shown for address explorer case)
then they are separated by a single unix new line (`0x0a`).
# Complex Data
For Bitcoin-specific data we provide a few records together. The
first is a label, then various binary data related to what's going
on (such as a PSBT file after signing).
## Text Label
Coldcard's first record will be a simple text record (English, UTF-8) that
describes what is being shared.
Type: urn:nfc:wkt:T (standard text)
Body: "Partly signed PSBT", "Deposit Address", "Signed Transaction" and similar.
Consider this a title for what's being offered for sharing purposes.
## SHA256 Checksum
When the Coldcard is sharing a larger object, such as a PSBT file,
we know the SHA256 of that object, so we share that as well. This value can
be ignored or used for end-to-end error detection. It does not
protect against tampering.
Type: `urn:nfc:ext:bitcoin.org:sha256`
Body: Exactly 32 bytes of binary. It's the SHA256 over the main
payload (PSBT file, for example).
If present, this value will always directly preceed the object (txn
or PSBT) that it covers. NFC-V has CRC16 over each low-level message,
but that's all.
## TXID Value
When sharing a fully-signed transaction, the TXID, if known, will be
shared in hex.
Type: `urn:nfc:ext:bitcoin.org:txid`
Body: Exactly 32 bytes of binary.
The transaction ID is calculated as a hash over the transaction.
Without signature witness data, it is simply SHA256 over the bytes
of the transaction. For segwit transactions, it's a bit more complex
to calculate.
## PSBT File
The payload is a binary PSBT file, per BIP-174. The PSBT may be unsigned,
partly signed, fully signed or otherwise incomplete.
Type: `urn:nfc:ext:bitcoin.org:psbt`
Body: Binary PSBT file, variable length. First five bytes will be `psbt\xff`.
## Bitcoin Transaction
A fully-signed, wire-ready Bitcoin transaction.
Type: `urn:nfc:ext:bitcoin.org:txn`
Body: Binary, variable length. First four bytes will typically be
`0x02 0x00 0x00 0x00` (version number two, in LE32).
When the Coldcard has signed and finalized a transaction, it can
share it in this format. Typically the user will want to broadcast
this new transaction on the Bitcoin P2P network.
## JSON Files
When exporting wallet details, we need to share a JSON file in most
cases. These are marked as "application/json".
# Examples
This section will include a number of examples, with analysis of the content.
- __comming soon__

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@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
# NFC Push Tx
This feature allows single-tap broadcast of the freshly-signed transaction.
`PSBT ==[SD|QR|NFC]==> COLDCARD signed TXN ==[NFC tap]==> Phone Browser ==> Server TXN Broadcast`
Once enabled with a URL, the COLDCARD will show the NFC animation
after signing the transaction. When the user taps their phone, the
phone will see an NFC tag with URL inside. That URL contains the
signed transaction ready to go, and once opening in the mobile
browser, that URL will load. The landing page will connect to a
Bitcoin node (or similar) and send the transaction on the public
Bitcoin network.
This feature is available on Q and Mk4 and requires NFC to be enabled.
See `Settings > NFC Push Tx`.
See the latest on our feature minisite: [PushTx.org](https://pushtx.org)
## Protocol Spec
The COLDCARD needs a URL prefix. To that it appends some values:
- `t=...`
- this is the transaction, in binary encoded with
[base64url](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4648#section-5)
- `&c=...`
- the rightmost 8 bytes of SHA256 over the transaction. Also `base64url` encoded.
- `&n=XTN`
- if, and only if, the COLDCARD is set for Testnet, this value is appended to
indicate that the transaction is for Testnet3 and not MainNet.
- when RegTest is enabled, the value will be `XRT`
We provide a few default URL values to our customers, including one backend we
will operate on `coldcard.com`. The URL can also be directly entered by the
customer. On the Q, it can be scanned from a QR code.
For COLDCARD backend, the url used is:
https://coldcard.com/pushtx#
The complete URL with a typical transaction might look like this (but longer):
https://coldcard.com/pushtx#t=AgAAAAMNCxXtp2GVYVhkRXHLMmdZFs4p3kbFK ⋯ ABf&c=uiSVRda-1tw
We are using hash symbol here so that our server logs do not get
contaminated with the arguments. The landing page uses javascript
to read the hash part of the URL and decodes from there. If you
prefer, your URL can end with `?` and then the arguments will be
sent by the phone's browser to your server. Your processing can be
entirely done in the backend in this case.
## Expectations for the Backend
Your code should decode the transaction and check the SHA-256 hash
matches. If it does not match, or if `c` value is missing, assume
the URL has been truncated and report that to the user.
Once decoded, your code should immediately broadcast the transaction.
A confirmation step is not required in our opinion. Once it is
submitted to Bitcoin Core (or other API), any status response should
be decoded and shown to the user so they know it is on it's way.
If it was not accepted, please report the error to the user as
clearly as possible.
Next, it would make sense to either link to the TXID on a block
explorer to provide further proof that it has been sent and that
it is now waiting in the mempool.
## Backend Implementations
- Mempool.space's [implementation of this feature](https://github.com/mempool/mempool/pull/5132).
- A single-file (html and javascript) file is available
at [coldcard.com/static/coldcard-pushtx.html](https://coldcard.com/static/coldcard-pushtx.html).
You can host this file anywhere your phone can reach, and then use that URL in your
COLDCARD settings. It uses your phone's browser to submit directly
to `mempool.space` and `blockstream.info` sites (both at same time). It is equivalent
to the page hosted at `https://coldcard.com/pushtx#`. Full source code is published here:
[github.com/Coldcard/push-tx](https://github.com/Coldcard/push-tx)
### Notes
- Complete URL might be as large as 8,000 bytes. Some web servers will not support beyond
4k bytes and the NFC implementation of the phone may also have limits.
- The service URL provided must end in `?` or `#` or `&`.
- `base64url` values from COLDCARD will not have padding (`=` bytes) at end.
- POST cannot be used directly because the expect the phone to do a GET on the URL provided.
- Honest backends will not log the IP address of incoming transactions, but there is
no way to enforce that, and CloudFlare sees all.
## Example URL
```
https://mempool.space/pushtx#t=AgAAAAOHqK3w3hC6PSC0buthnJA5R9Y88WAlEvm9cifNVUPhIwAAAABqRzBEAiB-M9YprNYoohqHdQHg4wY_qcEMwDmyIQH8prykk8-0KwIgARxcojKrtixicouiUxhk4jQq_MAl11ptIgHDlRjgk5ABIQM4bgMAVDbDSr_9CvLjbg5nxrWnDGI-kVmkfL81GXZtCf____8OaH0RxW7DjZKdIF6rvbHvvyFGCBQ0PTgpx20nA_wbLgAAAABqRzBEAiBwUFigORJDPK8ptnYPAntjV-RUn1jAuzphicQstwVv-QIgEbMC8FWXQ5Jve5DaAqKJsqoj3peK83iub_oOkmbiYg4BIQO5Ehn2t0oUG3hnK4cBnwCwMc33DcdJ8aSMWzRQ_wjZL_____-UG6M-eBeAun-EZp6EbVypvVJ3mXCQrN_fUDn-kwoEnQAAAABqRzBEAiAgFAtVTpQYTKplc9NuV7Ws7ZFYeNO8BCS4ozgWrgd2ogIgGTTcw98xQdcGWeWQhVfVm_vZorBIOYovQPQeK0Lg9t8BIQLPWPioVWvj1z4NMHBCkeirYOUalCa83wbSH0CREnGZvv____8CjM_wCAAAAAAZdqkUIJA8_yqzaj0NzhvYVEIBno5gETGIrIzP8AgAAAAAGXapFEaV7xTyleuEX9OejdlUlsz7RTr0iKwAAAAA&c=hre47vyMC78&n=XTN
```
- this transaction doesn't have valid inputs, and will cause an error
- mempool.space will redirect this to a testnet endpoint (because ends with `n=XTN`)

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# Notes on Reproducible Builds
The following document aims to breakdown how reproducibility is verified in the `make repro` build step.
## stm32/shared.mk
The entrypoint makefile for repro builds.
### repro
The `repro` command in `shared.mk` is the first step in the repro build process, which triggers a docker build and run process.
```makefile
repro: submods-match code-committed
repro:
docker build -t coldcard-build - < dockerfile.build
(cd ..; docker run $(DOCK_RUN_ARGS) sh src/stm32/repro-build.sh $(VERSION_STRING) $(HW_MODEL) $(PARENT_MKFILE))
```
`$(HW_MODEL)` is the model string (e.g. `mk4`, `q1`) and `$(PARENT_MKFILE)` is the
top-level makefile being used (`MK-Makefile` or `Q1-Makefile`). The `submods-match`
and `code-committed` prerequisites ensure the submodules and working tree are clean
before a repro build.
Below are interesting sections from the docker logs that give an idea as to what is going on in build process:
```stdout
+ mkdir /tmp/checkout
+ mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /tmp/checkout
...
```
We will pull the release from coldcard.com into the `/tmp/checkout` directory.
```
+ git clone /work/src/.git firmware
...
+ cd firmware/external
+ git submodule update --init
...
Successfully installed signit-1.0
...
+ cd ../stm32
+ cd ../releases
+ '[' -f '*-v5.0.7-mk4-coldcard.dfu' ]
+ dd 'bs=66' 'skip=1'
+ grep -F v5.0.7-mk4-coldcard.dfu signatures.txt
0+1 records in
0+1 records out
+ PUBLISHED_BIN=2022-10-05T1724-v5.0.7-mk4-coldcard.dfu
+ '[' -z 2022-10-05T1724-v5.0.7-mk4-coldcard.dfu ]
+ wget -S https://coldcard.com/downloads/2022-10-05T1724-v5.0.7-mk4-coldcard.dfu
...
'2022-10-05T1724-v5.0.7-mk4-coldcard.dfu' saved
...
+ PUBLISHED_BIN=/tmp/checkout/firmware/releases/2022-10-05T1724-v5.0.7-mk4-coldcard.dfu
...
+ make -f MK-Makefile setup
...
+ make -f MK-Makefile firmware-signed.bin firmware-signed.dfu production.bin dev.dfu firmware.lss firmware.elf
...
signit sign -b l-port/build-COLDCARD_MK4 -m mk4 5.0.7 -o firmware-signed.bin
...
signit sign -m mk4 5.0.7 -r firmware-signed.bin -k 1 -o production.bin
You don't have that key (1), so using key zero instead!
...
cd ../external/micropython/ports/stm32 && make BOARD=COLDCARD_MK4 -j 4 EXCLUDE_NGU_TESTS=1 DEBUG_BUILD=0
...
../external/micropython/tools/dfu.py -b 0x08020000:dev.bin dev.dfu
arm-none-eabi-objdump -h -S l-port/build-COLDCARD_MK4/firmware.elf > firmware.lss
cp l-port/build-COLDCARD_MK4/firmware.elf .
+ '[' /tmp/checkout/firmware/stm32 '!=' /work/src/stm32 ]
+ rsync -av --ignore-missing-args firmware-signed.bin firmware-signed.dfu production.bin dev.dfu firmware.lss firmware.elf /work/built
sending incremental file list
dev.dfu
firmware-signed.bin
firmware-signed.dfu
firmware.elf
firmware.lss
production.bin
...
+ make -f MK-Makefile 'PUBLISHED_BIN=/tmp/checkout/firmware/releases/2022-10-05T1724-v5.0.7-mk4-coldcard.dfu' check-repro
...
Comparing against: /tmp/checkout/firmware/releases/2022-10-05T1724-v5.0.7-mk4-coldcard.dfu
test -n "/tmp/checkout/firmware/releases/2022-10-05T1724-v5.0.7-mk4-coldcard.dfu" -a -f /tmp/checkout/firmware/releases/2022-10-05T1724-v5.0.7-mk4-coldcard.dfu
rm -f -f check-fw.bin check-bootrom.bin
signit split /tmp/checkout/firmware/releases/2022-10-05T1724-v5.0.7-mk4-coldcard.dfu check-fw.bin check-bootrom.bin
start 293 for 870400 bytes: Firmware => check-fw.bin
start 870701 for 114688 bytes: Bootrom => check-bootrom.bin
signit check check-fw.bin
magic_value: 0xcc001234
timestamp: 2022-10-05 17:24:55 UTC
version_string: 5.0.7
pubkey_num: 1
firmware_length: 870400
install_flags: 0x0 =>
hw_compat: 0x8 => Mk4
best_ts: b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
future: 0000000000000000 ... 0000000000000000
signature: 293948e7ce4a3555 ... 766437aa65d3e88a
sha256^2: 7f3a7c5f794ce72f68280447cddc837fa62245fdf4b795822127624f8775dca2
ECDSA Signature: CORRECT
signit check firmware-signed.bin
magic_value: 0xcc001234
timestamp: 2022-10-24 13:33:16 UTC
version_string: 5.0.7
pubkey_num: 0
firmware_length: 870400
install_flags: 0x0 =>
hw_compat: 0x8 => Mk4
best_ts: b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
future: 0000000000000000 ... 0000000000000000
signature: deb643d0a140d89e ... c544f09cd80fa65c
sha256^2: a46ddd6e599a49a573bf76054f438c9efe1ee031bfae74a00b0e7bbe76f516c3
ECDSA Signature: CORRECT
hexdump -C firmware-signed.bin | sed -e 's/^00003f[89abcdef]0 .*/(firmware signature here)/' > repro-got.txt
hexdump -C check-fw.bin | sed -e 's/^00003f[89abcdef]0 .*/(firmware signature here)/' > repro-want.txt
diff repro-got.txt repro-want.txt
SUCCESS.
You have built a bit-for-bit identical copy of Coldcard firmware for v5.0.7
```
## check-repro
The `check-repro` section of the makefile contains the steps required to verify that the build artifacts are infact a bit-for-bit match to the release candidates.
```makefile
check-repro: TRIM_SIG = sed -e 's/^00003f[89abcdef]0 .*/(firmware signature here)/'
check-repro: firmware-signed.bin
ifeq ($(PUBLISHED_BIN),)
@echo ""
@echo "Need published binary for: $(VERSION_STRING)"
@echo ""
@echo "Copy it into ../releases"
@echo ""
else
@echo Comparing against: $(PUBLISHED_BIN)
test -n "$(PUBLISHED_BIN)" -a -f $(PUBLISHED_BIN)
$(RM) -f check-fw.bin check-bootrom.bin
$(SIGNIT) split $(PUBLISHED_BIN) check-fw.bin check-bootrom.bin
$(SIGNIT) check check-fw.bin
$(SIGNIT) check firmware-signed.bin
hexdump -C firmware-signed.bin | $(TRIM_SIG) > repro-got.txt
hexdump -C check-fw.bin | $(TRIM_SIG) > repro-want.txt
diff repro-got.txt repro-want.txt
@echo ""
@echo "SUCCESS. "
@echo ""
@echo "You have built a bit-for-bit identical copy of Coldcard firmware for v$(VERSION_STRING)"
endif
```
To summarize `check-repro`:
- At the final `check-repro` step, we have a locally built `firmware-signed.bin` and we want to check that it matches the binary release provided by Coinkite.
- This step verifies the signature of the binary is valid, using either the Coinkite key factory key or the "debug" key zero which is public.
- An identical checksum match will not be possible as is, since there is signature data embedded into into the binary, which must be removed.
- The specific release of the version that is being built is fetched, and placed it under /tmp/checkout/firmware/releases/*.dfu
- `split` (cli/signit.py: Line 153-175) is run against the release `*.dfu` resulting in a `check-fw.bin` and `check-bootrom.bin`. "This splits the DFU file into the two parts it contains: the main firmware (COLDCARD application) and the boot loader code."
- `check` (cli/signit.py: Line 176-243) is run against each the release `check-fw.bin` and our built `firmware-signed.bin`.
- a hexdump is taken of each the release `check-fw.bin` and our built `firmware-signed.bin` piped through $TRIM_SIG which removes 64 bytes of signature data and subsitutes it with a common string.
- Finally the diff of the two hexdumps are compared to prove reproducibility.

