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Peter D. Gray 2023-02-08 11:12:47 -05:00
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docs/microsd-2fa.md
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@ -71,11 +71,26 @@ In Delta Mode, the usual card policy is in effect. However, if you
are relying on this 2FA feature to wipe the seed in a case of duress,
there doesn't seem to be any need for Delta Mode.
## Duress Defenses
We recommend simply keeping no card in your Coldcard once activating
this feature. Your attacker, or yourself under duress, will login
normally and trigger this defense without you taking any explicit
action.
If you were being forced to prepare a PSBT under duress, you can
choose which SD card to use (so pick a normal one, which isn't
enrolled) and you may also have a chance to clear your card of the
special file. Either way would be an opportunity to ensure the
automatic wipe occurs, even as you comply as provide the PIN code.
If your hands are on the Coldcard during login, you can eject the
card as well.
automatic wipe occurs, even as you comply and provide the PIN code.
Your enrolled SD cards can also be stored at another location away
from your Coldcard. This could be a bank safety deposit box, since
it contains no sensitive data.
If you are closely surveilled when logging and using your Coldcard,
the PIN code might already be known to your attacker. However, there
is no indication on the screen during a normal (successful) login
that this feature is in effect, so they would not know if the SD
card was inserted by chance or necessity.