View File

@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ of your duress PIN.
The attackers could tell when the brick-me PIN has worked, but when
the brick-me PIN works, the Coldcard will immediately use it to
destroy the main pairing secret. This renders the security element
useless. This happens in about 50 milliseconds and is done long
useless. This happens in about 50 milliseconds and is done long before
before anyone gets an on-screen confirmation that it worked.
There is little time to interrupt this or jam the bus to stop it.
@ -183,12 +183,12 @@ This double-hashed value is what's stored inside the secure element
as it travels on the bus. Because of the inclusion of the pairing
secret, the hashes generated by each Coldcard will be different.
With Mark3 hardware, we've added a key-stretching step, which starts
With Mark3 hardware, we've added a key-streching step, which starts
with the above value, and does HMAC-SHA256 using a secret key known
only to the 608a (repeatedly). That value is used directly to check the
duress PIN, and if that doesn't match, it is HMAC-SHA256'ed again,
using a key that is usage limited. This limits actual PIN login attempts
to a set value and is enforced by the 608a internally.
to a set value and is enfoced by the 608a internally.
## Genuine vs. Caution Lights
@ -273,15 +273,13 @@ Here's what the warning screen looks like:
- Dev signs binary release with private "zero key" published in our Github
- Give firmware binary file to users (via web download probably)
- They upgrade via normal process (copy to MicroSD, or USB upgrade)
- On first reboot, big "unauthorized firmware" warning is shown, with delay.
- On first reboot, big "unauthorized firmware" warning is shown, with delay
- If they know the main PIN (since they are the owner), they follow process to set green light
- Next reboot and following, as long as "genuine" mode is maintained, they boot without
warnings (Mk3 and earlier)
- Mk4 will always alert on boot-up when running code not approved by Coinkite.
- Next reboot and following, as long as "genuine" mode is maintained, they boot without warnings
### Benefits
- no warnings, but still trustable thanks to ATECC608
- no warnings, but still trustable thanks to ATECC608A
- random devs can replace 99% of firmware at Micropython layer (everything but bootloader)
- but they need to retain our code for talking to bootloader and secure element,
so that PIN can be entered and verified.

View File

@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
# BIP-322 Generic Signed Message Format
BIP-322 specification: <https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0322.mediawiki>
## Proof of Reserves (POR)
### PoR PSBT
COLDCARD accepts a specially crafted PSBT file to sign as BIP-322 Proof of Reserves. The PSBT
must meet all these requirements:
* COLDCARD acts as a BIP-322 PSBT signer. It validates the BIP-322 `to_sign`
transaction, shows the message from `PSBT_GLOBAL_GENERIC_SIGNED_MESSAGE`, and
adds signatures to the PSBT. Finalizing and encoding the final BIP-322
signature string is the responsibility of the finalizer.
* PSBT MUST include `PSBT_GLOBAL_GENERIC_SIGNED_MESSAGE = 0x09`; the value is
the exact message shown to the user and signed by BIP-322.
* PSBT requires `PSBT_IN_BIP32_DERIVATION` for each input
* P2SH wrapped segwit addresses MUST have proper redeem script in PSBT: `PSBT_IN_REDEEM_SCRIPT`
* P2WSH segwit addresses MUST have proper witness script in PSBT: `PSBT_IN_WITNESS_SCRIPT`
* PSBT (`to_sign`) MUST have at least one input.
* First (0th) input of `to_sign` MUST spend the BIP-322 `to_spend` output.
* Input 0 MUST include one of `PSBT_IN_NON_WITNESS_UTXO` or `PSBT_IN_WITNESS_UTXO`.
* When input 0 provides `PSBT_IN_WITNESS_UTXO`, COLDCARD reconstructs the
expected `to_spend` txid from `PSBT_GLOBAL_GENERIC_SIGNED_MESSAGE` and the
witness UTXO scriptPubKey.
* When input 0 provides `PSBT_IN_NON_WITNESS_UTXO`, it MUST be the BIP-322
`to_spend` transaction as defined in
[BIP-322](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0322.mediawiki#full):
* 1 input, 1 output
* output nValue is 0
* input prevout hash is 0
* input prevout n is 0xffffffff
* input scriptSig is `OP_0 PUSH32 message_hash`
* PSBT (`to_sign`) MUST only have one output with null-data `OP_RETURN`
* `to_sign` transaction version MUST be 0 or 2.
* Optionally inputs can be added to `to_sign` for Proof of Reserve signing.
* PSBT MUST be version 0 or 2.
* Foreign inputs not allowed in POR PSBT.
The signatures created by the BIP-322 process will never be suitable
for a on-chain Bitcoin transaction that could move funds, because
of these restrictions imposed by BIP-322.
### Output
COLDCARD always returns a signed PSBT for BIP-322 message signing and Proof of
Reserves. It never returns an extracted/finalized transaction for these PSBTs.
This is true even when finalization is requested over USB, such as with
`ckcc unsigned.psbt --finalize`.
The signed PSBT is the handoff artifact for the external finalizer/verifier. It
keeps the PSBT metadata needed to verify or finalize the BIP-322 signature,
including public keys, scripts, partial signatures, and UTXO data. This matters
because the address being proven normally commits only to a hash of the public
key or script, not the public key or script itself.
### Proof of Reserves Signing Experience
After Coldcard recognizes a BIP-322 PSBT it reads the message from
`PSBT_GLOBAL_GENERIC_SIGNED_MESSAGE` and shows it to the user for approval.
COLDCARD verifies that the message hash matches the input 0 `to_spend`
commitment before offering to sign.
When the PSBT contains only input 0, COLDCARD labels the request as
`BIP-322 Message`, because it is message signing and does not prove ownership
of any additional reserve UTXOs. In that case it does not show transaction
input/output counts. When the PSBT contains additional inputs, COLDCARD labels
the request as `Proof of Reserves` and shows the reserve amount.
If the message contains non-ASCII characters, COLDCARD warns that some
characters may not be readable on screen.
Legacy PoR PSBTs without `PSBT_GLOBAL_GENERIC_SIGNED_MESSAGE` are rejected by
this flow.
Read more [here.](https://gist.github.com/orangesurf/0c1d0a31d3ebe7e48335a34d56788d4c)
Example screen text for a one-input BIP-322 message signing PSBT:
```text
BIP-322 Message
Message:
This is the signed message
Challenge Address:
bc1qzvjnhf7k70uxv6xvneaqxql7k09dd6nsr5wheq
Press ENTER to approve and sign message. Press (2) to explore transaction.
CANCEL to abort.
```
Example screen text for a Proof of Reserves PSBT:
```text
Proof of Reserves
Message:
POR
Amount 0.20000000 BTC
Challenge Address:
bc1qzvjnhf7k70uxv6xvneaqxql7k09dd6nsr5wheq
21 inputs
1 output
Press ENTER to approve and sign proof of reserves. Press (2) to explore transaction.
CANCEL to abort.
```

View File

@ -8,6 +8,36 @@
#
from hashlib import sha256
# Read input, remove whitespace around it
r = input().strip()
# Calc sha256
h = sha256(r.encode()).digest()
# Show the hash
print(h.hex())
print()
# Sanity check for empty input
empty = "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855"
if h.hex() == empty:
print('WARNING: Input is empty. This is a known wallet\n')
# Warnings for short length
if len(r) < 99:
ae = 2.585 * len(r)
print('WARNING: Input is only %d bits of entropy\n' % ae)
# Apply BIP39 to convert into seed words
v = int.from_bytes(h, 'big') << 8
w = []
for i in range(24):
v, m = divmod(v, 2048)
w.insert(0, m)
assert not v
# final 8 bits are a checksum
w[-1] |= sha256(h).digest()[0]
# English wordlist
wl = '''\
@ -182,42 +212,5 @@ window wine wing wink winner winter wire wisdom wise wish witness wolf woman
wonder wood wool word work world worry worth wrap wreck wrestle wrist write
wrong yard year yellow you young youth zebra zero zone zoo'''.split()
def entropy_to_mnemonic24(entropy):
# Apply BIP39 to convert entropy into seed words
assert len(entropy) == 32
v = int.from_bytes(entropy, 'big') << 8
indexes = []
for i in range(24):
v, m = divmod(v, 2048)
indexes.insert(0, m)
assert not v
# final 8 bits are a checksum
indexes[-1] |= sha256(entropy).digest()[0]
return [wl[i] for i in indexes]
def main():
# Read input, remove whitespace around it
r = input().strip()
# Calc sha256
h = sha256(r.encode()).digest()
# Show the hash
print(h.hex())
print()
# Sanity check for empty input
empty = "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855"
if h.hex() == empty:
print('WARNING: Input is empty. This is a known wallet\n')
# Warnings for short length
if len(r) < 99:
ae = 2.585 * len(r)
print('WARNING: Input is only %d bits of entropy\n' % ae)
mnemonic = entropy_to_mnemonic24(h)
# Print index number and each word (24)
print('\n'.join('%4d: %s' % (n + 1, word) for n, word in enumerate(mnemonic)))
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
# Print index number and each word (24)
print('\n'.join('%4d: %s' % (n+1, wl[i]) for n, i in enumerate(w)))

View File

@ -1,222 +0,0 @@
# Usage:
#
# echo 123456123456 | python3 rolls12.py
#
# - Requires python3 and nothing else!
# - This file is <https://coldcardwallet.com/docs/rolls12.py>
# - Public domain.
#
from hashlib import sha256
# English wordlist
wl = '''\
abandon ability able about above absent absorb abstract absurd abuse access
accident account accuse achieve acid acoustic acquire across act action actor
actress actual adapt add addict address adjust admit adult advance advice
aerobic affair afford afraid again age agent agree ahead aim air airport aisle
alarm album alcohol alert alien all alley allow almost alone alpha already
also alter always amateur amazing among amount amused analyst anchor ancient
anger angle angry animal ankle announce annual another answer antenna antique
anxiety any apart apology appear apple approve april arch arctic area arena
argue arm armed armor army around arrange arrest arrive arrow art artefact
artist artwork ask aspect assault asset assist assume asthma athlete atom
attack attend attitude attract auction audit august aunt author auto autumn
average avocado avoid awake aware away awesome awful awkward axis baby bachelor
bacon badge bag balance balcony ball bamboo banana banner bar barely bargain
barrel base basic basket battle beach bean beauty because become beef before
begin behave behind believe below belt bench benefit best betray better between
beyond bicycle bid bike bind biology bird birth bitter black blade blame blanket
blast bleak bless blind blood blossom blouse blue blur blush board boat body
boil bomb bone bonus book boost border boring borrow boss bottom bounce box
boy bracket brain brand brass brave bread breeze brick bridge brief bright
bring brisk broccoli broken bronze broom brother brown brush bubble buddy
budget buffalo build bulb bulk bullet bundle bunker burden burger burst bus
business busy butter buyer buzz cabbage cabin cable cactus cage cake call calm
camera camp can canal cancel candy cannon canoe canvas canyon capable capital
captain car carbon card cargo carpet carry cart case cash casino castle casual
cat catalog catch category cattle caught cause caution cave ceiling celery
cement census century cereal certain chair chalk champion change chaos chapter
charge chase chat cheap check cheese chef cherry chest chicken chief child
chimney choice choose chronic chuckle chunk churn cigar cinnamon circle citizen
city civil claim clap clarify claw clay clean clerk clever click client cliff
climb clinic clip clock clog close cloth cloud clown club clump cluster clutch
coach coast coconut code coffee coil coin collect color column combine come
comfort comic common company concert conduct confirm congress connect consider
control convince cook cool copper copy coral core corn correct cost cotton
couch country couple course cousin cover coyote crack cradle craft cram crane
crash crater crawl crazy cream credit creek crew cricket crime crisp critic
crop cross crouch crowd crucial cruel cruise crumble crunch crush cry crystal
cube culture cup cupboard curious current curtain curve cushion custom cute
cycle dad damage damp dance danger daring dash daughter dawn day deal debate
debris decade december decide decline decorate decrease deer defense define
defy degree delay deliver demand demise denial dentist deny depart depend
deposit depth deputy derive describe desert design desk despair destroy detail
detect develop device devote diagram dial diamond diary dice diesel diet differ
digital dignity dilemma dinner dinosaur direct dirt disagree discover disease
dish dismiss disorder display distance divert divide divorce dizzy doctor
document dog doll dolphin domain donate donkey donor door dose double dove
draft dragon drama drastic draw dream dress drift drill drink drip drive drop
drum dry duck dumb dune during dust dutch duty dwarf dynamic eager eagle early
earn earth easily east easy echo ecology economy edge edit educate effort egg
eight either elbow elder electric elegant element elephant elevator elite else
embark embody embrace emerge emotion employ empower empty enable enact end
endless endorse enemy energy enforce engage engine enhance enjoy enlist enough
enrich enroll ensure enter entire entry envelope episode equal equip era erase
erode erosion error erupt escape essay essence estate eternal ethics evidence
evil evoke evolve exact example excess exchange excite exclude excuse execute
exercise exhaust exhibit exile exist exit exotic expand expect expire explain
expose express extend extra eye eyebrow fabric face faculty fade faint faith
fall false fame family famous fan fancy fantasy farm fashion fat fatal father
fatigue fault favorite feature february federal fee feed feel female fence
festival fetch fever few fiber fiction field figure file film filter final
find fine finger finish fire firm first fiscal fish fit fitness fix flag flame
flash flat flavor flee flight flip float flock floor flower fluid flush fly
foam focus fog foil fold follow food foot force forest forget fork fortune
forum forward fossil foster found fox fragile frame frequent fresh friend
fringe frog front frost frown frozen fruit fuel fun funny furnace fury future
gadget gain galaxy gallery game gap garage garbage garden garlic garment gas
gasp gate gather gauge gaze general genius genre gentle genuine gesture ghost
giant gift giggle ginger giraffe girl give glad glance glare glass glide glimpse
globe gloom glory glove glow glue goat goddess gold good goose gorilla gospel
gossip govern gown grab grace grain grant grape grass gravity great green grid
grief grit grocery group grow grunt guard guess guide guilt guitar gun gym
habit hair half hammer hamster hand happy harbor hard harsh harvest hat have
hawk hazard head health heart heavy hedgehog height hello helmet help hen hero
hidden high hill hint hip hire history hobby hockey hold hole holiday hollow
home honey hood hope horn horror horse hospital host hotel hour hover hub huge
human humble humor hundred hungry hunt hurdle hurry hurt husband hybrid ice
icon idea identify idle ignore ill illegal illness image imitate immense immune
impact impose improve impulse inch include income increase index indicate
indoor industry infant inflict inform inhale inherit initial inject injury
inmate inner innocent input inquiry insane insect inside inspire install intact
interest into invest invite involve iron island isolate issue item ivory jacket
jaguar jar jazz jealous jeans jelly jewel job join joke journey joy judge juice
jump jungle junior junk just kangaroo keen keep ketchup key kick kid kidney
kind kingdom kiss kit kitchen kite kitten kiwi knee knife knock know lab label
labor ladder lady lake lamp language laptop large later latin laugh laundry
lava law lawn lawsuit layer lazy leader leaf learn leave lecture left leg legal
legend leisure lemon lend length lens leopard lesson letter level liar liberty
library license life lift light like limb limit link lion liquid list little
live lizard load loan lobster local lock logic lonely long loop lottery loud
lounge love loyal lucky luggage lumber lunar lunch luxury lyrics machine mad
magic magnet maid mail main major make mammal man manage mandate mango mansion
manual maple marble march margin marine market marriage mask mass master match
material math matrix matter maximum maze meadow mean measure meat mechanic
medal media melody melt member memory mention menu mercy merge merit merry
mesh message metal method middle midnight milk million mimic mind minimum minor
minute miracle mirror misery miss mistake mix mixed mixture mobile model modify
mom moment monitor monkey monster month moon moral more morning mosquito mother
motion motor mountain mouse move movie much muffin mule multiply muscle museum
mushroom music must mutual myself mystery myth naive name napkin narrow nasty
nation nature near neck need negative neglect neither nephew nerve nest net
network neutral never news next nice night noble noise nominee noodle normal
north nose notable note nothing notice novel now nuclear number nurse nut oak
obey object oblige obscure observe obtain obvious occur ocean october odor off
offer office often oil okay old olive olympic omit once one onion online only
open opera opinion oppose option orange orbit orchard order ordinary organ
orient original orphan ostrich other outdoor outer output outside oval oven
over own owner oxygen oyster ozone pact paddle page pair palace palm panda
panel panic panther paper parade parent park parrot party pass patch path
patient patrol pattern pause pave payment peace peanut pear peasant pelican
pen penalty pencil people pepper perfect permit person pet phone photo phrase
physical piano picnic picture piece pig pigeon pill pilot pink pioneer pipe
pistol pitch pizza place planet plastic plate play please pledge pluck plug
plunge poem poet point polar pole police pond pony pool popular portion position
possible post potato pottery poverty powder power practice praise predict
prefer prepare present pretty prevent price pride primary print priority prison
private prize problem process produce profit program project promote proof
property prosper protect proud provide public pudding pull pulp pulse pumpkin
punch pupil puppy purchase purity purpose purse push put puzzle pyramid quality
quantum quarter question quick quit quiz quote rabbit raccoon race rack radar
radio rail rain raise rally ramp ranch random range rapid rare rate rather
raven raw razor ready real reason rebel rebuild recall receive recipe record
recycle reduce reflect reform refuse region regret regular reject relax release
relief rely remain remember remind remove render renew rent reopen repair
repeat replace report require rescue resemble resist resource response result
retire retreat return reunion reveal review reward rhythm rib ribbon rice rich
ride ridge rifle right rigid ring riot ripple risk ritual rival river road
roast robot robust rocket romance roof rookie room rose rotate rough round
route royal rubber rude rug rule run runway rural sad saddle sadness safe sail
salad salmon salon salt salute same sample sand satisfy satoshi sauce sausage
save say scale scan scare scatter scene scheme school science scissors scorpion
scout scrap screen script scrub sea search season seat second secret section
security seed seek segment select sell seminar senior sense sentence series
service session settle setup seven shadow shaft shallow share shed shell sheriff
shield shift shine ship shiver shock shoe shoot shop short shoulder shove
shrimp shrug shuffle shy sibling sick side siege sight sign silent silk silly
silver similar simple since sing siren sister situate six size skate sketch
ski skill skin skirt skull slab slam sleep slender slice slide slight slim
slogan slot slow slush small smart smile smoke smooth snack snake snap sniff
snow soap soccer social sock soda soft solar soldier solid solution solve
someone song soon sorry sort soul sound soup source south space spare spatial
spawn speak special speed spell spend sphere spice spider spike spin spirit
split spoil sponsor spoon sport spot spray spread spring spy square squeeze
squirrel stable stadium staff stage stairs stamp stand start state stay steak
steel stem step stereo stick still sting stock stomach stone stool story stove
strategy street strike strong struggle student stuff stumble style subject
submit subway success such sudden suffer sugar suggest suit summer sun sunny
sunset super supply supreme sure surface surge surprise surround survey suspect
sustain swallow swamp swap swarm swear sweet swift swim swing switch sword
symbol symptom syrup system table tackle tag tail talent talk tank tape target
task taste tattoo taxi teach team tell ten tenant tennis tent term test text
thank that theme then theory there they thing this thought three thrive throw
thumb thunder ticket tide tiger tilt timber time tiny tip tired tissue title
toast tobacco today toddler toe together toilet token tomato tomorrow tone
tongue tonight tool tooth top topic topple torch tornado tortoise toss total
tourist toward tower town toy track trade traffic tragic train transfer trap
trash travel tray treat tree trend trial tribe trick trigger trim trip trophy
trouble truck true truly trumpet trust truth try tube tuition tumble tuna
tunnel turkey turn turtle twelve twenty twice twin twist two type typical ugly
umbrella unable unaware uncle uncover under undo unfair unfold unhappy uniform
unique unit universe unknown unlock until unusual unveil update upgrade uphold
upon upper upset urban urge usage use used useful useless usual utility vacant
vacuum vague valid valley valve van vanish vapor various vast vault vehicle
velvet vendor venture venue verb verify version very vessel veteran viable
vibrant vicious victory video view village vintage violin virtual virus visa
visit visual vital vivid vocal voice void volcano volume vote voyage wage wagon
wait walk wall walnut want warfare warm warrior wash wasp waste water wave way
wealth weapon wear weasel weather web wedding weekend weird welcome west wet
whale what wheat wheel when where whip whisper wide width wife wild will win
window wine wing wink winner winter wire wisdom wise wish witness wolf woman
wonder wood wool word work world worry worth wrap wreck wrestle wrist write
wrong yard year yellow you young youth zebra zero zone zoo'''.split()
def entropy_to_mnemonic12(entropy):
# Apply BIP39 to convert entropy into seed words
assert len(entropy) == 16
v = int.from_bytes(entropy, 'big') << 4
indexes = []
for i in range(12):
v, m = divmod(v, 2048)
indexes.insert(0, m)
# final 4 bits are a checksum
indexes[-1] += sha256(entropy).digest()[0] >> 4
return [wl[i] for i in indexes]
def main():
# Read input, remove whitespace around it
r = input().strip()
# Calc sha256
h = sha256(r.encode()).digest()[:16]
# Show the hash
print(h.hex())
print()
# Sanity check for empty input
empty = "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb924"
if h.hex() == empty:
print('WARNING: Input is empty. This is a known wallet\n')
# Warnings for short length
if len(r) < 50:
ae = 2.585 * len(r)
print('WARNING: Input is only %d bits of entropy\n' % ae)
mnemonic = entropy_to_mnemonic12(h)
# Print index number and each word (12)
print('\n'.join('%4d: %s' % (n + 1, word) for n, word in enumerate(mnemonic)))
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()

View File

@ -1,299 +0,0 @@
# Dual Secure Elements
## Background
The **COLDCARD<sup>&reg;</sup>** Mk4 and Q have two secure elements:
- SE1 (Secure Element 1): Microchip ATECC608
- SE2 (Secure Element 2): Maxim DS28C36B
Because different vendors make them, they do not share bugs and weaknesses.
Although Mk3 uses the SE1 chip, Mk4 uses it a little differently.
SE2 is an entirely new chip, never previously deployed in a COLDCARD.
Both chips use secp256r1 for Elliptic-curve Cryptography (ECC) and
HMAC-SHA256.
## Design Goals
### The Assumption
Assume attackers have physical access to a COLDCARD, have opened
the case, and can probe the bus connections between the MCU and SE1
or SE2. They may even de-solder SE1 and SE2 from the board, and put
active circuits between them and the MCU &mdash; an active MiTM attack.
### The Solutions
Three parties hold secrets in the COLDCARD: the main MCU (microcontroller)
and the two secure elements. Our goal is that **all three** must
be fully compromised to access the seed words. Thus, if one part
has a vulnerability, the COLDCARD as a whole is still secure.
Additionally, knowledge of the correct PIN code is required, even
if all three devices are cracked wide open. (This is a last line
of defence, a brute-force attack on all PIN combinations will breach
it.)
COLDCARD also supports new Trick PIN codes with side effects such
as wiping or bricking the COLDCARD, or providing access to a decoy
or duress wallet. Ideally, attackers will not detect using a false
PIN, even while probing the signals on the board.
## MCU vs. SE1 and SE2
As in Mk1 through Mk3 of the COLDCARD, the MCU has a Pairing Secret.
The MCU uses the Pairing Secret to authenticate itself to SE1 and
vice versa. Flash memory holds the 32-byte Pairing Secret in a
protected area. Only the boot loader code can access this memory,
and the MicroPython code cannot read this area of the chip. Using
an internal firewall feature and PCROP (proprietary code readout
protection) achieves this result.
COLDCARD also shares a secret between SE2 and the MCU. Just like SE1,
this authenticates SE2 to the MCU and encrypts their mutual
communications. The Pairing Secret for SE2 is not stored in SE1 and
is unique from the other Pairing Secret used for SE1.
These Pairing Secrets secure the electrical connections between
SE1, SE2, and the MCU probing attempts. In practice, this means
most commands and responses are XOR'ed with an HMAC-SHA256 value
where the HMAC key is the Pairing Secret and the message is a hash
of the command arguments.
There are also cases where an ECC signature and ECDH establish a
shared secret between devices.
## Seed Decryption
SE1 still holds the seed words, but they are AES-encrypted, and SE1
does not contain a key to decrypt it. The MCU and SE2 store the
seed word decryption key. To access the AES key held in SE2, SE1
has to perform a public key signature and ECDH setup, which requires
the main PIN code. The MCU will only provide its key if both SE1
and SE2 are satisfied.
Earlier COLDCARD versions XOR-ed the stored value with a secret in
the MCU (one-time pad), but this new approach is more powerful
because it mixes in values from the SE2 and MCU using AES; this
increases flexibility and resistance to known plain text attacks.
## All the Keys
| Symbol | Chip's Name | Type | Holder | Purpose
|-----------------------|---------------------|--------------|----------|----------
| `SE1 pairing` | slot 1 | HMAC | SE1, MCU | Protects communications between SE1 and MCU
| `SE2 pairing` | secret A | HMAC | SE2, MCU | Pairing for SE2
| `SE2 comms` | keypair A | ECC | SE2 | MCU captures pubkey half, used in ECDH comms
| `SE joiner` | slot 7, pubkey C | ECC | SE1/SE2 | SE2 knows only public part, SE1 has privkey
| `pin stretch` | slot 2 | HMAC | SE1 | Key stretching for PIN entry and anti-phish words
| `firmware` | slot 14 | SHA256d | SE1 | Firmware checksum, controls green/red LEDs
| `nonce/chksum` | slot 10 | data | SE1 | AES nonce and GMAC tag, protected by PIN
| `SE2 easy key` | page 14 | AES via HMAC | SE2 | Another SE2 part of AES seed key
| `SE2 hard key` | page 15 | AES via ECC | SE2 | SE2's part of AES seed key; ECC used to unlock
| `tpin key` | `tpin_key` | HMAC(key) | MCU | Key for HMAC used to encrypt trick PINs
| `trick PIN slots` | pages 0-12 | HMAC | SE2 | Protect duress wallet seeds and pins (6 spots)
| `SE2 trash` | secret B | HMAC | SE2 | Used to destroy values (only SE2 knows the value)
| `hash cache secret` | `hash_cache_secret` | XOR/AES | MCU | In-memory encryption of actual PIN when unlocked
| `mcu hmac key` | `mcu_hmac_key` | HMAC | MCU | Used as HMAC key to compress other keys
| `replaceable mcu key` | `MCU_KEYS` | AES | MCU | Replaceable MCU key (up to 256 times)
All keys listed are 32 bytes long and picked randomly using the hardware RNG.
An entered PIN code goes through the same hashing process as with
previous COLDCARD versions. This involved process uses a value in
SE1 for key stretching purposes. Before the final hashed PIN value
unlocks a few slots in SE1, `MCU pin check` HMACs the hashed PIN
value and uses the result to check for Trick PINs in SE2. If no
Trick PINs decode in SE2's memory, the PIN is tested against SE1.
If the PIN is correct:
- The the PIN-attempt counter resets to 13 attempts remaining.
- The `SE joiner` slot on SE1 establishes ECDH communication between the MCU and SE1.
- `SE joiner` authorizes the page on SE2 holding `SE2 seed key`.
The `SE2 seed key` value and the `MCU seed key` are now available
to decrypt the seed words unlocked by the PIN.
These sources combine to create the final seed decryption key:
k = HMAC-SHA256 (key = (`mcu hmac key`), msg = (`SE2 easy key` + `SE2 hard key` + current `replaceable mcu key`))
### AES Details
COLDCARD uses AES-256 in
[CTR mode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation#Counter_(CTR)).
Message authentication involves adding 32 bytes of zeros to the
end of the message and checking they decode correctly.
A new keyslot, 10, stores the MAC data (encrypted zeros).
The starting nonce for CTR mode is fixed random value composed of
the first 15 bytes of the `mcu hmac key`, followed by a zero (this
increments if more than 16 bytes are encrypted or decrypted).
### MCU Keys
There are two keys in the MCU that affect the seed, the `mcu hmac
key`, and the `replaceable mcu key`.
The `mcu hmac key` is fixed at factory setup time. It acts as the key for
an HMAC operation that compresses the seed key.
The `replaceable mcu keys` are picked at runtime and saved to flash.
There is only one key active at a time, but there are a few slots
in flash for new ones. When the COLDCARD performs a wipe, it clears
the current `mcu replaceable key`. That process is very fast and
does not have any external signals to betray it's occurring. There
is no need to clear the keys in SE2 or SE1 since without the `mcu
replaceable key`, the actual AES key is still unknown.
New COLDCARDs will ship from the factory with no key picked yet.
Once the main PIN is set and a wallet imported or created, the
first `mcu replaceable key` is picked.
Each wipe operation consumes a replaceable key, and there are a limited
number of them (256) available during the life of the COLDCARD.
### Captured values
The MCU captures public and semi-public values and prohibits them
from changing. These include:
- SE1 and SE2 chip serial numbers (used in most HMAC responses, fully public)
- The public key for `SE joiner` and `SE2 comms` key pairs
Logically, these values are potentially readable at runtime. Since
they are not expected to change, storing them assures they will not
change when under attack (perhaps by substituting a different part).
Blocking the values from read-back out of the secure element is
done where possible.
## Trick PINs
Supporting certain COLDCARD features requires several distinct PIN
codes with various side effects, such as:
- Unlocking a duress wallet
- Triggering a long login delay
- Bricking the COLDCARD
- Blanking the COLDCARD
SE2's even-numbered pages store these PINs with the adjacent odd
slot holding the corresponding secret. The MCU tries each PIN a
user enters against all the slots and works silently to support the
Trick features.
The type of support depends on the type of Trick. Duress wallets
require storing 32 or 64 bytes of seed words (generated from the true
seed via BIP-85). Other cases dictate encoding a short numeric code
provided to higher layers for implementation. For example, a flag
in that code can trigger the boot ROM to wipe the `mcu seed key`.
External actors cannot interrupt or monitor this change because it
is internal to the MCU. The `mcu seed key` is as critical as the
other parts of the AES key to access the seed words. The `mcu seed
key` being zero makes the seed permanently inaccessible.
The MCU code may continue speaking to SE1 to complete the fraud,
but in general, SE1 will no longer store the duress wallet or Brick
Me PINs as in previous generations (Mk1-3). Mk4 and Q implement
those feature in SE2.
### Trick PIN Operation
When a PIN is entered, it is hashed through a series of operations
that take a round trip to SE1. This is the same as the Mk3 using
its secure element for key stretching. A 32-byte deterministic hash,
dependent on secrets from the main MCU and SE1 and unique to each
COLDCARD, is returned. The hash is compared against all 14 of the
slots in SE2.
A few least significant bits (LSB) are masked out of the hash. If
the PIN entered matches one of the slots, the masked-out bits are
checked. Based on the check, two values are taken: `tc_arg` and
`tc_flags`. These two values implement flags and arguments
required to implement the Trick PIN features.
### Trick PIN slot data
The flags are checked along with their corresponding arguments if
a match is found while iterating through all the slots. Some flags
are implemented directly in the boot loader before anything is sent
to Micropython. Other flags are passed to Micropython for implementation
or are implemented in both the boot ROM and Micropython.
**Example 1** A flag is set for Fast Wipe and an attacker has control
of the I2C-bus going to SE2 and the one-wire bus going to SE1. They
can attempt to block the wipe in hopes of trying different PINs
without damaging anything, but they will fail. If `tc_flags`, which
is a bitmask, indicates a Fast Wipe, the seed wiping happens inside
the main MCU. It clears data inside the main MCU extremely quickly
and with no external signals &mdash; either before or after &mdash;
to indicate it happened. This prevents blocking Fast Wipe.
**Example 2** The login countdown feature allows specifying a Trick
PIN. When the Trick PIN is entered, the COLDCARD will show a countdown
timer and the time that must elapse before logging in is allowed.
`tc_arg` encodes the number of minutes on the delay.
**Example 3** Although SE2 holds the Trick PINs, it does not know
the True PIN and Delta Mode will not reveal the full True PIN. The
"Delta Mode" Trick PIN has its unique hash result, and an entry from SE1 is used
to calculate the True PIN. This is accomplished by masking out the
last four digits of the hash and substituting four digits from
`tc_arg`. Limiting it to four digits enables a difference between
the Delta PIN and the True PIN.
This makes the True PIN unknowable without knowing the Delta Mode
Trick PIN; SE2 cannot be searched for the True PIN and generating
the PIN hashes for SE2 would only be possible after cracking SE1
and the main MCU.
## Spare Slots
Moving the duress wallet and Brick Me PINs to SE2 left free storage
inside SE1. This storage is called Spare Secrets. Spare Secrets has
3 &times; 72 bytes of space, protected by the same measures as the
seed words.
Mk4/Q still supports the Long Secret (416 bytes), but its API is
changed. The slow speed of fetching the Long Secret in 32-byte
blocks due to the reconstructing the primary AES Seed Key for each
call necessitated the change.
## Observations
It's essential that SE2 cannot validate a PIN code. Brute-forcing
SE2 would be easy because it lacks SE1's rate limiting (or usage
counter), so SE2 only stores Trick PINs. Testing against the Trick
PINs would require compromising the MCU. Due to SE2's performance,
the maximum attempt rate would be 6 ms. However, controlling the
MCU makes that testing pointless to such an attacker; they could
just NOP-out the Trick PIN checking.
A user expecting attackers smart enough to crack open the case and
monitor the buses should provide a Trick PIN that wipes the COLDCARD's
secrets and bricks it. Sophisticated attackers could detect Trick
PINs that continue operation (duress PINs), unlike the average thug.
## Fast Brick
Quickly bricking the system is done by rotating the SE1
pairing secret by mixing in a random nonce via the chip's key
rotation process. Only a knowledge of the old pairing secret is
needed for this change. This is similar the to `brick_me` PIN
and how that worked on previous products.

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# COLDCARD Mk4/Mk5/Q Security Model
## Abstract
**COLDCARD<sup>&reg;</sup>** Marks 1 through 3 used a single secure
element to store a hardware wallets most important secret: the 24
seed words used to generate a deterministic wallet. This secure
element is in a limited and read-only state until authorized by PIN entry.
Clearing the secure element is impossible without first entering
the correct PIN. The Mk4 COLDCARD introduced several new security
features, including a second secure element and Trick PINs which
can render stored data unrecoverable, or brick the COLDCARD entirely
if necessary, without entering the true authorization PIN (True
PIN).
The COLDCARD Q continues with the same security model introduced
in Mk4.
## Introduction
Previous versions of the COLDCARD had a single secure element, first
the Microchip ATECC508A and later the ATECC608B, to store its
secrets. This secure element has 72 bytes of storage protected by
a 4- to 12-digit PIN code.
Mk4 adds a second secure element to the COLDCARD. The ATECC608 is
still used, now called SE1 (Secure Element 1), along with a new
chip, the Maxim DS28C36B, called SE2 (Secure Element 2). The
DS28C36B (SE2) has more memory with fifteen 32-byte slots of secure
storage. The two chips have a cryptographic link requiring signed
challenges between them.
The design goal for Mk4 is that both secure elements 1 and 2, and
the main MCU need to be fully compromised before seed words are
leaked. It's no longer the case that an unanticipated issue with a
secure element's chip design can allow seed words to escape the
COLDCARD.
Encrypting values inside the secure element began with Mk2. Mk4
distributes the encryption key among three components: the main
MCU, SE1 and SE2. The main MCU now can clear its part of the
HMAC-SHA256 key, making it impossible to decrypt the data held inside
SE1. The Fast Wipe feature performs a simple write to the main MCU without
authentication data. This also allows Trick PIN configurations to
include functions like wiping the seed.
Learn more about the [Mk4's dual secure elements.](mk4-secure-elements.md)
## Trick PINs Implementation
Mk4 introduces a new concept called Trick PINs. These PIN codes
are any PIN other than the True PIN, and the user configures them
to perform different functions in many different ways.
When a user sets a Trick PIN, SE2 records it with a few bytes of
flags and arguments. This may also include up to 64 bytes of seed
data. When a PIN is entered on a COLDCARD, the boot ROM checks all
the Trick PINs first. If the PIN entered matches a set Trick PIN,
the COLDCARD performs the trick.
Find the Trick PIN settings under:
`Settings > Login Settings > Trick PINS`
### Trick PIN Options
Using a Trick PIN can initiate one or more of the following options:
- Wipe the seed
- Mimic a blank device (appears to have wiped the seed)
- Load a duress wallet (two types supported)
- Brick the COLDCARD immediately
- Start a login countdown timer (may include wipe/brick)
- Pretend PIN is incorrect and perform additional tricks (e.g. wipe)
- Display wiped message on the screen (nothing is actually wiped)
- Reboot the COLDCARD (no change to state)
- Delta Mode: advanced duress option with real seed
ANY wrong PIN can trigger most types of tricks, as can specific values.
#### Hidden Tricks
Once defined, you may hide a Trick PIN from the menu. The Trick PIN
won't appear in the menu despite being set. To change it later, select
`Add New Trick` and re-enter the Trick PIN. The COLDCARD will
restore the Trick PIN to the menu.
#### Duress Wallets
This Trick PIN leads to a duress wallet that operates as if the
user entered the True PIN. An attacker will only have access to the
duress wallet. They won't have access to steal the main stash.
The private key can be automatically derived using BIP-85 methods,
based on account numbers 1001, 1002, or 1003 for a 24-word duress wallet
(or 2001, 2002, 2003 for a 12-word one). Because this is BIP-85
based, it behaves exactly like a normal wallet. Defining a passphrase
for the wallet is also possible.
The Mk4 also supports older COLDCARD duress wallets and their UTXOs
on the blockchain. There is an option to create compatible wallets
easily.
#### Brick Self
A Trick PIN that bricks (destroys) the COLDCARD.
The brick effect happens immediately, and the screen displays
"Bricked." Subsequent reboots will also show "Bricked." The COLDCARD
is now e-waste.
#### Wipe Seed
Use a Trick PIN to wipe (forget) the COLDCARD's seed. After the
seed is wiped, a user can set the device to:
- Reboot with no message
- Be silent and pretend the PIN code was wrong
- Proceed to a duress wallet
- Show a message saying, "Seed is wiped, Stop"
#### Look Blank
The COLDCARD pretends it is blank, but it is not. All data remain intact.
#### Login Countdown
The COLDCARD wipes the seed and displays a login countdown. This
function has two options for the end of the countdown: the COLDCARD
will brick itself, or the COLDCARD will just reset.
#### Delta Mode
Delta Mode is the most advanced option, and it is not recommended
novices use it. This function is inspired by safes that allow adding
one digit to the final number to act as a duress code. The safe
will open, but a silent alarm is triggered (or poison gas is
released). A Delta Mode Trick PIN must differ from the True PIN,
but only by **the last four digits**.
Delta Mode logs into the secrets in SE1 using the True PIN code.
The COLDCARD calculates the True PIN using the Trick PIN and contents
of SE2. Nothing unusual can be detected externally; the COLDCARD
behaves normally and it has access to the actual seed words.
Internally, however, the COLDCARD operates in a special mode.
In Delta Mode, attempting to view the seed words wipes the seed.
Anything that could reveal the seed words, like accessing the Trick
PIN menu to determine if a trick is in effect will wipe the seed.
An attacker avoiding these menu functions could sign transactions
in Delta Mode.
Transactions signed in Delta Mode do not have correct signatures.
If the signed transaction is broadcast, the network will reject it
because the signatures do not verify.
The value of Delta Mode is against a well-researched attacker who
knows the XPUB or XFP of the true wallet which is their target. An
Electrum wallet file on a user's personal computer can provide these
identifiers to an attacker. The computer's owner obviously controls
that wallet and its temptingly massive balance. Since the user's
UTXOs are known; a duress wallet won't suffice. Delta Mode lets the
attacker believe they control the correct XPUB/XPRV and UTXOs.
## Other Mk4 Security-Related Improvements
In addition to adding a second secure element in Mk4, COLDCARD gains
several other security improvements.
### Countdown to Login Feature
The Mk4 adds a configuration option to incorporate Fast Wipe.
Implementing this feature as a Trick PIN keeps it protected inside SE2.
Also new in Mk4: the login delay starts over after a power cycle.
Up to 28 days long, the delay restarts from zero after losing power.
Increasing the waiting time is a prudent policy change that our
customers suggested.
### Kill Key Feature
On the Mk4, this feature allows the user to execute a Fast Wipe
when the anti-phishing words are displayed on the screen. This
feature is turned off by default.
The user sets a particular key number to trigger Fast Wipe. If that
key is pressed while viewing the anti-phishing words, the seed is
wiped immediately, and the login process continues. Nothing is shown
to indicate the seed has been wiped.
It is strongly recommended that the first digit for the second half
of the True PIN is **not** used as the Kill Key. Missing a step
would unintentionally wipe the seed.
For the COLDCARD Q, the same feature exists: any letter may be
specified but numbers are not supported. This change allows the
"kill button" to be active through-out the entire login process.
It can be even be pressed while the nickname is shown, and at any
point during the PIN entry.
### SPI Serial Flash Removed
The Mk3 and earlier had a dedicated, external chip to hold settings
and the PSBT during operation. Mk4 and later, do not have that
chip. The settings now reside inside the main MCU, increasing
security. Settings are still AES-encrypted as before.
The separate settings chip could be blanked externally or even
removed/replaced. This possibility might enable getting around
security features that were not part of the secure element. Although
it is not significant risk, Mk4 eliminates that risk entirely.
In addition, the PSBT file now is held in an 8 MB pseudo-SRAM (PSRAM)
chip during operation. It is word-addressed, not page-based, and
there is nothing to erase. This change makes signing transactions
much faster and permits transaction sizes up to 1 MB (the network
only accepts transactions up to 100 KB). Previous transaction size
limits no longer apply.
### Virtual Debug Serial Port Removed
Mk3 and earlier made a virtual serial port available over USB. As
it was only useful to developers, it was disabled by default. Mk4
uses a real universal asynchronous receiver-transmitter (UART)
leading to physical pins. It is not only disabled by default, but
it also cannot be accessed without breaking the case. A developer
wanting to interact with the pins must be willing to damage the
COLDCARD's case to do so, but the option is there if needed.
## SD Card Recovery Mode
Mk4/Mk5/Q bootloader is smart enough to be able to read an SD card. You
will only be able to trigger the SD card loading code, if the
COLDCARD was powered down during the upgrade process. At that point,
the intended firmware image has been lost because it it held in
PSRAM only, during the flash writing process. The bootloader knows
main flash (ie. Micropython code) is corrupt because it fails the
checksum check (and/or signature check).
The bootloader will only install an image of exactly the same version
as was being installed when interrupted. This is done by verifying
the checksum of the proposed firmware vs. a value held in SE1. The
new firmware's expected checksum is recorded before any flash is
erased.
The SD card will be searched for all DFU files, and each is
checked for valid factory signature, and that its checksum matches
the anticipated version the user was attempting to install.
If any other parts of flash---beyond the normal upgradable firmware
area---have also been corrupted, this process will not work and the
unit will be a brick.
On the COLDCARD Q, only the top slot (A) is supported for this
operation.
## Flash ECC (Error Detection/Correction Codes)
Flash memory cells in this MCU are protected by ECC bits. An
additional 8 bits are calculated and stored alongside each 64-bit
value. This allows detecting any 2-bits changing and correction of
up to 1-bit error per 64 bits.
When a corrupted flash memory word is detected, an NMI (non maskable
interrupt) is caused which will crash the microprocessor. This
typically happens during boot-up when the checksum over flash memory
is performed.
We know of no legitimate way for this to occur, so we will assume
that it's an attack, such as exposing the bare die to targeted UV-C
radiation. If the attacker is able to flip 2 or more bits, then
this will effectively brick the COLDCARD once the ECC error is detected.
Critical flash cells, such as those that prevent JTAG access, are
not a single bit (it's a special bit pattern), and regardless are
protected via ECC the same as other flash cells.

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# Seed XOR
## The Problem
What do I do to secure my [SEEDPLATE](https://bitcoinmetalbackup.com/)?
Most people now understand that metal seed backups are paramount,
as paper burns. The challenge is how to store clear-text secrets?
Anyone with physical access could use it and gain complete
control of your funds! Encrypted digital backups are great, but they
are not discrete and you could be compelled to produce the passphrase.
Enter [_Seed XOR_](https://seedxor.com), a plausibly deniable means
of storing secrets in two or more parts that look and behave just
like the original secret. One 12-, 18-, or 24-word seed phrase becomes two or more parts
that are also BIP-39 compatible seeds phrases. These should be backed up in your
preferred method, metal or otherwise. These parts can be individually loaded
with honeypot funds as each one has same word length, with the last being
the checksum and will work as such in any normal BIP-39 compatible wallet.
This one more solution for your game-theory arsenal.
- *Q*: I'm lazy, can I do this to my Existing Seed?
- *A*: Yes. You can split the words you have already in your Coldcard, making
2, 3 or 4 new SEEDPLATES. You could also use any number of existing SEEDPLATES
you have, and combine them to make a new random wallet that is the XOR of
their values. Effectively that makes a new random wallet.
## Background
[_Seed XOR_](https://seedxor.com) works by taking any number of
seed phrases in BIP-39 style, and simply XOR-ing them together,
bit-by-bit into a new phrase. All seed phrases have to be of the same length.
The last word contains checksum.
For the "parts" (sometimes called "shares") this checksum
is calculated as normal for BIP-39, but those final bits are not used in
the XOR process. But the checksums still protects the integrity of the
individual parts. In 24-words XOR last 8 bits are checksum and in 12-words
XOR last 4 bits are checksum.
Useful properties of this approach:
- Every "part" looks and operates as a valid BIP-39 wallet.
- All the parts can be combined in any order and you arrive at the same result.
- You must have all parts, because any combination of less than all parts is a
valid Seed XOR wallet too.
- Each "part" can be recorded on a SEEDPLATE like normal and no new recording tools
are needed. No information about you original seed is leaked by finding up
to N-1 of the parts.
- You can store funds on the seeds of any part, and any subset of parts, which
opens even more duress options.
We recommend storing the checksum word of the original
wallet along with your N parts. This allows you to be sure you've
gotten all the parts and assembled them correctly. This does reveal
3 bits of your real wallet however, and also reveals that a
working and correct subset of parts has been assembled.
It is not hard to calculate a Seed XOR on paper (or to verify or
reconstruct a seed split by Coldcard). Below is a complete example,
and a lookup table that allows you to XOR together hex digits. You
can do the XOR at the bit level, but we recommend looking up each
word and finding it's 3-digit hex value (0x000 to 0x7FF), and going
hex-digit by hex-digit (4 bits).
## How Parts are Generated
Create new parts on your Coldcard:
Advanced > Danger Zone > Seed Functions > Seed XOR > Split Existing
You can choose between 2, 3 or 4 parts. You can also choose (next
screen) to generate them deterministically or using the TRNG. The
advantage of the deterministic approach is you'll always get the
same answers, so you can check that you've recorded the correct
words right the next day.
When the parts are made deterministically, we take a double-SHA256 over
a fixed string (`Batshitoshi`), your master secret, and the text
`0 of 4 parts` which changes for each part (the index is 0-based).
In random mode, we simply pick random bytes (and then double-SHA256
them) from the Coldcard's True Random Number Generator (TRNG). The number
of bytes matches your secret length: 16, 24, or 32 bytes for a 12-, 18-,
or 24-word seed respectively.
This is done to make all but the one part. The final part is the
value needed to get back to your secret, so it's the XOR of the
other N-1 parts. It contains just as much entropy as the other
parts.
### Other Notes
- So many possible duress games are possible once you've split your
seed up, and you are able to "give up" all of the seed phrases,
except one, and the attackers will still get nothing. You can load
various possible combinations of your Seed XOR's with various amounts,
so none are obviously empty and so on.
- Any two or more SEEDPLATES you have already encoded can be used
together to make a new wallet based on their XOR. No changes to
their existing values are needed... just import the set into a new
Coldcard and effectively a new random seed is in play at that point.
- One downside of the deterministic approach is that it allows
attackers to verify they have a seed that was split by Coldcard.
They can import the N parts into a Coldcard, and then split them
again on that Coldcard, and should arrive at the same values. If
they don't then either you used the TRNG, or they have some subset
of all the parts.
- You can pick your XOR parts randomly, and the result when XOR'ed
together, is a random wallet. However, it would be best to get the
last word checksum recorded correctly, so please use a tool such
as the Coldcard to lookup the 24th word and save that (for each
part). For example, you might take a fresh Coldcard (no secret)
and draw 23 words from a hat. After providing the 23rd word, the
Coldcard will show 8 possible final words. You can pick randomly
from that list, or simply use the first one, and then cancel the seed
import process on the Coldcard. Record that final word along
with the others on a SEEDPLATE.
## XOR Lookup Table
| XOR | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | A | B | C | D | E | F
|----:|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---
|**0**| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | A | B | C | D | E | F
|**1**| 1 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 7 | 6 | 9 | 8 | B | A | D | C | F | E
|**2**| 2 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 7 | 4 | 5 | A | B | 8 | 9 | E | F | C | D
|**3**| 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | B | A | 9 | 8 | F | E | D | C
|**4**| 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | C | D | E | F | 8 | 9 | A | B
|**5**| 5 | 4 | 7 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 2 | D | C | F | E | 9 | 8 | B | A
|**6**| 6 | 7 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 1 | E | F | C | D | A | B | 8 | 9
|**7**| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | F | E | D | C | B | A | 9 | 8
|**8**| 8 | 9 | A | B | C | D | E | F | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7
|**9**| 9 | 8 | B | A | D | C | F | E | 1 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 7 | 6
|**A**| A | B | 8 | 9 | E | F | C | D | 2 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 7 | 4 | 5
|**B**| B | A | 9 | 8 | F | E | D | C | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4
|**C**| C | D | E | F | 8 | 9 | A | B | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3
|**D**| D | C | F | E | 9 | 8 | B | A | 5 | 4 | 7 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 2
|**E**| E | F | C | D | A | B | 8 | 9 | 6 | 7 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 1
|**F**| F | E | D | C | B | A | 9 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0
- XOR = EOR = &oplus; = Exclusive OR [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exclusive_or)
- values in table are: x &oplus; y in hex
- go sideways for first digit, then look down for second digit
- in fact, doesn't matter if you do row or column first
- example: 2 XOR 6 => 4 same as 6 XOR 2 => 4
- any values XOR itself is zero (diagonal on this table)
- alternative view: (x) XOR (y) = flip bits of (x) that are set in (y)
- XOR with zero does nothing (flips no bits)
- XOR with 0xF flips all four bits
- XOR with self flips all set bits, so gives zero
- to XOR three values together, do (a&oplus;b)=X then (X&oplus;c)=answer
- right to A, down to B ... take that number, and go to that column
- down to C, that is answer: a &oplus; b &oplus; c
## Open Standard
Seed XOR is an open standard. Other software and hardware wallets are encouraged to
implement support. No license or permission is required, including usage of the term
"Seed XOR" when referring to implementations of this feature. Such implementations
should match the process described in this documentation and be fully interoperable.
---
# 24 Words XOR Seed Example Using 3 Parts
## Seed A (1 of 3)
1=romance [5DC], 2=wink [7DE], 3=lottery [420], 4=autumn [07D], 5=shop [635], 6=bring [0E1],
7=dawn [1BF], 8=tongue [723], 9=range [58E], 10=crater [194], 11=truth [74E], 12=ability [001],
13=miss [46E], 14=spice [68C], 15=fitness [2BF], 16=easy [22E], 17=legal [3FB], 18=release [5A9],
19=recall [59B], 20=obey [4BF], 21=exchange [275], 22=recycle [59F], 23=dragon [210], 24=room [5DF]
A = 5DC 7DE 420 07D 635 0E1 1BF 723 58E 194 74E 001 46E 68C 2BF 22E 3FB 5A9 59B 4BF 275 59F 210 5DF
## Seed B (2 of 3)
1=lion [411], 2=misery [46D], 3=divide [1FF], 4=hurry [37D], 5=latin [3EB], 6=fluid [2CD], 7=camp [106],
8=advance [01F], 9=illegal [388], 10=lab [3E0], 11=pyramid [578], 12=unaware [763], 13=eager [227],
14=fringe [2E8], 15=sick [63E], 16=camera [105], 17=series [620], 18=noodle [4B0], 19=toy [733],
20=crowd [1A2], 21=jeans [3BD], 22=select [61A], 23=depth [1D9], 24=lounge [422]
B = 411 46D 1FF 37D 3EB 2CD 106 01F 388 3E0 578 763 227 2E8 63E 105 620 4B0 733 1A2 3BD 61A 1D9 422
## Seed C (3 of 3)
1=vault [78E], 2=nominee [4AF], 3=cradle [18F], 4=silk [644], 5=own [4F0], 6=frown [2EC], 7=throw [70A],
8=leg [3FA], 9=cactus [100], 10=recall [59B], 11=talent [6EB], 12=worry [7EE], 13=gadget [2F5],
14=surface [6D1], 15=shy [63C], 16=planet [52F], 17=purpose [573], 18=coffee [169], 19=drip [219],
20=few [2AC], 21=seven [625], 22=term [6FB], 23=squeeze [69C], 24=educate [234]
C = 78E 4AF 18F 644 4F0 2EC 70A 3FA 100 59B 6EB 7EE 2F5 6D1 63C 52F 573 169 219 2AC 625 6FB 69C 234
## Calculation (XOR each hex digit)
A = 5DC 7DE 420 07D 635 0E1 1BF 723 58E 194 74E 001 46E 68C 2BF 22E 3FB 5A9 59B 4BF 275 59F 210 5DF
B = 411 46D 1FF 37D 3EB 2CD 106 01F 388 3E0 578 763 227 2E8 63E 105 620 4B0 733 1A2 3BD 61A 1D9 422
C = 78E 4AF 18F 644 4F0 2EC 70A 3FA 100 59B 6EB 7EE 2F5 6D1 63C 52F 573 169 219 2AC 625 6FB 69C 234
| | | | | | |
XOR = 643 71C 450 544 12E 0C0 7B3 4C6 706 7EF 4DD 08C 4BC 2B5 2BD 604 0A8 070 0B1 7B1 7ED 57E 555 3xx
## Resulting Seed Phrase
1=silent [643], 2=toe [71C], 3=meat [450], 4=possible [544], 5=chair [12E], 6=blossom [0C0],
7=wait [7B3], 8=occur [4C6], 9=this [706], 10=worth [7EF], 11=option [4DD], 12=bag [08C],
13=nurse [4BC], 14=find [2B5], 15=fish [2BD], 16=scene [604], 17=bench [0A8], 18=asthma [070],
19=bike [0B1], 20=wage [7B1], 21=world [7ED], 22=quit [57E], 23=primary [555]
final word between: gas [300] - lend [3FF]
correct final word: indoor [398]
# 12 Words XOR Seed Example Using 3 Parts
## Seed A (1 of 3)
1=romance [5DC], 2=wink [7DE], 3=lottery [420], 4=autumn [07D], 5=shop [635], 6=bring [0E1],
7=dawn [1BF], 8=tongue [723], 9=range [58E], 10=crater [194], 11=truth [74E], 12=ability [001]
A = 5DC 7DE 420 07D 635 0E1 1BF 723 58E 194 74E 001
## Seed B (2 of 3)
1=boat [0C6], 2=unfair [768], 3=shell [62B], 4=violin [7A2], 5=tree [73F], 6=robust [5DA], 7=open [4D9],
8=ride [5CB], 9=visual [7A7], 10=forest [2D9], 11=vintage [7A1], 12=approve [056]
B = 0C6 768 62B 7A2 73F 5DA 4D9 5CB 7A7 2D9 7A1 056
## Seed C (3 of 3)
1=lion [411], 2=misery [46D], 3=divide [1FF], 4=hurry [37D], 5=latin [3EB], 6=fluid [2CD], 7=camp [106],
8=advance [01F], 9=illegal [388], 10=lab [3E0], 11=pyramid [578], 12=unhappy [76A]
C = 411 46D 1FF 37D 3EB 2CD 106 01F 388 3E0 578 76A
## Calculation (XOR each hex digit)
A = 5DC 7DE 420 07D 635 0E1 1BF 723 58E 194 74E 001
B = 0C6 768 62B 7A2 73F 5DA 4D9 5CB 7A7 2D9 7A1 056
C = 411 46D 1FF 37D 3EB 2CD 106 01F 388 3E0 578 76A
| | |
XOR = 10B 4DB 3F4 4A2 2E1 7F6 460 2F7 1A1 0AD 597 73x
## Resulting Seed Phrase
1=cannon [10B], 2=opinion [4DB], 3=leader [3F4], 4=nephew [4A2], 5=found [2E1], 6=yard [7F6],
7=metal [460], 8=galaxy [2F7], 9=crouch [1A1], 10=between [0AD], 11=real [597]
final word between: toward [730] - tree [73F]
correct final word: trade [735]
- It's not possible to calculate the checksum of the final seed phrase on paper (needs SHA256).
- But it must start with the indicated digit(s). If using 24 words XOR, there will be only one
suitable choice offered by the Coldcard in that range (x00 to xFF),
once you have entered the other 23 words.
- The checksum of each of the XOR-parts protects the final result, assuming your XOR
math is correct.

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# Spending Policy
This special mode will stop you from signing transactions if they
exceed a spending policy you define beforehand. Once enabled, many
features of the COLDCARD are disabled or inaccessible.
You might want to use this feature when traveling with your COLDCARD.
## Spending Policy: Multisig (formerly CCC)
We also support a mode where the COLDCARD is a multisig co-signer
and only performs its signature when a spending policy is met. The
other multisig signers are free to sign or not sign as appropriate.
Multisig mode is more advanced and requires use of multisig addresses,
new UTXO, and cooperating multisig on-chain wallets.
This document will only discuss the "Single signer" version of
Spending Policy. Both modes can be active at the same time, but if
a transaction would be signed by Multisig policy, then we assume
it's also okay to sign your main key as well.
# Before You Start
When a Spending Policy is in effect, there are limitations
in effect:
- Firmware updates are blocked.
- There is no way to backup the COLDCARD.
- Seed vault and Secure Notes are read-only (and can also be hidden).
- Settings menu is inaccessible.
- BIP-39 passphrases may be blocked (optional).
We recommend getting the COLDCARD fully configured and setup
for typical transactions before enabling the Spending Policy.
# Setup Spending Policy
Visit `Advanced / Tools > Spending Policy` menu and choose
"Single-Signer". First some background information is shown,
then you are prompted to define the "Bypass PIN". This PIN code
is only used when you need to disable the spending policy, but is
also the only way to do so once enabled... so don't loose it.
Once the "Bypass PIN" is confirmed, you will arrive at menu for
related settings. Use "Edit Policy..." to change the spending policy
and define a Max Magnitude (limit number of BTC per transaction),
Velocity (minimum time gaps between signed transactions). You can
define a whitelist of up to 25 destination addresses (leave empty
for any). Finally you can enroll your phone in 2FA (second factor)
so that you must open an Authenticator app on your phone before
transactions are signed.
## Other Security Settings
In addition to policy itself, there are a number of on/off
switches which affect operation of the COLDCARD while the Spending
Policy is in effect:
### Word Check
If enabled, you will have to enter the first and last seed word
after the Bypass PIN as an additional security check.
### Allow Notes
On the Q, secure notes and passwords may be visible or hidden
using this setting. In either case they are strictly readonly.
### Related Keys
BIP-39 passphrase entry, Seed Vault usage will be blocked unless this
setting is enabled. Even when enabled, the Seed Vault is always readonly
and cannot be changed.
# Other Menu Items
## Last Violation
If you have recently tried and failed to sign a transaction, the
reason for the transaction being rejected can be viewed and cleared,
using menu item "Last Violation". It is shown only if a Spending
Policy violation (attempt) has occurred since the last valid signing.
This is meant as a debugging tool, and the information stored is
terse.
## Remove Policy
This will remove your spending policy completely and remove
the Bypass PIN. Your COLDCARD will be back to normal.
## Test Drive
Experiment with how the COLDCARD will function if the Spending
Policy was enabled. You can try to sign transactions that should
be rejected and view the menus in the new mode without rebooting.
Choose "EXIT TEST DRIVE" on top menu to return to the Spending
Policy menu. Reboot will also restore normal operation without
any special challenges.
## ACTIVATE
This step will enable the Spending Policy and return to the
main menu with it in effect. When you reboot the COLDCARD,
the policy will still be in effect. You must use the
Bypass PIN, followed by the normal main PIN, possibly
followed by entering the first and last words of your seed
phrase, before you can disable and change the policy.
We recommend test-driving the feature before doing that.
# Tips and Tricks
## Money Manager Mode
You could setup a Coldcard for another person, perhaps a family member,
and enable web 2FA authentication. There does not need to be any
other spending policy limits (velocity could be unlimited).
Then enroll your own phone with the required 2FA values, and
keep both that and the spending policy bypass PIN confidential.
The holder the the Coldcard will need a 2FA code from your phone
when they want to spend. They can call you for the 6-digit code
from the 2FA app on your phone. This is not hard to provide over a
voice call.
Because a spending policy is in effect, they will not be able to
see the seed words, other private key material, so regardless of
any spoofing or phishing, they cannot move funds without your help.
You should record the bypass PIN, so it can be revealed somehow,
should you die. You do not need to share the risks associated with
holding a copy of the seed words.
## Passphrase Considerations
If you are using the same BIP-39 passphrase for everything, you should
probably do a "Lock Down Seed" (Advanced/Tools > Danger Zone > Seed
Functions) first. This takes your master seed and BIP-39 passphrase
and cooks them together into an XPRV which then is stored as your
master secret. (Replacing the master seed phrase.) This process
cannot be reversed, so other funds you may have on the same seed
words are protected. Once you are operating in XPRV mode, you can
define a spending policy, and know that it is restricted to only
that wallet.
When operating in XPRV mode, the "Passphrase" menu item is not shown
because BIP-39 passwords cannot be applied to XPRV secrets.
## Trick PIN Thoughts
When doing your game theory w.r.t to bypass mode and this feature,
remember that you should assume the attacker already has your main
PIN. That's how they know they cannot spend all your coin, because
they either tried to, or noticed the menus are very limited. They also
have all your UTXO locations and total wallet balance (because they
can export your xpubs to any wallet and load balance from there).
Therefore, a trick pin that leads to a duress wallet after giving up
the bypass unlock PIN, will not fool them. Best would be to provide
a false bypass PIN that is in fact a brick/wipe PIN.
## Lock Out Changes to Policy
In the Trick Pin menu once Spending Policy has been enabled, you will
find the Bypass PIN listed. You could delete or "hide" it. Hiding
it is pointless since you cannot get to the trick PIN menu while
the policy is in effect. Deleting the PIN however, is useful because
it assures changes to spending policy are impossible. To recover
the COLDCARD when this move is later regretted, under Advanced,
there is "Destroy Seed" option which will clear the seed words and
all settings, including the spending policy.
### Unlock Policy & Wipe
We've provided a new trick PIN that pretends to be the unlock
spending policy pin, so the login sequence is correct... but it
will wipe the seed in the process. It will be obvious to your
attackers that you've wiped the seed because the main PIN will lead
to blank wallet now (no seed loaded).
### Delta Mode and Spending Policy
If, from the start, you gave your "delta mode PIN" to the attackers,
then when they bypass the policy (after also getting the bypass PIN
from you), they will still be in Delta Mode.
They could attempt unlimited spending, but transactions signed will
not be valid. If they try to view the seed words or generally export
private key material, they will hit many of the "wipe seed if delta
mode" cases.
## Forgotten Bypass PIN Code
If you've enabled a spending policy and still remember the main PIN,
but cannot disable the feature because you've forgotten the Bypass
PIN, your only option is to use `Advanced > Destroy Seed`. After
some confirmations, this erases the master seed, all settings, seed
vault items, secure notes, and trick pins. It's basically a factory
reset except for the main PIN code which is unchanged. Once you've
done that, you can enter your seed words from backup (or restore a
backup file) and continue to use the COLDCARD again.

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# Temporary Seeds
[_(new in v5.0.7, requires Mk4, Mk5, or Q)_](upgrade.md)
Temporary seed (renamed in `5.2.0` from Ephemeral seed) is a temporary secret completely separate
from the master seed, typically held in **COLDCARD<sup>&reg;</sup>** RAM and
not persisted between reboots in the Secure Element.
Temporary seeds *completely* defeat the design
of Coldcard's security model, based on secure elements.
Enable the `Seed Vault` feature to store these secrets longer-term.
Read more about `Seed Vault` feature below.
!!! warning "Make sure you know what you're doing!"
This feature is intended for those one-off signings, like recovering
a lost seed from some other system or importing some seed as a
balance check. We do not recommend handing unencrypted seed material
on a regular basis!
## Usage
* if temporary seed is already in use, first home menu option `[<xfp>]` is visible with fingerprint of temporary master secret
* go to `Advanced/Tools > Temporary Seed`
* temporary seed words can be Generated with TRNG
- `Advanced/Tools > Temporary Seed > Generate Words`
* temporary seed words can be imported
- `Advanced/Tools > Temporary Seed > Import Words`
* importing extended private keys
- `Advanced/Tools > Temporary Seed > Import XPRV`
- `Advanced/Tools > Temporary Seed > Tapsigner Backup`
* temporary seed can be activated from BIP-85 derived secrets - go to `Advanced/Tools > Derive Seed B85` and pick types of secret. Keep in mind that only word based and xprv based secrets can be used as temporary seed.
- `12 words`
- `18 words`
- `24 words`
- `XPRV (BIP-32)`
- pick derivation `Index` in next prompt, or just press OK for index 0
- Press (0) in next prompt to activate derived secret as a temporary seed
* temporary seed can be activated from Duress Wallet
- go to `Settings -> Login Settings -> Trick Pins`
- add new Duress Wallet trick pin and save it
- choose newly created trick pin in trick pins menu and use `Activate Wallet` option
* temporary seed can be obtained from `SeedXOR`
- go to `Advanced/Tools -> Danger Zone -> Seed Functions -> SeedXOR`
- pick `Restore Seed XOR` option and provide all XOR parts
- Press (2) to activate restored seed as temporary seed
* BIP-39 passphrase is from version `5.2.0` handled internally as temporary seed
Ability to generate and use **Temporary seed** is available on Coldcard when:
1. no PIN chosen and no secret chosen (newly unpacked Coldcard)
2. PIN set up but no secret chosen yet
3. with both PIN and secret already picked
# Restore Master
[_(new in v5.2.0, requires Mk4, Mk5, or Q)_](upgrade.md)
From version `5.2.0` users no longer need to reboot COLDCARD to return
to their "master seed" (one stored in SE2). Once COLDCARD has temporary
seed active, first item in home menu is `[xfp]` and is a clone of `Ready To Sign`.
Last item in home menu is `Restore Master`.
`Restore Master` offers two options. First, if user presses OK, COLDCARD wipes temporary seed settings
and switches back to master seed and its settings.
If user presses (1) temporary seed settings are preserved for later use and COLDCARD only switches
back to master seed and its settings.
If current temporary seed is also saved in Seed Vault, option to wipe settings is not available.
Seed Vault entries can only be deleted in Seed Vault menu.
# Seed Vault
[_(new in v5.2.0, requires Mk4, Mk5, or Q)_](upgrade.md)
Seed Vault adds the ability to store multiple temporary secrets into encrypted settings for simple
recall and later use (AES-256-CTR encrypted with your master seed's key).
Users can capture and hold master secret from any temporary seed source, including: TRNG, Dice Rolls,
SeedXOR, TAPSIGNER backups, BIP-85 derived values, BIP-39 passphrase wallets.
## Enable Seed Vault
Enable this functionality in `Advanced/Tools -> Danger Zone -> Seed Vault -> Enable`.
Once seed vault is enabled new menu item is visible in home menu `Seed Vault`.
To disable Seed Vault user needs to remove all entries from Seed Vault first.
## Add Seed to Vault
After `Seed Vault` is enabled, users will see a new prompt, after
creation of temporary seed, asking whether to save this temporary
seed to Seed Vault. Press (1) to save or any other key to ignore.
If option to save was chosen, confirmation prompt is shown - `Saved to seed vault.`
## Seed Vault menu
* if Seed Vault is empty `(none saved yet)` is the first menu item followed by shortcut to `Temporary Seed` menu.
* if not empty, saved seeds are listed in menu as `[xfp]`
* if current active temporary seed is stored in Seed Vault - it has checkmark next to it
* if temporary seed is active - last menu item of Seed Vault menu is `Restore Master`
## Seed Vault entry submenu
1. by default `[xfp]` but can be renamed to allow user labeling and leads to additional information about the seed
2. `Use This Seed` allows to switch to the saved temporary seed. If it is already active `In Use` is shown instead.
3. `Rename` allows to change 1. menu item to something personalized to user (limited to 40 characters)
4. `Delete` allows to remove temporary seed from Seed Vault and optionally to completely wipe its settings.

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# Firmware Upgrade and Recovery Process
_This document applies to the Mk4, Mk5, and Q. Earlier COLDCARDs did not use this approach._
On the COLDCARD, we have done away with the slow external SPI flash
(serial flash) chip entirely (used in Mk1-Mk3). In it's place we
use a much faster and huge 64 Mbit PSRAM chip (quad SPI RAM chip:
ESP-PSRAM64H).
This chip is volatile and forgets its contents at power down.
For working space of PSBT files during signing, that's okay but it
can be a problem during firmware upgrades. This document explains
how we've solved the risks of firmware upgrades and possible bricking
that can happen with power fails at just the wrong time.
## Firmware Upgrade Process
Steps:
- firmware image (DFU file) is copied onto the COLDCARD, either by USB or SDCard
- the proposed firmware image (up to about 1.5Mbytes) is stored in PSRAM
- the user approves the upgrade, and they must process the main PIN code to do that.
- firmware image is checked for correct signature from factory (nothing proceeds if
not signed by a legit key)
- a checksum is calculated over the new firmware, and the current contents of
flash, including the bootloader code, its secrets, unique identity bits
(for the main chip). We call this the "world checksum".
- before anything else happens, we update the main secure element (608C) with
the world checksum, and during boot, knowledge of the world checksum is required
to light the green genuine light.
- the light stays green at this point, and the system could still boot the old firmware
- flash erasing and writing of the new firmware starts
- this takes about 15 seconds because flash is relatively slow
- once that is done, the system resets, and the normal bootup sequence will
re-verify the flash for its signature
- the green light will be active because the world checksum was already written earlier
## Recovery Cases
When the system boots up, it always checks the firmware's signature. If it's
corrupt or missing, then we attempt a few different recovery stpes.
### PSRAM Holds New Firmware
If the system resets before the flash is erased and programmed completely, we
still have enough information in the PSRAM to start over. If main firmware
is corrupt, then we look in PSRAM for an image that we might have been
burning when we got interrupted. A full signature check is done (so any bitrot
will be detected).
Importantly, the firmware we find in PSRAM at this point must also reconstruct
the right "world checksum" as is already stored in the 608. If it does not,
then we do not use the contents of the PSRAM and continue with other options.
We need this policy because the PSRAM is an external chip, and an attacker
might try this:
1) Corrupt the main firmware slightly. Perhaps by shining a UV-C light source
at the bare die. Only one bit flip is required. This is done only to trigger
recovery mode.
2) Replace the PSRAM contents with a special firmware image. (It would need
to factory signed, but perhaps it has some feature they want to abuse or
something.)
3) Power up the COLDCARD, and it would try to restore the firmware image in PSRAM.
Because of the world checksum, only the intended firmware can be
restored, not any other version. There is no way to for the attacker
to change the other parts of the firmware based just corrupting a few
bits using UV-C.
### Recovering from Power Fails
The most likely way to make the upgrade fail is a power failure
during the 15-second period while the firmware is copied from PSRAM
to main flash. The PSRAM will forget it's contents, and the COLDCARD
no longer has a complete copy of firmware anywhere.
Most products would be a "brick" at this point, and the docs would
warn against power fails during upgrade. However, the COLCARD can read
SD Cards to load replacement firmware. The card does not need to
be specially prepared, but we recommend erasing it, formating with
FAT32 and then copying just the firmware onto the card.
If the main firmware is corrupt or missing, and the PSRAM does not
hold a suitable firmware upgrade, then the screen will show "Insert Card".
Once a card is inserted, a search is made for a suitable firmware file.
All DFU files will be considered, but you must provide the firmware
file that you were attempting to upgrade to during the power failure,
because the "world checksum" is calculated for each image found on
the card. You will not be able to substitute a newer version of firmware.
Of course, firmware factory signatures are checked as well.
## Key Entry Sequence
We do **not** provide a key sequence to enter recovery mode. This
would be a nice to have to recover from major bugs in the main firmware,
but our security model does not allow it: Since the recovery methods
will only replace the bits you used to have with the exact same
bits you had previously, there is no need to "recover" if the
firmware is already there.
Attackers would not need a sequence, since they can gitch the clock
or use UV-C light on the bare die to change bits.
## Reality of Flipping Bits in Flash
It's not actually possible to flip a few flash bits because this
chip has ECC for all flash cells. It will auto-correct single-bit
errors, and for double-bit errors it stops execution completely.
So good luck attackers, have a nice day!

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# Web 2FA Authentication
How to support [RFC 6238](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6238)
TOTP (Time based One Time Password) 2FA check, on our little embedded
device without a real-time clock?
Solution: Store the pre-shared secret in the COLDCARD, and send that
securely to a trusted webserver which knows the time and can do a
fancy UX. That webserver accepts the time-based-one-time 2FA numeric
code from the user, and if correct, reveals a secret
that can be used back on the COLDCARD to authorize an action.
For the Mk4, the secret is 8 digit numeric code to be entered,
for the COLDCARD Q, it is a QR code to be scanned.
### History / Background
The HSM feature uses HOTP tokens, which do not require a backend,
but are not as robust as time-based tokens.
Web2FA is available to be enabled as part of a Spending Policy,
both in Multisig and Single Signer modes. When enabled, you will be
prompted complete 2FA authentication after viewing the details of
the transaction to be signed. You will not be able to sign without
the correct code.
## How It Works
- Web backend has a ECC keypair, with pubkey known to CC firmware releases.
- Usual 2fa base32 secret is picked by CC and stored in CC (so that server is stateless)
- CC creates URL encrypted to the pubkey of server, containing args:
- shared secret for TOTP (same value as held in user's phone)
- the response nonce (32 bytes, shown as 64 hex chars, on Q; or 8 digits on Mk4)
to be revealed to the user on successful auth
- flag if Q model, so can provide a QR to be scanned in that case (rather than digits)
- some text label for what's being approved, which is presented to user so they can pick
correct 2fa shared secret.
- above is all encrypted in transit, and only the server can decrypt
- user is sent to that encrypted URL using NFC tap on the COLDCARD
- user arrives at server:
- shown label [which also indicates the server can be trusted, since only it could decrypt it]
- prompt for 6 digits from authenticator app
- does [RFC 6238](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6238) 2FA check using current time
- checks using current time and the shared secret provided by CC, fails if wrong.
- time based failure: offer retry (they typed too slow / minor clock drift)
- can offer to retry, but also do some rate limiting (only one attempt per 30-sec period)
- server will store very recent responses so attacker cannot get two codes
in any 30sec period (ie. blocks immediate reuse of same URL)
- until a valid code is given, user is stuck here
- when valid token received:
- if Q, show a QR code to be scanned, with the full nonce
- for non-Q system, a 8-digit decimal value is given: user has to enter that into the COLDCARD
- web site shows instructions about what to do next on product.
## From COLDCARD PoV
- makes complex encrypted URL, which contains a nonce it wants, waits for that nonce back (or QR)
- it's either the nonce from the URL, or fail
- if the right nonce, then we know the server knows the decryption key, and we
are trusting it actually verify the 2FA token properly.
## Encryption - Simple ECDH
- CC picks a secp256k1 keypair, generates compressed pubkey
- multiplies that private key by server's known public key
- apply sha256(resulting coordinate) => the session key
- apply AES-256-CTR over URL contents (ascii text)
- prepend 33 bytes of pubkey, and then base64url encode all of it
- full url is: `https://coldcard.com/2fa?{base64 encoded binary}`
## Trust Issues
- 2FA enrol happens on the CC, which picks the shared secret and shows QR for mobile
app setup. Same TRNG process as picking a seed.
- Server knows the shared secret, but only during operation, and we won't store it [sorry,
gotta trust us on that, but no help to us to store it].
- Only we can run the server, because the private key is company-secret.
- MiTM and network snoopers get nothing because HTTPS is used and only your browser
can see the nonce, and only after you've given the right digits.
- Coinkite server could skip the 2FA checks and just give you the answer
you want to type into the COLDCARD. Again, you have to trust us on that.
## URL Format
https://coldcard.com/2fa?g={nonce}&ss={shared_secret}&nm={label_text}&q={is_q}
(the query string is then encrypted to the server's pubkey, so the args above
are what is inside the encrypted payload.)
- `nonce`: text string that is either 8 digits on Mk4, or 64 hex chars on Q
- `shared_secret`: 16 chars of Base32-encoded pre-shared secret
- `nm`: human readable label for the transaction/purpose
- `is_q`: flag indicating use of QR to provide nonce back to user
Server will accept plaintext arguments as above, but normally everything
after the question mark is encrypted.

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@ -3,12 +3,10 @@
#
# paper.py - generate paper wallets, based on random values (not linked to wallet)
#
import ujson
from ubinascii import hexlify as b2a_hex
from utils import imported
from public_constants import AF_CLASSIC, AF_P2WPKH
from actions import needs_microsd
from ux import ux_show_story, ux_dramatic_pause
from files import CardSlot, CardMissingError, needs_microsd
from files import CardSlot, CardMissingError
from actions import file_picker
from menu import MenuSystem, MenuItem
@ -53,8 +51,9 @@ class PaperWalletMaker:
self.is_segwit = False
async def pick_template(self, *a):
fn = await file_picker(suffix='.pdf', min_size=20000, taster=template_taster,
none_msg=no_templates_msg)
fn = await file_picker('Pick PDF template to use, or X for none.',
suffix='.pdf', min_size=20000,
taster=template_taster, none_msg=no_templates_msg)
self.template_fn = fn
self.update_menu()
@ -64,42 +63,44 @@ class PaperWalletMaker:
def set(idx, text):
self.is_segwit = bool(idx)
self.update_menu()
return int(self.is_segwit), ['Classic P2PKH', 'Segwit P2WPKH'], set
return int(self.is_segwit), ['Classic', 'Segwit/Bech32'], set
@staticmethod
def can_do_qr():
import version
return version.has_fatram
def update_menu(self):
# Reconstruct the menu contents based on our state.
self.my_menu.replace_items([
MenuItem("Don't make PDF" if not self.template_fn else 'Making PDF',
f=self.pick_template),
MenuItem('Classic P2PKH' if not self.is_segwit else 'Segwit P2WPKH',
chooser=self.addr_format_chooser),
f=self.pick_template, predicate=self.can_do_qr),
MenuItem('Classic Address' if not self.is_segwit else 'Segwit Address',
chooser=self.addr_format_chooser),
MenuItem('Use Dice', f=self.use_dice),
MenuItem('GENERATE WALLET', f=self.doit),
], keep_position=True)
async def doit(self, *a, have_key=None):
# make the wallet.
from glob import dis, VD
from main import dis
try:
import ngu
from msgsign import write_sig_file
from chains import current_chain
import tcc
from serializations import hash160
from stash import blank_object
if not have_key:
# get some random bytes
await ux_dramatic_pause("Picking key...", 2)
pair = ngu.secp256k1.keypair()
privkey = tcc.secp256k1.generate_secret()
else:
# caller must range check this already: 0 < privkey < order
# - actually libsecp256k1 will check it again anyway
pair = ngu.secp256k1.keypair(have_key)
privkey = have_key
# pull out binary versions (serialized) as we need
privkey = pair.privkey()
pubkey = pair.pubkey().to_bytes(False) # always compressed style
# calculate corresponding public key value
pubkey = tcc.secp256k1.publickey(privkey, True) # always compressed style
dis.fullscreen("Rendering...")
@ -107,66 +108,45 @@ class PaperWalletMaker:
digest = hash160(pubkey)
ch = current_chain()
if self.is_segwit:
addr = ngu.codecs.segwit_encode(ch.bech32_hrp, 0, digest)
addr = tcc.codecs.bech32_encode(ch.bech32_hrp, 0, digest)
else:
addr = ngu.codecs.b58_encode(ch.b58_addr + digest)
addr = tcc.codecs.b58_encode(ch.b58_addr + digest)
wif = ngu.codecs.b58_encode(ch.b58_privkey + privkey + b'\x01')
wif = tcc.codecs.b58_encode(ch.b58_privkey + privkey + b'\x01')
with imported('uqr') as uqr:
# make the QR's now, since it's slow
is_alnum = self.is_segwit
qr_addr = uqr.make(addr if not is_alnum else addr.upper(),
min_version=4, max_version=4,
encoding=(uqr.Mode_ALPHANUMERIC if is_alnum else 0))
if self.can_do_qr():
with imported('uqr') as uqr:
# make the QR's now, since it's slow
is_alnum = self.is_segwit
qr_addr = uqr.make(addr if not is_alnum else addr.upper(),
min_version=4, max_version=4,
encoding=(uqr.Mode_ALPHANUMERIC if is_alnum else 0))
qr_wif = uqr.make(wif, min_version=4, max_version=4, encoding=uqr.Mode_BYTE)
qr_wif = uqr.make(wif, min_version=4, max_version=4, encoding=uqr.Mode_BYTE)
else:
qr_addr = None
qr_wif = None
# Use address as filename. clearly will be unique, but perhaps a bit
# awkward to work with.
basename = addr
force_vdisk = False
if VD:
prompt = "Press (1) to save paper wallet file to SD Card"
escape = "1"
if VD is not None:
prompt += ", press (2) to save to VDisk"
escape += "2"
prompt += "."
ch = await ux_show_story(prompt, escape=escape)
if ch == "2":
force_vdisk = True
elif ch == '1':
force_vdisk = False
else:
return
dis.fullscreen("Saving...")
with CardSlot(force_vdisk=force_vdisk) as card:
with CardSlot() as card:
fname, nice_txt = card.pick_filename(basename +
('-note.txt' if self.template_fn else '.txt'))
sig_cont = []
with card.open(fname, 'wt+') as fp:
self.make_txt(fp, addr, wif, privkey, qr_addr, qr_wif)
fp.seek(0)
contents0 = fp.read()
h = ngu.hash.sha256s(contents0.encode())
sig_cont.append((h, fname))
with open(fname, 'wt') as fp:
self.make_txt(fp, addr, wif, privkey, qr_addr, qr_wif)
if self.template_fn:
fname, nice_pdf = card.pick_filename(basename + '.pdf')
with open(fname, 'wb+') as fp:
with open(fname, 'wb') as fp:
self.make_pdf(fp, addr, wif, qr_addr, qr_wif)
fp.seek(0)
contents1 = fp.read()
h = ngu.hash.sha256s(contents1)
sig_cont.append((h, fname))
else:
nice_pdf = ''
nice_sig = write_sig_file(sig_cont, pk=privkey, sig_name=basename,
addr_fmt=AF_P2WPKH if self.is_segwit else AF_CLASSIC)
# Half-hearted attempt to cleanup secrets-contaminated memory
# - better would be force user to reboot
# - and yet, we just output the WIF to SDCard anyway
@ -178,21 +158,16 @@ class PaperWalletMaker:
await needs_microsd()
return
except Exception as e:
from utils import problem_file_line
await ux_show_story('Failed to write!\n\n'+problem_file_line(e))
await ux_show_story('Failed to write!\n\n\n'+str(e))
return
story = "Done! Created file(s):\n\n%s" % nice_txt
if nice_pdf:
story += "\n\n%s" % nice_pdf
story += "\n\n%s" % nice_sig
await ux_show_story(story)
await ux_show_story('Done! Created file(s):\n\n%s\n\n%s' % (nice_txt, nice_pdf))
async def use_dice(self, *a):
# Use lots of (D6) dice rolls to create privkey entropy.
privkey = b''
with imported('seed') as seed:
count, privkey = await seed.add_dice_rolls(0, privkey, True, enforce=True)
count, privkey = await seed.add_dice_rolls(0, privkey, True)
if count == 0: return
if privkey >= SECP256K1_ORDER or privkey == bytes(32):
@ -204,7 +179,9 @@ class PaperWalletMaker:
def make_txt(self, fp, addr, wif, privkey, qr_addr=None, qr_wif=None):
# Generate the "simple" text file version, includes private key.
from ubinascii import hexlify as b2a_hex
from descriptor import append_checksum
import ujson
fp.write('Coldcard Generated Paper Wallet\n\n')
@ -228,7 +205,7 @@ class PaperWalletMaker:
w = qr.width()
for y in range(w):
fp.write(' ')
ln = ''.join('\u2588\u2588' if qr.get(x,y) else ' ' for x in range(w))
ln = ''.join('\u2588\u2588' if qr.get(x,y) else '' for x in range(w))
fp.write(ln)
fp.write('\n')
@ -285,8 +262,7 @@ class PaperWalletMaker:
async def make_paper_wallet(*a):
msg = background_msg.format(can_qr='\nIf you have a special PDF template file, '
'it can also make a pretty version of the same data.')
msg = background_msg.format(can_qr=('\nIf you have a special PDF template file, it can also make a pretty version of the same data.' if PaperWalletMaker.can_do_qr() else ''))
if await ux_show_story(msg) != 'y':
return
@ -296,6 +272,11 @@ async def make_paper_wallet(*a):
menu = MenuSystem([])
rv = PaperWalletMaker(menu)
# annoying?
# always have them pick the template, because that's mostly required
#if rv.can_do_qr():
# await rv.pick_template()
rv.update_menu()
return menu

2
external/README.md vendored
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
## Background on Submodules
This project uses many submodules, and to build the final products, you will
This project uses many submodules, and to build the final produts, you will
have to get all the submodules into place and build them in appropriate orders.
A good resource, from an unrelated project, is:

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@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
This link forest allows micropython's makefile to find the C-language modules
we are using today.

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@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
# AES-256 for CTR mode (only)
- from <https://github.com/Ko-/aes-armcortexm> under CC0-1.0
- ASM for ARM (only)
- very thin interface

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@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
#pragma once
#include <stdint.h>
typedef struct param {
uint8_t nonce[12];
uint8_t ctr[4];
uint8_t rk[15*16];
} param;
extern void AES_256_keyschedule(const uint8_t *key, uint8_t *);
extern void AES_256_encrypt_ctr(param const *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *, uint32_t);

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

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@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
// from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Ko-/aes-armcortexm/public/aes256ctr/aes_256_ctr.c
// taken Feb 25/2021
// REFERENCE ONLY -- not used.
#include "../common/stm32wrapper.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
typedef struct param {
uint32_t ctr;
uint8_t nonce[12];
uint8_t rk[15*16];
} param;
extern void AES_256_keyschedule(const uint8_t *, uint8_t *);
extern void AES_256_encrypt_ctr(param const *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *, uint32_t);
#define AES_256_decrypt_ctr AES_256_encrypt_ctr
int main(void)
{
clock_setup();
gpio_setup();
usart_setup(115200);
// plainly reading from CYCCNT is more efficient than using the
// dwt_read_cycle_counter() interface offered by libopencm3,
// as this adds extra overhead because of the function call
SCS_DEMCR |= SCS_DEMCR_TRCENA;
DWT_CYCCNT = 0;
DWT_CTRL |= DWT_CTRL_CYCCNTENA;
const uint32_t LEN = 256*16;
const uint32_t LEN_ROUNDED = ((LEN+15)/16)*16;
const uint8_t nonce[12] = {1,2,3,1,2,4,1,2,5,1,2,6};
const uint8_t key[32] = {4,5,6,7,4,5,6,8,4,5,6,9,4,5,6,10,4,5,6,11,4,5,6,12,4,5,6,13,4,5,6,14};
uint8_t in[LEN];
uint8_t out[LEN_ROUNDED];
unsigned int i;
for(i=0;i<LEN;++i)
in[i] = i%256;
char buffer[36];
param p;
p.ctr = 0;
memcpy(p.nonce, nonce, 12);
memcpy(p.rk, key, 32);
unsigned int oldcount = DWT_CYCCNT;
AES_256_keyschedule(key, p.rk+32);
unsigned int cyclecount = DWT_CYCCNT-oldcount;
/*
// Print all round keys
unsigned int j;
for(i=0;i<15*4;++i) {
sprintf(buffer, "rk[%2d]: ", i);
for(j=0;j<4;++j)
sprintf(buffer+2*j+8, "%02x", p.rk[i*4+j]);
send_USART_str(buffer);
}
*/
sprintf(buffer, "cyc: %d", cyclecount);
send_USART_str(buffer);
oldcount = DWT_CYCCNT;
AES_256_encrypt_ctr(&p, in, out, LEN);
cyclecount = DWT_CYCCNT-oldcount;
sprintf(buffer, "cyc: %d", cyclecount);
send_USART_str(buffer);
/*
// Print ciphertext
sprintf(buffer, "out: ");
send_USART_str(buffer);
for(i=0;i<LEN;++i) {
sprintf(buffer+((2*i)%32), "%02x", out[i]);
if(i%16 == 15)
send_USART_str(buffer);
}
if(LEN%16 > 0)
send_USART_str(buffer);
*/
/*
// Perform decryption
p.ctr = 0;
AES_256_decrypt_ctr(&p, out, in, LEN);
// Print plaintext
sprintf(buffer, "in: ");
send_USART_str(buffer);
for(i=0;i<LEN;++i) {
sprintf(buffer+((2*i)%32), "%02x", in[i]);
if(i%16 == 15)
send_USART_str(buffer);
}
if(LEN%16 > 0)
send_USART_str(buffer);
*/
while (1);
return 0;
}

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@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
#
# Pure ASM version of AES-256 for CTR mode only
#
ifdef BOARD
SRC_USERMOD += $(USERMOD_DIR)/aes_256_ctr.o
SRC_USERMOD += $(USERMOD_DIR)/module.c
endif

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@ -1,187 +0,0 @@
//
// module top-level
//
#include "py/obj.h"
#include "py/runtime.h"
#include "py/builtin.h"
#include "aes_256_ctr.h"
#if MICROPY_ENABLE_DYNRUNTIME
#error "Static Only"
#endif
// AES block size
#define BLKSIZE 16
typedef struct {
mp_obj_base_t base;
uint8_t runt[BLKSIZE];
int runt_len;
param p;
} mp_obj_AES256CTR_t;
STATIC const mp_obj_type_t s_AES256CTR_type;
STATIC mp_obj_t s_AES256CTR_make_new(const mp_obj_type_t *type, size_t n_args, size_t n_kw, const mp_obj_t *args) {
// args: key, nonce
mp_arg_check_num(n_args, n_kw, 1, 2, false);
mp_buffer_info_t key;
mp_get_buffer_raise(args[0], &key, MP_BUFFER_READ);
if(key.len != 32) {
// only AES-256 here
mp_raise_ValueError(NULL);
}
mp_obj_AES256CTR_t *o = m_new_obj_with_finaliser(mp_obj_AES256CTR_t);
o->base.type = type;
// state setup, and key schedule
memset(&o->p, 0, sizeof(param));
o->runt_len = 0;
if(n_args == 2) {
mp_buffer_info_t n_in;
mp_get_buffer_raise(args[1], &n_in, MP_BUFFER_READ);
if(n_in.len > 16) {
mp_raise_ValueError(NULL);
}
// can be 12 bytes of nonce + 4 bytes ctr, or just all 16 bytes of state
memcpy(o->p.nonce, n_in.buf, n_in.len);
}
// key setup
memcpy(o->p.rk, key.buf, 32);
AES_256_keyschedule(key.buf, o->p.rk+32);
return o;
}
static bool inline
is_unaligned(const void *p)
{
return !!(((uint32_t)p) & 0x3);
}
STATIC mp_obj_t s_AES256CTR_cipher(mp_obj_t self_in, mp_obj_t buf_in)
{
mp_obj_AES256CTR_t *self = MP_OBJ_TO_PTR(self_in);
mp_buffer_info_t buf;
mp_get_buffer_raise(buf_in, &buf, MP_BUFFER_READ);
int len = buf.len, in_len = buf.len;
const uint8_t *inp = buf.buf;
uint8_t *rv = m_malloc(in_len);
uint8_t *outp = rv;
if(self->runt_len) {
// we've already encrypted (w/ zero bytes) for this part
uint8_t *ch = &self->runt[BLKSIZE - self->runt_len];
while(self->runt_len && in_len) {
*(outp++) = *(inp++) ^ *(ch++);
self->runt_len --;
in_len --;
}
}
bool nogood = (is_unaligned(inp) || is_unaligned(outp));
while(in_len) {
if(in_len >= BLKSIZE) {
if(nogood) {
uint8_t blk[BLKSIZE];
// align data so ASM can work
memcpy(blk, inp, BLKSIZE);
AES_256_encrypt_ctr(&self->p, blk, blk, BLKSIZE);
memcpy(outp, blk, BLKSIZE);
} else {
// rare? but faster case
AES_256_encrypt_ctr(&self->p, inp, outp, BLKSIZE);
}
outp += BLKSIZE;
inp += BLKSIZE;
in_len -= BLKSIZE;
} else {
uint8_t blk[BLKSIZE] = {};
memcpy(blk, inp, in_len);
AES_256_encrypt_ctr(&self->p, blk, self->runt, BLKSIZE);
memcpy(outp, self->runt, in_len);
self->runt_len = BLKSIZE - in_len;
in_len = 0;
}
// inc counter (big endian, assumes nonce != ~0)
uint8_t *ctr = &self->p.ctr[3];
while(1) {
ctr[0] += 1;
if(ctr[0]) break;
ctr--;
}
}
return mp_obj_new_bytearray_by_ref(len, rv);
}
STATIC MP_DEFINE_CONST_FUN_OBJ_2(s_AES256CTR_cipher_obj, s_AES256CTR_cipher);
STATIC mp_obj_t s_AES256CTR_copy(mp_obj_t self_in) {
mp_obj_AES256CTR_t *self = MP_OBJ_TO_PTR(self_in);
mp_obj_AES256CTR_t *rv = m_new_obj_with_finaliser(mp_obj_AES256CTR_t);
*rv = *self;
rv->base.type = &s_AES256CTR_type;
return rv;
}
STATIC MP_DEFINE_CONST_FUN_OBJ_1(s_AES256CTR_copy_obj, s_AES256CTR_copy);
STATIC mp_obj_t s_AES256CTR_blank(mp_obj_t self_in) {
mp_obj_AES256CTR_t *self = MP_OBJ_TO_PTR(self_in);
// cf_aes_finish is just this anyway
memset(self, 0, sizeof(mp_obj_AES256CTR_t));
self->base.type = &s_AES256CTR_type;
return self_in;
}
STATIC MP_DEFINE_CONST_FUN_OBJ_1(s_AES256CTR_blank_obj, s_AES256CTR_blank);
STATIC const mp_rom_map_elem_t s_AES256CTR_locals_dict_table[] = {
{ MP_ROM_QSTR(MP_QSTR_cipher), MP_ROM_PTR(&s_AES256CTR_cipher_obj) },
{ MP_ROM_QSTR(MP_QSTR_blank), MP_ROM_PTR(&s_AES256CTR_blank_obj) },
{ MP_ROM_QSTR(MP_QSTR_blank), MP_ROM_PTR(&s_AES256CTR_blank_obj) },
{ MP_ROM_QSTR(MP_QSTR_copy), MP_ROM_PTR(&s_AES256CTR_copy_obj) },
{ MP_ROM_QSTR(MP_QSTR___del__), MP_ROM_PTR(&s_AES256CTR_blank_obj) },
};
STATIC MP_DEFINE_CONST_DICT(s_AES256CTR_locals_dict, s_AES256CTR_locals_dict_table);
STATIC const mp_obj_type_t s_AES256CTR_type = {
{ &mp_type_type },
.name = MP_QSTR_AES256CTR,
.make_new = s_AES256CTR_make_new,
.locals_dict = (void *)&s_AES256CTR_locals_dict,
};
STATIC const mp_rom_map_elem_t mp_module_aes256ctr_globals_table[] = {
{ MP_ROM_QSTR(MP_QSTR___name__), MP_ROM_QSTR(MP_QSTR_aes256ctr) },
{ MP_ROM_QSTR(MP_QSTR_new), MP_ROM_PTR(&s_AES256CTR_type) },
};
STATIC MP_DEFINE_CONST_DICT(mp_module_aes256ctr_globals, mp_module_aes256ctr_globals_table);
const mp_obj_module_t mp_module_aes256ctr = {
.base = { &mp_type_module },
.globals = (mp_obj_dict_t *)&mp_module_aes256ctr_globals,
};
MP_REGISTER_MODULE(MP_QSTR_aes256ctr, mp_module_aes256ctr, 1);

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@ -1 +0,0 @@
../libngu/ngu

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@ -1 +0,0 @@
../mpy-qr

@ -1 +1 @@
Subproject commit 3d1dfa858beb58b8dac37d8c66d7aed2909812f2
Subproject commit f3033b9dce8619c3ad89bdd840f5c91156d9598c

1
external/crypto vendored Submodule

@ -0,0 +1 @@
Subproject commit f83020c73dbb3d033b344345c99792d430d644c6

1
external/libngu vendored

@ -1 +0,0 @@
Subproject commit 537519a829259622ea6b0334fbafd6cae852852f

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Subproject commit 4107246f8a080807b62c3b4838e71e812ea68b6f
Subproject commit db4e297ea1f40d2105cea1e2592e46fbda918dbc

1
external/modcryptocurrency vendored Submodule

@ -0,0 +1 @@
Subproject commit aba6ba441b0d51b255e680e1988a4d240155f849

2
external/mpy-qr vendored

@ -1 +1 @@
Subproject commit 11347d83f4eb325b10676a4eb8e17deccfe0df44
Subproject commit 198042652fa5720efeed09d20aee436ddbf35ece

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@ -1,16 +1,11 @@
# (c) Copyright 2018 by Coinkite Inc. This file is covered by license found in COPYING-CC.
all: graphics_mk4.py graphics_q1.py
all: graphics.py
MK4_SOURCES = $(wildcard mono/*.txt) $(wildcard mono/*.png)
Q1_SOURCES = colour/*.???
SOURCES = $(wildcard *.txt) $(wildcard *.png)
graphics_mk4.py: Makefile $(MK4_SOURCES) build.py
./build.py graphics_mk4.py $(MK4_SOURCES)
graphics_q1.py: Makefile $(Q1_SOURCES) compress.py
./compress.py graphics_q1.py $(Q1_SOURCES)
graphics.py: Makefile $(SOURCES) build.py
./build.py $(SOURCES)
up: all
(cd ../shared; make up)

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@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
#
# (c) Copyright 2018 by Coinkite Inc. This file is covered by license found in COPYING-CC.
# (c) Copyright 2018 by Coinkite Inc. This file is part of Coldcard <coldcardwallet.com>
# and is covered by GPLv3 license found in COPYING.
#
import os, sys, pdb
from PIL import Image, ImageOps
@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ def read_text(fname):
def read_img(fn):
img = Image.open(fn)
w,h = img.size
assert 1 <= w < 128, (w, fn)
assert 1 <= w < 128, w
img = img.convert('L')
# fix colour issues: assume minority colour is white (1)
@ -65,8 +66,6 @@ def crunch(n):
def doit(outfname, fnames):
assert outfname.endswith('.py')
assert outfname != 'build.py'
assert fnames, "need some files"
fp = open(outfname, 'wt')
@ -88,7 +87,7 @@ class Graphics:
assert img.mode == '1'
#img.show()
varname = fn.split('/')[-1].split('.')[0].replace('-', '_')
varname = fn.split('.')[0].replace('-', '_')
w,h = img.size
raw = img.tobytes()
@ -109,4 +108,4 @@ class Graphics:
fp.write("\n# EOF\n")
if 1:
doit(sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2:])
doit('graphics.py', sys.argv[1:])

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#!/usr/bin/env python3
#
# (c) Copyright 2023 by Coinkite Inc. This file is covered by license found in COPYING-CC.
#
# Read in PNG (or even JPG) and output heavily compressed RGB565 data suited to Q1's LCD panel.
#
# - also renders status bar icons/indicators
#
import os, sys, pdb
from PIL import Image, ImageOps, ImageFont, ImageDraw
import zlib
from struct import pack
WBITS = -10
FONT_PATH = './fonts/'
def read_img(fn):
img = Image.open(fn)
w,h = img.size
assert 1 <= w <= 320, f'too wide; {w}'
assert 1 <= h <= 240, f'too tall: {h}'
img = img.convert('RGB')
# maybe: quantitize to a reasonable num colours, so compression
# can work better?
return img
def compress(n, wbits=WBITS):
# NOTE: neg wbits implies no zlib header, and receiver may need to know it?
z = zlib.compressobj(wbits=wbits, level=zlib.Z_BEST_COMPRESSION)
rv = z.compress(n)
rv += z.flush(zlib.Z_FINISH)
return rv
def crunch(n):
# try them all... not finding any difference tho.
a = [(wb,compress(n, wb)) for wb in range(-9, -15, -1)]
a.sort(key=lambda i: (-len(i[1]), -i[0]))
print("Wbit values:")
print('\n'.join("%3d => %d" % (wb,len(d)) for wb,d in a))
return a[0]
# LCD Display wants RGB565 values, but big endian, so green gets split weird.
def swizzle(r,g,b):
# from 0-255 per component => two bytes
b = (b >> 3)
g = (g >> 3) # should be >> 2 for 6 bits; but looks trash?
r = (r >> 3)
return pack('>H', ((r<<11) | (g<<6) | b))
# these values tested on real hardware
assert swizzle(255, 0, 0) == b'\xf8\x00' # red
##assert swizzle(0, 255, 0) == b'\xc0\x0f' # green (6 bits)
assert swizzle(0, 255, 0) == b'\x07\xc0' # green (5 bits)
assert swizzle(0, 0, 255) == b'\x00\x1f' # blue
def into_bgr565(img):
# get the raw bytes needed for this specific display
rv = bytearray()
for y in range(img.height):
for x in range(img.width):
px = img.getpixel((x, y))
assert len(px) == 3
r,g,b = px
rv.extend(swizzle(r,g,b))
return rv
def make_icons():
# return list of (varname, img) for each image
# - see shared/lcd_display.py TOP_MARGIN for this
ICON_SIZE = 14
MAX_HEIGHT = 14
# PROBLEM: this file costs money... altho free version looks okay too
try:
awesome = ImageFont.truetype(FONT_PATH + 'Font Awesome 6 Sharp-Regular-400.otf', ICON_SIZE)
except:
raise
# use a bitmap font for best readability
sm_font = ImageFont.load('ter-powerline-x12b.pil')
targets = [
#( 'brand', True, 'Q', dict(col='#ffb000') ),
( 'shift', True, 'SHIFT', {} ),
( 'symbol', True, 'SYM', {} ),
( 'caps', True, 'CAPS', {} ),
( 'bip39', True, 'PASSPHRASE', dict(col_1='yellow') ),
( 'tmp', True, 'TMP.SEED', dict(col_0='black', col_1='red') ),
( 'devmode', True, 'DEV', dict(col='#66E6FF') ),
( 'edge', True, 'EDGE', dict(col='#66E6FF') ),
( 'bat_0', False, '\uf244', dict(col='red', y=-1, pad=1)),
( 'bat_1', False, '\uf243', dict(col='yellow', y=-1, pad=1)),
( 'bat_2', False, '\uf242', dict(col='amber', y=-1, pad=1)),
( 'bat_3', False, '\uf240', dict(col='amber', y=-1, pad=1)),
( 'plugged', False, '\uf1e6', dict(col='amber', x=3, w=16, y=-2)), # to match width of bat_*
#( 'locked', False, '\uf023', dict(col='green')),
#( 'unlocked', False, '\uf3c1', dict(col='green')), # why tho?
]
targets += [ ( 'ch_'+c, True, c.upper(), dict(col='white') ) for c in
'0123456789abcdef']
samples = Image.new('RGB', (320*3, ICON_SIZE+1))
s_x = 5
for basename, is_text, body, opts in targets:
for state in [0, 1]:
col = opts.get('col', '#fff' if state else '#444')
vn = f'{basename}_{state}'
if 'col' in opts:
if state == 0: continue
vn = basename
if state == 0 and 'col_0' in opts:
col = opts['col_0']
if state == 1 and 'col_1' in opts:
col = opts['col_1']
img = Image.new('RGB', (100,100))
d = ImageDraw.Draw(img)
f = sm_font if is_text else awesome
x, y = (0, 1 if is_text else 0)
y += opts.get('y', 0)
x += opts.get('x', 0)
tl = (x, y)
_,_, w,h = d.textbbox(tl, body, font=f)
w = opts.get('w', w)
if h > MAX_HEIGHT:
h = MAX_HEIGHT
print(f'"{vn}" too tall, cropped')
elif opts.get('pad'):
h = MAX_HEIGHT
if col == 'amber':
# brand colour
col = '#ffb000'
d.text(tl, body, font=f, fill=col)
rv = img.crop( (0, 0, w,h) )
samples.paste(rv, (s_x, 0))
s_x += w + 10
yield (vn, rv)
samples = samples.crop( (0,0, s_x, samples.height ))
samples.save('icon-samples.png')
def doit(outfname, fnames):
assert outfname.endswith('.py')
assert outfname != 'compress.py'
assert fnames, "need some files"
fp = open(outfname, 'wt')
fp.write("""\
# autogenerated; don't edit
#
# BGR565 pixel data
#
class Graphics:
# (w,h, data)
""")
fnames += make_icons()
for fn in fnames:
if isinstance(fn, str):
img = read_img(fn)
varname = fn.split('/')[-1].split('.')[0].replace('-', '_')
else:
varname, img = fn
assert img.mode == 'RGB'
w,h = img.size
raw = into_bgr565(img)
comp = compress(raw)
#crunch(raw)
print(" %s = (%d, %d,\n %r\n )\n" % (varname, w, h, comp), file=fp)
print("done: '%s' (%d x %d) => %d raw => %d compressed bytes" % (
varname, w, h, len(raw), len(comp)))
fp.write("\n# EOF\n")
if 1:
doit(sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2:])
# EOF

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@ -1,7 +1,4 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
#
# Generate some data for hsm_ux.py animation
#
from math import sin, pi
from collections import Counter

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@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
Font Awesome 6*.otf
iosevka-*.ttf
!iosevka-heavy.ttf

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@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
# Fonts for Q1
This directory may contain font files from Font Awesome.
We cannot re-distribute the OTF files themselves due to their license.
However, once we render and build the compressed graphics file that we need,
the font is not required anymore.
Iosveka is open and can be re-distributed here.

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@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
Font Awesome Pro License
------------------------
Font Awesome Pro is commercial software that requires a paid license. Full
Font Awesome Pro license: https://fontawesome.com/license.
# Commercial License
The Font Awesome Pro commercial license allows you to pay for FA Pro once, own
it, and use it just about everywhere you'd like.
# Attribution
Attribution is not required by the Font Awesome Pro commercial license.
# Brand Icons
All brand icons are trademarks of their respective owners. The use of these
trademarks does not indicate endorsement of the trademark holder by Font
Awesome, nor vice versa. **Please do not use brand logos for any purpose except
to represent the company, product, or service to which they refer.**

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@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
# autogenerated; don't edit
#
class Graphics:
# (w,h, w_bytes, wbits, data)
arrow_down = (7, 11, 1, 0, b'\x10\x10\x10\x10\x10\x10\x10\xfe|8\x10')
arrow_up = (7, 11, 1, 0, b'\x108|\xfe\x10\x10\x10\x10\x10\x10\x10')
box = (13, 21, 2, 0, b'?\xe0@\x10\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08@\x10?\xe0')
scroll = (3, 61, 1, 0, b'@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@@\xe0@')
selected = (15, 12, 2, 0, b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x06\x00\x0c\x00\x18\x0000`\x18\xc0\r\x80\x07\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00')
sm_box = (11, 17, 2, 0, b'\xe4\xe0\x80 \x80 \x80 \x00\x00\x00\x00\x80 \x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x80 \x00\x00\x00\x00\x80 \x80 \x80 \xe4\xe0')
space = (9, 2, 2, 0, b'\x80\x80\xff\x80')
spin = (13, 36, 2, 0, b'\x02\x00\x07\x00\x0f\x80\x1f\xc0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xf2x\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x80\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x80\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x80\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\xf2x\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x1f\xc0\x0f\x80\x07\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00')
wedge = (6, 11, 1, 0, b'\x00\x00\xc0\xe0p8\x1c8p\xe0\xc0')
xbox = (13, 21, 2, 0, b'?\xe0b0\x88\x88\xa2(\x88\x88\xa2(\x88\x88\xa2(\x88\x88\xa2(\x88\x88\xa2(\x88\x88\xa2(\x88\x88\xa2(\x88\x88\xa2(\x88\x88b0?\xe0')
# EOF

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@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
# autogenerated; don't edit
#
class Graphics:
# (w,h, w_bytes, wbits, data)
arrow_down = (7, 11, 1, 0, b'\x10\x10\x10\x10\x10\x10\x10\xfe|8\x10')
arrow_up = (7, 11, 1, 0, b'\x108|\xfe\x10\x10\x10\x10\x10\x10\x10')
box = (13, 21, 2, 0, b'?\xe0@\x10\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08@\x10?\xe0')
mk4_nfc_1 = (126, 49, 16, 0, b'\x00\x7f\xff\xff\xff\xfc\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xcf\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xcf\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xcf\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xcf\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e\x03\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x80\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e\x07\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xe0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e\x1f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00 G\xe3\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00 G\xe3\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x000D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x000D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00(D\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00(D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00$G\xe4\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00$G\xe4\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00"D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00"D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00 \xc4\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00 \xc4\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00 D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00 D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00 D\x03\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00 D\x03\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e?\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xe0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x1f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xc0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x0f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x7f\xff\xff\xff\xfc\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00?\xff\xff\xff\xf8\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00')
mk4_nfc_2 = (118, 49, 15, 0, b'\x00\x7f\xff\xff\xff\xfc\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xcf\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xcf\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xcf\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xcf\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x03\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x80\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x07\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xe0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x1f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x00 G\xe3\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x00 G\xe3\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x000D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x000D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00(D\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00(D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00$G\xe4\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00$G\xe4\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x00"D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x00"D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x00 \xc4\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x00 \xc4\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00 D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00 D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00 D\x03\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00 D\x03\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0?\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xe0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\x1f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xc0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\x0f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x7f\xff\xff\xff\xfc\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00?\xff\xff\xff\xf8\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00')
mk4_nfc_3 = (110, 49, 14, 0, b'\x00\x7f\xff\xff\xff\xfc\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xcf\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xcf\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xcf\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xcf\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xf0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\x03\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x80\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\x07\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xe0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\x1f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x00 G\xe3\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x00 G\xe3\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x000D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x000D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00(D\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00(D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00$G\xe4\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00$G\xe4\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x00"D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x00"D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x00 \xc4\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x00 \xc4\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00 D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00 D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00 D\x03\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00 D\x03\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00?\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xe0\x00\xff\xff\xff\x1f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xc0\x00\xff\xff\xff\x0f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x7f\xff\xff\xc0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00?\xff\xff\xff\xf8\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00')
mk4_nfc_4 = (102, 49, 13, 0, b'\x00\x7f\xff\xff\xff\xfc\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xcf\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xcf\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xcf\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xcf\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x03\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xf0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x0e\x03\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x80\x00\xe0\x0e\x07\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xe0\x00\xe0\x0e\x1f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00 G\xe3\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00 G\xe3\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e0\x000D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e0\x000D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00(D\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00(D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00$G\xe4\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00$G\xe4\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00"D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00"D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00 \xc4\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00 \xc4\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00 D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00 D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00 D\x03\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00 D\x03\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e?\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xe0\x00\xff\xff\x9f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xc0\x00\xff\xff\x8f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x7f\xff\xc0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00?\xff\xff\xff\xf8\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00')
mk5_nfc_1 = (126, 49, 16, 0, b'\x00\x7f\xff\xff\xff\xfc\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xf0\xf0\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e\x03\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x80\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e\x07\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xe0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e\x1f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00 G\xe3\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00 G\xe3\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x000D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x000D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00(D\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00(D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00$G\xe4\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00$G\xe4\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00"D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00"D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00 \xc4\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00 \xc4\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00 D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00 D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00 D\x03\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe0\x00 D\x03\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x0e?\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xe0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x1f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xc0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x0f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x7f\xff\xff\xff\xfc\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00?\xff\xff\xff\xf8\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00')
mk5_nfc_2 = (118, 49, 15, 0, b'\x00\x7f\xff\xff\xff\xfc\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xf0\xf0\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x03\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x80\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x07\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xe0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0\x1f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x00 G\xe3\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x00 G\xe3\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x000D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x000D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00(D\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00(D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00$G\xe4\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00$G\xe4\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x00"D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x00"D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x00 \xc4\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x00 \xc4\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00 D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00 D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00 D\x03\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff0\x00 D\x03\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\xe0?\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xe0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\x1f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xc0\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\x0f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x7f\xff\xff\xff\xfc\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00?\xff\xff\xff\xf8\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00')
mk5_nfc_3 = (110, 49, 14, 0, b'\x00\x7f\xff\xff\xff\xfc\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xf0\xf0\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xf0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\x03\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x80\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\x07\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xe0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00\x1f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x00 G\xe3\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x00 G\xe3\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x000D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x000D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00(D\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00(D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00$G\xe4\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00$G\xe4\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x00"D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x00"D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x00 \xc4\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x00 \xc4\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00 D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00 D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00 D\x03\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xff0\x00 D\x03\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x000\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e\x00?\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xe0\x00\xff\xff\xff\x1f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xc0\x00\xff\xff\xff\x0f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x7f\xff\xff\xc0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00?\xff\xff\xff\xf8\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00')
mk5_nfc_4 = (102, 49, 13, 0, b'\x00\x7f\xff\xff\xff\xfc\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xf0\xf0\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xf0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0\x0e\x03\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x80\x00\xe0\x0e\x07\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xe0\x00\xe0\x0e\x1f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00 G\xe3\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00 G\xe3\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e0\x000D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e0\x000D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00(D\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00(D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00$G\xe4\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00$G\xe4\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00"D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00"D\x04\x00\x00\x00xp\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00 \xc4\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00 \xc4\x04\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00 D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00 D\x04\x10\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00 D\x03\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xff\xff\xb0\x00 D\x03\xe0\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xf0\x00\xe0\x0e?\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xe0\x00\xff\xff\x9f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xc0\x00\xff\xff\x8f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x7f\xff\xc0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00?\xff\xff\xff\xf8\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00')
scroll = (3, 61, 1, 0, b'@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@\x00\x00@@\xe0@')
selected = (9, 12, 2, 0, b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x80\x01\x80\x01\x00\x03\x00\x82\x00\xc6\x00d\x00<\x00\x18\x00\x00\x00')
sm_box = (11, 17, 2, 0, b'\xe4\xe0\x80 \x80 \x80 \x00\x00\x00\x00\x80 \x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x80 \x00\x00\x00\x00\x80 \x80 \x80 \xe4\xe0')
space = (9, 2, 2, 0, b'\x80\x80\xff\x80')
spin = (13, 36, 2, 0, b'\x02\x00\x07\x00\x0f\x80\x1f\xc0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xf2x\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x80\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x80\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x80\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x80\x08\x80\x08\x80\x08\xf2x\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x1f\xc0\x0f\x80\x07\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00')
wedge = (6, 11, 1, 0, b'\x00\x00\xc0\xe0p8\x1c8p\xe0\xc0')
xbox = (13, 21, 2, 0, b'?\xe0b0\x88\x88\xa2(\x88\x88\xa2(\x88\x88\xa2(\x88\x88\xa2(\x88\x88\xa2(\x88\x88\xa2(\x88\x88\xa2(\x88\x88\xa2(\x88\x88b0?\xe0')
# EOF

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xxx xxx yy yyyyyyyyyyy
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x

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